Opinion
No. 106479
06-07-2018
STATE OF OHIO PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE v. RONALD BECKWITH DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
FOR APPELLANT Ronald Beckwith, pro se Inmate No. A663562 Richland Correctional Institution 1001 Olivesburg Road P.O. Box 8107 Mansfield, Ohio 44901 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Michael C. O'Malley Cuyahoga County Prosecutor By: Frank Romeo Zeleznikar Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Justice Center - 8th Floor 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-14-585247-A BEFORE: S. Gallagher, J., Kilbane, P.J., and Blackmon, J.
FOR APPELLANT
Ronald Beckwith, pro se
Inmate No. A663562
Richland Correctional Institution
1001 Olivesburg Road
P.O. Box 8107
Mansfield, Ohio 44901
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michael C. O'Malley
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: Frank Romeo Zeleznikar
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
Justice Center - 8th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113 SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
{¶1} Appellant Ronald Beckwith appeals the decision of the trial court to deny his petition for postconviction relief. Upon review, we affirm.
{¶2} On May 21, 2014, appellant was charged under a five-count indictment with offenses related to the shooting death of the victim. The case proceeded to a jury trial on January 8, 2015. The jury found appellant not guilty on Count 1, aggravated murder, and guilty of the lesser included offense of murder. The jury also found appellant guilty of a second count of murder, two counts of felonious assault, and one count of having weapons while under disability, as well as accompanying specifications to the charges. On January 21, 2015, the trial court merged the allied offenses and imposed a total aggregate sentence of 20 years to life imprisonment.
{¶3} Appellant's conviction was affirmed on direct appeal in State v. Beckwith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102544, 2016-Ohio-3267, discretionary appeal not allowed, 147 Ohio St.3d 1505, 2017-Ohio-261, 67 N.E.3d 823. In reviewing the trial testimony, this court recognized that several witnesses testified to observing Beckwith and the victim engaging in an argument when Beckwith pulled out a gun and shot the victim; one witness stated the victim told her that Beckwith shot him; another witness testified that Beckwith told him in the holding cell that he got into an altercation with the victim and "shot him up"; and another witness testified that he heard a gunshot and saw Beckwith carrying the gun and running across the street. Id. at ¶ 8-11.
{¶4} On September 3, 2015, appellant filed a pro se "petition to vacate or set aside judgment of conviction or sentence." The petition was filed during the pendency of his direct appeal. Appellant raised the following claim for relief:
9a. Statement of constitutional claim: Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel. I asked to call Natalie Riggs.
9b. Short statement of facts supporting the claim: asked my counsel to call several witnesses on my behalf and none was called.
9c. The following evidence and/or affidavits are attached to support the claim: Natalie Riggs signed statement. Every witness against me stated they all went to store that was not open. Yet they all claimed to have had transations [sic] with Natalie.
{¶5} Appellant had attached to his petition a letter from Natalie Riggs. The letter states as follows:
To Whom It May Concern:
I am writing this letter because it has been brought to my attention that I was mentioned in this case. I have not worked on E. 93rd since November of 2011, when drunk driver crashed into the barbershop. I was not on E. 93rd when the murder of [the victim] took place on September 21, 2012. It was brought to my attention that Sampson Hughley said that he was talking to me when it happened, which is incorrect.
{¶6} The letter is signed and contains a notary stamp and signature. However, there is no statement that it was sworn to and subscribed in the notary's presence, and it does not appear to bear the notary's seal.
{¶7} The trial court denied the petition for postconviction relief on September 14, 2015. Thereafter, appellant requested the issuance of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed on October 10, 2017.
{¶8} The trial court observed that "In Beckwith's sole ground for relief, he argues that his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to call 'several witnesses' on his behalf, although the only witness Beckwith identifies is Natalie Riggs." The court further observed that the only piece of evidence from outside the record attached to the petition was a letter from Natalie Riggs. The court found that although the letter was notarized, "there is no language to indicate that the substance of the letter is sworn to by Natalie Riggs." The court determined the unsworn letter was not admissible and could not be considered. Absent any evidence presented from outside the record, the trial court found the petition is barred by res judicata.
{¶9} The trial court found in the alternative that "even if this court were to review the unsworn statement of Natalie Riggs, this statement would nonetheless fail to establish substantive grounds for relief under R.C. 2953.21(D)." The court found nothing to indicate that the witness who testified that prior to the shooting he was outside with three women, one of whom was named "Natalie," was referring to "Natalie Riggs." The court further found that "even if [the Natalies] were one in the same, there is no indication that Natalie's contrary statement would have influenced the outcome of the trial." As the trial court indicated, "[t]he evidence at trial was overwhelming in support of Beckwith's guilt."
{¶10} The trial court referenced the decision on the direct appeal, wherein this court stated: "[A]ll of the witnesses' testimonies are consistent with one another with no contradictions. One witness testified that they saw Beckwith running away from the crime scene with a gun after hearing a gunshot. Another witness testified that the victim told her that Beckwith shot him before he died." Beckwith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102544, 2016-Ohio-3267, at ¶ 35.
