State v. Belle

40 Citing cases

  1. State v. Jones

    29 Conn. App. 304 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992)   Cited 9 times
    In Jones, then judge, now Supreme Court Associate Justice Flemming L. Norcott, Jr., stated in his dissenting and concurring opinion that "[a] split of authority exists as to whether a court, after finding a Batson violation, always must dismiss those jurors selected, along with the rest of the venire, and begin the process anew."

    "In such a case, a court would be warranted in strictly applying the harmless error doctrine to require the state to prove harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Belle, 215 Conn. 257, 269, 576 A.2d 139 (1990). Here, although the trial court did not expressly find that the nonproduction of the tape infringed upon the defendant's right of confrontation, we believe that such a finding is supported by the record.

  2. State v. Adams

    225 Conn. 270 (Conn. 1993)   Cited 134 times
    In State v. Adams, 225 Conn. 270, 623 A.2d 42 (1993), our Supreme Court followed the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979), in holding that "any defendant found guilty on the basis of insufficient evidence has been deprived of a constitutional right" and is entitled to review as the court does with "any properly preserved claim."

    . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Belle, 215 Conn. 257, 273, 576 A.2d 139 (1990). We have said that a defendant is entitled to have the court present instructions to the jury relating to any theory of the defense for which there is any foundation in the evidence, even if weak or incredible.

  3. State v. Person

    236 Conn. 342 (Conn. 1996)   Cited 37 times
    In Person, the trial court erroneously refused to charge the jury on the defense of extreme emotional disturbance where the defendant's own testimony contradicted the claim that he was emotionally upset at the relevant time.

    "`A fundamental element of due process is the right of a defendant charged with a crime to establish a defense.'" State v. Belle, 215 Conn. 257, 273, 576 A.2d 139 (1990), quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967). The question before us today is whether a defendant forgoes the right to have a jury instructed on a requested defense if the defendant denies having the state of mind required to establish the requested defense.

  4. State v. Cerilli

    222 Conn. 556 (Conn. 1992)   Cited 44 times
    Holding identification instructions, although not constitutionally required, might be warranted by the facts of a particular case if the jury would otherwise be misled

    " (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Belle, 215 Conn. 257, 267-68, 576 A.2d 139 (1990). In this context, "bad faith" means "`a deliberate act done with intent to deprive the defense of information.'"

  5. State v. Cain

    25 Conn. App. 503 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 14 times

    Although the law in this area is still evolving, past cases have analyzed the destruction of 911 tape recordings in the same way that we have analyzed the destruction of any other recorded statement. Compare State v. Pollitt, 205 Conn. 61, 85-87, 530 A.2d 155 (1987) (defendant suffered no substantial prejudice from the loss of the victim's 911 statement), with State v. Belle, 215 Conn. 257, 268, 576 A.2d 139 (1990) (defendant not prejudiced by destruction of victim's statements before trial). Practice Book 752 provides that, upon a defendant's request, the state must disclose "any statement of the witness in the possession of the state or its agents . . . ."

  6. State v. Sanford

    594 A.2d 477 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 5 times

    The Connecticut Supreme Court has established that bad faith "[i]n the context of [Practice Book] 752 violation . . . connotes a deliberate act done with intent to deprive the defense of information." Williamson II, supra, 16. Absent this, there may not be a finding of bad faith; State v. Belle, 215 Conn. 257, 265 n. 8, 576 A.2d 139 (1990) (citing Williamson II, supra); and we find no evidence in the record to support such a conclusion. Unless there is showing of bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process under the federal constitution.

  7. State v. Tyson

    23 Conn. App. 28 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 21 times
    In State v. Tyson, 23 Conn. App. 28, 579 A.2d 1083, cert. denied, 216 Conn. 829, 582 A.2d 207 (1990), the Appellate Court considered an identical constitutional claim.

    A defendant is entitled as a matter of law to an instruction on a theory of defense only if there is evidence indicating that the defense is applicable. State v. Belle, 215 Conn. 257, 273, 576 A.2d 139 (1990); State v. Webley, 17 Conn. App. 200, 204, 551 A.2d 428 (1988). Once the defense is properly raised, the jury must be instructed that the state bears the burden of disproving it beyond a reasonable doubt.

  8. U.S. v. White

    972 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1992)   Cited 30 times
    Holding that the district court did not err in refusing to give lesser-included instruction of simple possession where the defendants were found with twenty-one kilos of cocaine and reasoning that "no rational jury could find that they did not intend to distribute the cocaine [t]he sheer quantity of the drugs involved negates an inference of personal use"

    The majority of state courts likewise adhere to this extremely permissive standard. See, e.g., State v. Belle, 215 Conn. 257, 576 A.2d 139, 148 (1990); Williams v. State, 99 Nev. 530, 665 P.2d 260, 261 (1983) People v. Farmer, 50 Ill. App.3d 111, 7 Ill.Dec. 892, 895, 365 N.E.2d 177, 180 (1977). The Supreme Court has long espoused similar views, at least in the context of murder trials.

  9. State v. Montanez

    277 Conn. 735 (Conn. 2006)   Cited 34 times
    Holding no reasonable possibility jury misled by general instruction or reference to principle of general intent eleven times because trial court repeatedly gave clear instructions on specific intent required for manslaughter

    This evidence was sufficient to entitle the defendant to an instruction regarding Ramos' use of self-defense. Cf. State v. Belle, 215 Conn. 257, 275, 576 A.2d 139 (1990) (rejecting request for jury instruction on theory of defense when "no testimony was presented from which the jury could have [reached a conclusion on that theory] . . . without resorting to speculation"). We accordingly proceed to consider the substance of the defendant's claim, that is, whether such an instruction was warranted as a matter of law.

  10. State v. Cavell

    235 Conn. 711 (Conn. 1996)   Cited 42 times
    Recognizing that violation of sequestration order arose when expert witness reviewed transcript of prior witness' testimony on evening before taking stand

    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Chapman, 229 Conn. 529, 544, 643 A.2d 1213 (1994); State v. Payne, 219 Conn. 93, 106, 511 A.2d 1246 (1991); State v. Belle, 215 Conn. 257, 269, 576 A.2d 139 (1990); State v. Johnson, 214 Conn. 161, 175, 571 A.2d 79 (1990). Although we have articulated the same principle in somewhat less definite terms; see, e.g., State v. Dennison, supra, 220 Conn. 661 (whether erroneous ruling "was harmful to [the defendant] in that it probably affected the outcome of the trial"); Swenson v. Sawoska, supra, 215 Conn. 153 ("whether the erroneous ruling `would likely affect the result'"); those alternate linguistic formulations did not change the fundamental nature of the appellate inquiry.