] In State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wn.2d 703, 974 P.2d 832 (1999), the Supreme Court of Washington defined the proper role of an appellate court when considering the inferences relied upon by a fact-finder, emphasizing that appellate acceptance of trial court findings as to inferences depended upon whether any rational trier of fact could have made the inference. In its discussion it also pointed out that a determination of the reasonableness of an inference was primarily for the fact-finder.

Smith, 374 Md. at 534, 823 A.2d at 668. In Smith, we relied on language from a Washington case, State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wash.2d 703, 974 P.2d 832 (1999), where evidence of a defendant's intent was at issue. The Washington Supreme Court opined that

Attempted residential burglary requires the State to prove a substantial step toward and the intent to commit residential burglary. State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wn.2d 703, 707, 974 P.2d 832 (1999) (citing State v. Aumick, 126 Wn.2d 422, 429-30, 894 P.2d 1325 (1995)). Therefore, the State must prove a person, with the intent to commit the crime of residential burglary, performed an act that was a substantial step toward entering or remaining unlawfully in a dwelling with the intent to commit a crime against a person or property ih&em7sMev~West, l8Wn.

State v. Jeffrey, 77 Wn. App. 222, 223, 227, 889 P.2d 956 (1995). Osterhoudt relies on State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wn.2d 703, 974 P.2d 832 (1999), for the proposition that essential proof of guilt cannot be supplied solely by a pyramiding of inferences. Bencivenga, 137 Wn.2d at 711 (citing State v. Weaver, 60 Wn.2d 87, 89, 371 P.2d 1006 (1962)).

As noted, for purposes of these counts York stipulated at trial that he had a prior felony conviction. York relies on State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wn.2d 703, 974 P.2d 832 (1999), and State v. Weaver, 60 Wn.2d 87, 371 P.2d 1006 (1962), for the proposition that "essential proofs of guilt cannot be supplied by a pyramiding of inferences." See Bencivenga, 137 Wn.2d at 711 (citing Weaver, 60 Wn.2d at 89).

As the Supreme Court explained in a more recent case, Jackson does not apply where there is no jury instruction at issue such as there was in Jackson. See State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wn.2d 703, 708, 974 P.2d 832 (1999). In Bencivenga, the defendant was seen at 3:30 A.M. trying to pry open the back door of a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant.

Nothing forbids a jury from inferring intent from proven facts, so long as it is satisfied the State has proven that intent beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wn.2d 703, 709, 974 P.2d 832 (1999). The fact that the crime charged here is attempted residential burglary does not change the analysis.

Nothing forbids a jury from inferring intent from proven facts, so long as it is satisfied the State has proven that intent beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wn.2d 703, 709, 974 P.2d 832 (1999). The fact that the crime charged here is attempted residential burglary does not change the analysis.

Benitez argues there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for possession of a stolen firearm. In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wn.2d 703, 706, 974 P.2d 832 (1999). A defendant's claim of insufficiency of the evidence admits the truth of the State's evidence and all inferences that can reasonably be drawn from that evidence.

The jury can infer intent from all of the facts and circumstances. State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wn.2d 703, 709, 974 P.2d 832 (1999). Mere preparation to commit a crime is not a substantial step.