Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-1454-12T2
05-07-2014
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JOSEPH J. BELL, Defendant-Appellant.
Bell, Shivas & Fasolo, P.C., attorneys for appellant (James K. Pryor, of counsel and on the brief). Gaetano T. Gregory, Acting Hudson County Prosecutor (Stephanie David-Elson, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Maven and Hoffman.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, Municipal Appeal No. 22-12.
Bell, Shivas & Fasolo, P.C., attorneys for appellant (James K. Pryor, of counsel and on the brief).
Gaetano T. Gregory, Acting Hudson County Prosecutor (Stephanie David-Elson, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant Joseph Bell appeals from an October 12, 2012 Law Division order, entered after a trial de novo, finding him guilty of a traffic violation, N.J.S.A. 39:4-66.2. We affirm.
Trial on the traffic offense was held before the Weehawken Municipal Court on June 27, 2012. Defendant and Weehawken Police Officer William Weyer testified. The record established that on May 3, 2012, at approximately 5:17 p.m., defendant, an attorney, was driving northbound on Palisades Avenue en route to the Weehawken Municipal Court. Upon approaching the intersection of Palisades Avenue and Hackensack Plank Road, the traffic signal was red and there was a lot of congestion at the light.
According to Officer Weyer, who was in his patrol car directly behind defendant's vehicle, as defendant approached the intersection, while the traffic signal was red he turned off Palisades Avenue entering the Dunkin' Donuts parking lot. There were many cars in the lot and "it was kind of a tight fit." Taking only a couple of minutes, defendant maneuvered through the congested parking lot, then exited onto Hackensack Plank Road. Officer Weyer immediately conducted a motor vehicle stop and issued the traffic summons, citing defendant for operating a motor vehicle on public or private property to avoid traffic signals or signs in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-66.2. The officer acknowledged defendant told him he had driven around the block three times trying to locate the Weehawken Municipal Court.
Defendant testified he could not locate the courthouse, even with the assistance of a GPS device, and had driven through that traffic light "three or four times." Defendant stated he pulled into the Dunkin' Donuts parking lot to ask for directions from a gentleman who appeared to be wearing a postal worker's uniform. He claimed the man did not appear to understand what he was saying, but rather "pointed down the street." Defendant denies having any intent to violate the law.
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked "Where in the Dunkin' Donuts lot was the gentleman?" Defendant responded, "the gentleman was coming across the street. I saw him coming. He was across the street. He was in the lot, and I pulled into the lot 'cause I was coming around the lot again I pulled into the Dunkin' Donuts. I asked him. I don't think he understood what I was saying."
At the close of evidence, the Municipal Court judge weighed the credibility of the officer and defendant, then credited the officer's testimony that he did not see defendant speak to anyone. The judge stated:
I accept the police officer's testimony based upon the fact that if [] defendant wished to speak to someone, he should have stopped his car, got out of his vehicle, and spoken to him. The fact that he did not lends credibility to the police officer who did not see this person that was alleged by [] defendant.
Based upon that, I find [] defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Upon finding defendant guilty of violating N.J.S.A. 39:4-66.2, the court imposed a fine of sixty-one dollars and twenty-four dollars for court costs. Defendant filed a timely appeal.
After a trial de novo in the Law Division, Judge Frederick J. Theemling, Jr. concurred with the municipal court's findings that defendant approached the intersection of Palisades Avenue and Hackensack Plank Road, exited off Palisades Avenue, drove through the Dunkin' Donuts parking lot, exiting on Hackensack Plank Road. Further, the Law Division judge deferred to the lower court's credibility determination, and found Officer Weyer credible, accepting his testimony he did not see defendant stop to speak to anyone in the parking lot. The judge determined, therefrom, the State proved the specific intent required of N.J.S.A. 2C:2.2(b)(1), and inferred from the officer's testimony that defendant had made the conscious decision to drive through the Dunkin' Donuts parking lot to avoid the traffic control signals located at the intersection. The Law Division entered a judgment of conviction on October 12, 2012. The judge imposed the same fines and penalties that had been imposed by the municipal court.
This appeal followed, in which defendant raises the following issues:
I. BASED ON THE FACTS IN EVIDENCE, THE COURT BELOW COULD NOT HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE DEFENDANT VIOLATED THE STATUTE.
II. IN ADDITION TO NOT MAKING DETAILED CREDIBILITY FINDINGS, THE COURT BELOW DID NOT PROPERLY TAKE INTO ACCOUNT UNDISPUTED FACTS THAT COMPEL AN ACQUITTAL.
III. THE COURT BELOW IMPROPERLY RELIED ON ITS OWN PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF FACTS NOT INTRODUCED AT TRIAL IN ORDER TO RENDER A GUILTY VERDICT.
Our review of the findings of fact made by the Law Division is limited. We defer to the trial court's findings when those findings are supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record. State v. Stas, 212 N.J. 37, 49 (2012). We also defer "to trial courts' credibility findings that are often influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record." State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999). We owe no deference, however, to either the trial court's interpretation of the law or to its determination of the legal consequences that result from its fact-finding. Stas, supra, 212 N.J. at 49. In an "appeal from a de novo trial on the record, [the appellate court] consider[s] only the action of the Law Division and not that of the municipal court." State v. Oliveri, 336 N.J. Super. 244, 251 (App. Div. 2001) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, our review of purely legal issues is plenary. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995); State v. Goodman, 415 N.J. Super. 210, 225 (App. Div. 2010), certif. denied, 205 N.J. 78 (2011).
N.J.S.A. 39:4-66.2 prohibits a motorist from operating a vehicle on private property "for the purpose of avoiding a traffic control signal or sign." Defendant argues the State's evidence was insufficient to establish he acted with the purpose to avoid the traffic signal. The State argues the mental state can be inferred from the evidence presented, utilizing common sense and experience. See State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 577 (1997). The essential issue for review then is a mixed question of fact and law: whether defendant possessed the requisite state of mind to satisfy the necessary elements of the statute.
In the present case, defendant argues his purpose for entering the parking lot was to ask directions to the Weehawken Courthouse not to avoid the traffic signal. That explanation is not borne out by the facts credited to Officer Weyer, that based on his clear vantage point from directly behind defendant's vehicle and his observations of defendant's actions, defendant did not stop to speak to anyone, but rather "maneuvered through the congested parking lot, then exited onto Hackensack Plank Road."
The Law Division judge reasonably relied on his familiarity with the intersection, see N.J.R.E. 201(b)(2), (providing courts may take judicial notice of such generally known facts within the area pertinent to the event that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute), as well as the credible testimony of Officer Weyer to infer defendant purposely entered the parking lot to avoid the traffic signal.
We conclude, therefore, sufficient credible evidence exists in the record to support finding defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of violating N.J.S.A. 39:4-66.2.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION