State v. Bencivenga

13 Citing cases

  1. H4IT Props. v. Chelan Cnty.

    No. 39772-6-III (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2024)

    See In re Guardianship of Mesler, 21 Wn.App. 2d 682, 718, 507 P.3d 864 (2022) ("'[T]he finder of fact is the sole and exclusive judge of the evidence, the weight to be given thereto, and the credibility of witnesses.'" (quoting State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wn.2d 703, 709, 974 P.2d 832 (1999)).

  2. Graham v. Silbaugh

    No. 37827-6-III (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2021)

    State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wn.2d 703, 709, 974 P.2d 832 (1999) (citing State v. Snider, 70 Wn.2d 326, 327, 422 P.2d 816 (1967)). The Court of Appeals is not a trial court and we do not provide a second opportunity to argue and decide disputed facts.

  3. State v. Stewart

    457 P.3d 1213 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020)   Cited 22 times

    In the time period between Green II and Homan (and even after Homan ), when reviewing whether a conviction is supported by a legally sufficient quantum of evidence, our Supreme Court has applied only the federal constitutional standard set forth in Jackson. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 188 Wash.2d 742, 750-51, 399 P.3d 507 (2017) ; State v. Condon, 182 Wash.2d 307, 314, 343 P.3d 357 (2015) ; Engel, 166 Wash.2d at 576, 210 P.3d 1007 ; State v. Wentz, 149 Wash.2d 342, 347, 68 P.3d 282 (2003) ; State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wash.2d 703, 706, 974 P.2d 832 (1999) ; State v. Luvene, 127 Wash.2d 690, 712, 903 P.2d 960 (1995). ¶40 Moreover, in Johnson, our Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged that "Washington has adopted the federal standard for sufficiency review."

  4. State v. Priest

    No. 32549-1-III (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2017)

    Determining the reasonableness of an inference of intent from proven facts is the province of the fact finder, not the appellate court. State v. Samalia, 186 Wn.2d at 276; State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wn.2d 703, 711, 974 P.2d 832 (1999). We conclude, based on substantial evidence, that the trial court did not err when concluding that David Priest voluntarily abandoned the cell phone.

  5. State v. Tyler

    195 Wn. App. 385 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 32 times
    Applying Shelton to mandatory VPA and rejecting argument that RCW 10.01.160 applies to mandatory financial obligations

    ¶ 24 In every such case since Green II, our Supreme Court has applied only the federal constitutional standard announced in Jackson when reviewing whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence. See, e.g., State v. Condon, 182 Wash.2d 307, 314, 343 P.3d 357 (2015) ; State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wash.2d 703, 706, 974 P.2d 832 (1999) ; State v. Luvene, 127 Wash.2d 690, 712, 903 P.2d 960 (1995). ¶ 25 Thus, on appellate review of a criminal conviction, Washington's sole evidentiary sufficiency standard is that which the Fourteenth Amendment requires.B

  6. State v. Potts

    No. 45724-5-II (Wash. Ct. App. Jul. 6, 2016)   Cited 1 times

    Where "'the inferences and underlying evidence are strong enough to permit a rational fact finder to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, a conviction may be properly based on pyramiding inferences.'" State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wn.2d 703, 711, 974 P.2d 832 (1999) (quoting 1 Clifford S. Fishman, Jones on Evidence: Civil and Criminal § 5.17, at 450 (7th ed. 1992)) (internal quotations omitted).

  7. State v. Holmes

    No. 70398-6-I (Wash. Ct. App. Sep. 29, 2014)

    In analyzing a claim of insufficiency, we draw no distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence because both are considered equally reliable. State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wn.2d 703, 711, 974 P.2d 832 (1999). The credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the evidence

  8. State v. Locke

    175 Wn. App. 779 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 42 times
    In State v. Locke, 175 Wn.App. 779 (2013), Robert Locke e-mailed then Washington Governor Christine Gregoire via her website.

    Br. of Appellant at 9. Our Supreme Court, however, subsequently rejected the rule in Weaver, citing with approval the statement that “[i]f the inferences and underlying evidence are strong enough to permit a rational fact finder to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, a conviction may be properly based on ‘pyramiding inferences.’ ” State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wash.2d 703, 711, 974 P.2d 832 (1999). ¶ 14 Locke was convicted under RCW 9A.36.090(1), which provides:

  9. State v. Hathaway

    161 Wn. App. 634 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011)   Cited 79 times
    In Hathaway, law enforcement stopped Jennifer Hathaway's car and subsequently arrested her for driving with a suspended license.

    The trier of fact is the sole and exclusive judge of the evidence. State v. Benciuenga, 137 Wn.2d 703, 709, 974 P.2d 832 (1999). We defer to the trier of fact's resolution of conflicting testimony, evaluation of witness credibility, and decisions regarding the persuasiveness of evidence.

  10. State v. K.G

    161 Wn. App. 1011 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011)

    State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 81, 917 P.2d 563 (1996). State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wn.2d 703, 711, 974 P.2d 832 (1999). To prove K.G. was a minor in possession, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant (1) was a person under the age of 21 at the time he was charged, (2) that he possessed, consumed, or otherwise acquired any liquor, (3) while in the state of Washington. Possession can be established if a person knows the substance is present, it is immediately accessible, and he exercises dominion and control over it. Evidence of assimilation into the body is circumstantial evidence of prior possession, and when combined with other corroborating evidence, alcohol consumption may support a possession conviction.