{¶11} Appellant filed this appeal from the trial court's ruling. He raises two assignments of error for our review. Under his first assignment of error, appellant claims the trial court erred by denying his timely filed postconviction petition sua sponte, in violation of the procedural mandates of R.C. 2953.21. He states that the trial court denied his petition 11 days after it was filed and without a response from the state. He further argues that R.C. 2953.21 mandates a response from the county prosecutor and that the prosecutor had requested an extension to file a response on the day the trial court denied the petition. He also refers to the docket, which reflects that two years after the trial court's ruling, the trial court ordered the prosecutor to file a response to the petition. The record reflects this order was issued after appellant had requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the prosecutor responded by filing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. In his reply brief, appellant reiterates that he is challenging the trial court's sua sponte denial of his petition. He maintains that the trial court failed to adhere to the requirements of R.C. 2953.21(D), which requires the court to consider his timely filed postconviction petition as well as the files and records in the case, prior to making a decision.
{¶12} We are not persuaded by appellant's argument. R.C. 2953.21(D) requires the trial court to consider a timely filed petition for postconviction relief in order to decide whether a ruling can be made concerning the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. A trial court may dismiss a petition for postconviction relief sua sponte if it determines there are no substantive grounds for relief that would warrant a hearing based upon the petition, the supporting affidavits, and the files and records of the case. State v. Holliday, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 11CAA110104, 2012-Ohio-2376, ¶ 10, citing State v. Worthy, 11th Dist. Portage No. 96-P-0122, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 2370, 6 (May 30, 1997). Although R.C. 2953.21(D) instructs the prosecuting attorney to file a response to a petition for postconviction relief within ten days, "[i]t is well-settled that R.C. 2953.21(C) mandates the trial court to sua sponte analyze a petition for post-conviction relief regardless of whether the State responds to such petition." State v. Davis, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 08 MA 174, 2009-Ohio-4634, ¶ 19, quoting State v. Houser, 9th Dist. Summit No. 21555, 2003-Ohio-6811, ¶ 6. Moreover, the trial court is not even required to consider the state's response before ruling on a petition for postconviction relief. Houser at ¶ 6. If the petition for postconviction relief fails to allege facts that, if proved, would entitle the petitioner to relief, the trial court may summarily dismiss the petition. Davis at ¶ 19.
{¶13} Insofar as R.C. 2953.21(D) instructs the trial court to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the dismissal of a petition, "[t]hese findings and conclusions need only 'apprise the petitioner of the reasons for the trial court's judgment [in order] to permit meaningful appellate review.'" Houser at ¶ 9, quoting State ex rel. Konoff v. Moon, 79 Ohio St.3d 211, 212, 1997-Ohio-398, 680 N.E.2d 989.
{¶14} Accordingly, we find no error with regard to the trial court's sua sponte denial of appellant's petition for postconviction relief. Further, the trial court's findings and conclusions are sufficient to permit a meaningful appellate review. Accordingly, we overrule the first assignment of error.
{¶15} Under his second assignment of error, appellant claims the trial court erred by denying his petition on the grounds of res judicata when the supporting affidavit was not part of the trial court record. He argues that the trial court erred in determining that the letter, which was notarized, was not a sworn statement because it did not include language to indicate that the substance of the letter was sworn to by Natalie Riggs.
{¶16} This court has previously recognized that "[u]nsworn letters are not admissible and should not be considered as part of a petition for postconviction relief." State v. Wilson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98033, 2012-Ohio-4065, ¶ 8. Further, "a notary's signature and seal are not a substitute for the formal swearing to the truth by the affiant when such is required for verification." Pinkney v. Southwick Invests., L.L.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 85074 and 85075, 2005-Ohio-4167, ¶ 23. Even if the letter were deemed a sworn statement and considered, the trial court found in the alternative that the statement would nonetheless fail to establish substantive grounds for relief under R.C. 2953.21(D).
{¶17} The trial court recognized that appellant's sole ground for relief was that his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to call "several witnesses" on his behalf, yet only one potential witness was identified, Natalie Riggs. The trial court noted that Natalie Riggs's statement was dated February 24, 2015. The trial court found nothing in the testimony to reflect that Natalie Riggs was the "Natalie" referred to at trial. In addition, the trial court found no indication that Natalie Riggs's statement would have influenced the outcome of trial.
{¶18} With a petition for postconviction relief that asserts ineffective assistance of counsel, "the petitioner bears the initial burden to submit evidentiary documents containing sufficient operative facts to demonstrate the lack of competent counsel and that the defense was prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness." State v. Jackson, 64 Ohio St.2d 107, 413 N.E.2d 819 (1980), syllabus. "In order to satisfy the prejudice requirement, 'the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would be different.'" State v. Quinones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104016, 2016-Ohio-7225, ¶ 11, quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). We apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a trial court's ruling on a petition for postconviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Brusiter, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101908, 2015-Ohio-1549, ¶ 9.
{¶19} Upon our review, we cannot conclude that appellant was prejudiced by trial counsel's alleged failure to investigate. Indeed, all of the witnesses' testimonies were consistent with one another, and we agree with the trial court that "[t]he evidence at trial was overwhelming in support of Beckwith's guilt." Appellant has not shown that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's failure to investigate, the result of the proceeding would be different. Upon our review, we find appellant failed to provide evidentiary documents containing sufficient operative facts to demonstrate the lack of competent counsel and that appellant was prejudiced by defense counsel's ineffectiveness. Accordingly, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied his petition for postconviction relief.
{¶20} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J., and
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCUR