Opinion
2110002285
11-27-2023
STATE OF DELAWARE v. KALVIN BENJAMIN, Defendant.
Jenna R. Milecki, Deputy Attorney General Darryl J. Rago, Esquire
Submitted: August 29 2023
Upon Consideration of State's Motion to Declare Defendant a Habitual Offender DENIED
Jenna R. Milecki, Deputy Attorney General
Darryl J. Rago, Esquire
ORDER
Charles E. Butler, Resident Judge
The Court has reviewed the pleadings in this matter and finds the State's offering insufficient to convince the Court beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant meets the statutory and decisional criteria for imposition of the Habitual Offender law. The reasoning is as follows:
1. Defendant was convicted at trial on two counts: Stalking and Strangulation. In the State's view, these convictions render the defendant susceptible to sentencing under the Habitual Offender Law, 11 Del. C. §4214. Both sides agree that the predicates for sentencing under that law require the commission of a prior felony, sentencing for the felony, followed by commission and sentencing for a second felony, followed by commission of another felony and so on.
E.g., Coble v. State, 2012 WL 1952293, at *1 (Del. May 30, 2012); Hall v. State, 473 A.2d 352, 356-357 (Del. 1984).
2. The point is, for our purposes, that the key indicators of availability of that statute are the date of commission of the offense and the date of sentencing for the offense. Each must follow seriatim. Moreover, the evidence that the defendant qualifies for this treatment must be shown "beyond a reasonable doubt."
Hall v. State, 788 A.2d 118, 128-129 (Del. 2001); see McNeill v. State, 2011 WL 4478122, at *2 (Del. Sept. 27, 2011).
3. Here, the State has shown the instant conviction, easily enough. And it has shown that Defendant was convicted in Delaware on a charge of Assault First Degree (and related offenses) in January, 2016 for an offense that occurred on March 31, 2015. His sentencing date on that offense was June 10, 2016. Since the offense date for the instant offense was August 28, 2021, the State has met the statutory criteria for showing at least one prior qualifying felony conviction.
4. Problems develop, however, in its evidence of the remaining convictions. Under section 4214(c) of Title 11 - the rather arcane code provision under which they seek such sentencing, the Defendant must have at least 3 prior qualifying offenses. One such offense must be a Title 11 "violent felony" under 11 Del. C. 4201(c), of which Assault First Degree is one.
5. As to the remaining 2 prior felony offenses required, the State relies on a total of 4 records from the State of New York. These records are called a "certificate of disposition." They list 4 separate "incident dates" and 4 separate "conviction dates." Each are separated by a period of time. But none of the certificates list a "sentencing date." The State would have the Court interpret or infer from the certifications that each offense was preceded by a sentence for the previous offense.
6. The one piece of evidence the State can point to that suggests this is so is that in a box called "Sentence Highlights" there are comments that a fine/surcharge is due to be paid by a certain date. The State urges that this comment reflects the fact that a sentence was imposed on or around that date.
7. These are not certified copies of docket sheets of New York convictions. They are some sort of an abstract, but the abstract does not include the sentencing date. Given the stakes involved and the State's burden of proving the prior offense dates and sentencing dates, the Court does not find that the State has met its burden of proving the predicates necessary to qualify the Defendant for Habitual Offender Sentencing.
The State's motion for sentencing under 11 Del. C. 4214 is DENIED.
Sentencing will proceed upon notice to the parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.