State v. Bell

5 Citing cases

  1. State v. Lemons

    294 S.W.3d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 10 times

    What Appellant takes issue with on appeal is Ms. Nix's testimony that her tests on the substance found on his person were inconclusive as to whether the substance was crack cocaine or simply cocaine. In State v. Bell, 855 S.W.2d 493 (Mo.App. 1993), there was a situation similar to the one found in the present matter. In Bell, the defendant was charged via information with knowingly possessing '"cocaine, a controlled substance. . . ."' Id.

  2. Martinez v. Sessions

    893 F.3d 1067 (8th Cir. 2018)   Cited 17 times
    Finding Missouri’s statute divisible by substance

    Lemus Martinez responds by citing two Missouri decisions holding that when a defendant is charged with trafficking or possessing cocaine, the State need not prove which type of cocaine—crack or powder—was involved. State v. Lemons , 294 S.W.3d 65, 70 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) ; State v. Bell , 855 S.W.2d 493, 494 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). But these decisions do not establish that the various controlled substances are means rather than elements, because crack cocaine and powder cocaine are not listed separately.

  3. State v. Devore

    No. ED112267 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2024)

    It is the possession of any "controlled substance" the statute forbids; it does not distinguish between the types or schedules of controlled substances. § 579.015.1; see also State v. Bell, 855 S.W.2d 493, 494 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993) (rejecting the argument the defendant could not be found guilty of possession of cocaine when he actually possessed cocaine base because the charging statute merely regulates possession or control of a "controlled substance" and does not create a legal distinction between such controlled substances); State v. Lemons, 294 S.W.3d 65, 70 (Mo. App. S.D. 2009) (affirming the defendant's conviction of possession of crack cocaine when testing determined it was only cocaine because the charging statute did not create a legal distinction between types of controlled substances, and "whether the substance was cocaine or crack cocaine it is clear that it was a controlled substance the possession of which is prohibited.").

  4. Gaines v. State

    No. ED112160 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2024)

    However, the statute at issue here which imposes the penalty-Section 579.015-does not create a legal distinction between types of controlled substances; it merely criminalizes possession of any controlled substance. See State v. Bell, 855 S.W.2d 493, 494 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993) (rejecting the argument that the defendant could not be found guilty of possession of cocaine when he actually possessed cocaine base because the charging statute merely regulates possession or control of a "controlled substance," and does not create a legal distinction between such controlled substances); see also State v. All statutory references are to RSMo 2016, as supplemented.

  5. State v. Campbell

    122 S.W.3d 736 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 70 times

    We take judicial notice that cocaine base is a Schedule II controlled substance pursuant to § 195.017.4(1)(d). SeeState v.Bell, 855 S.W.2d 493, 494 (Mo. App. 1993); State v. James, 796 S.W.2d 398, 399 (Mo. App. 1990). Defendant presented no evidence at trial.