Because implied bias is determined on a case-by-case basis in the absence of a statute defining it, categories of judicially determined implied bias do not always "match" the categories set forth in section 16-10-103. Compare State v. Benedict, 323 Conn. 654, 148 A.3d 1044 (Conn. 2015) (refusing to imply bias to a compensated police officer), with § 16-10-103(1)(k) (finding compensated employee of public law enforcement agency impliedly biased). However, sometimes they do.
Unlike those jurisdictions without a comparable statute, we therefore do not undertake a case-by-case analysis to see whether the implied bias of a juror necessitates granting a challenge for cause. Cf. State v. Benedict , 323 Conn. 654, 148 A.3d 1044, 1051 (2016) (in the absence of a statute or common-law rule that an impliedly biased juror must be excused, the "circumstances of [the] particular case" determine whether the juror should be excused because bias is likely). Rather, jurors who fall under section 16-10-103(1)(k) are conclusively presumed to be biased as a matter of law.
A party is one by or against whom a lawsuit is brought. State v. Barfell , 2010 WI App 61, ¶ 8 n.4, 324 Wis. 2d 374, 782 N.W.2d 437. Under this definition, police officers and police departments—who do not bring criminal lawsuits—are not parties to such actions. Czajkowski v. City of Chicago , 810 F. Supp. 1428, 1431, 1433 (N.D. Ill. 1993) ; State v. Benedict , 148 A.3d 1044, 1051 (Conn. 2016) ; Gentile v. Bauder , 718 So.2d 781, 783 (Fla. 1998).
Id. Likewise, in State v. Benedict, 323 Conn. 654, 148 A.3d 1044 (2016), the defendant appealed the Appellate Court’s judgment, which concluded that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s principal challenge. Id., 656.