Opinion
No. 108,347.
2013-03-8
STATE of Kansas, Appellant, v. Joseph BEAMAN, Appellee.
Appeal from Allen District Court; Daniel D. Creitz, Judge. Christopher Phelan, assistant county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellant. Jay Witt, of Chanute, for appellee.
Appeal from Allen District Court; Daniel D. Creitz, Judge.
Christopher Phelan, assistant county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellant. Jay Witt, of Chanute, for appellee.
Before HILL, P.J., ATCHESON and ARNOLD–BURGER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal by the State of a ruling of the district court suppressing evidence obtained from a traffic stop. The district court concluded there were insufficient facts to support a reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop in this case. We disagree and, therefore, reverse the matter.
The facts of this case are not in dispute. Around midnight on May 20, 2011, Iola police officer Danny Rodriguez stopped at a convenience store. As he walked through a narrow hallway in the store, Officer Rodriguez passed the defendant, Beaman, whom he had never met. Beaman appeared to stagger as he walked, his eyes were glassy and bloodshot, and he emitted a strong odor of alcohol. When he passed Officer Rodriguez, Beaman said, “There's one of those sheriff deputies.” His speech was slurred. Officer Rodriguez could not detect whether the odor of alcohol was coming from Beaman's person or breath, but he saw no spilled alcohol in the hallway. When Officer Rodriguez approached the store clerk and commented that Beaman had appeared drunk, the clerk did not respond but another man standing at the counter said, “Oh, yeah, he was drunk.” At that point, Officer Rodriguez left the store in an attempt to prevent Beaman from getting into a car but discovered that Beaman had already left. Officer Rodriguez got into his patrol vehicle and stopped Beaman about a 1/2 block away from the store. Officer Rodriguez did not see any traffic infractions, and he stated he stopped Beaman because he believed that Beaman might pose a risk to public safety.
The State charged Beaman with felony driving while under the influence of alcohol and other crimes. Beaman filed a motion to suppress the evidence from the traffic stop alleging that the facts did not support a reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory detention. After taking evidence on the matter, the district court found the stop to be illegal and suppressed any evidence attributable to the stop. Some fundamental points of law and our standard of review.
When reviewing a district court's ruling on a motion to suppress, an appellate court applies a mixed standard of review. Any findings of facts by the district court are adopted if they are supported by substantial competent evidence. The ultimate legal conclusion regarding suppression, however, is a question of law subject to unlimited appellate review. State v. Walker, 292 Kan. 1, 5, 251 P.3d 618 (2011). Here, the material facts are undisputed so the suppression question becomes solely a matter of law subject to plenary review. State v. Fitzgerald, 286 Kan. 1124, 1126, 192 P .3d 171 (2008).
Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and under Section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, the government is forbidden from conducting unreasonable searches and seizures of a person. Whether government intrusion is reasonable rests upon a balance between the State's interest in the intrusion and the individual's interest in remaining free from unwarranted government interference. State v. Marx, 289 Kan. 657, 661, 215 P.3d 601 (2009). A traffic stop of a vehicle on a public roadway constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants. State v. Gilbert, 292 Kan. 428, 434, 254 P.3d 1271 (2011). The State's interest in this intrusion outweighs an individual's liberty interest only when the State is capable of establishing a preponderance of the evidence that the law enforcement officer possessed specific and articulable facts supporting the officer's reasonable suspicion that the defendant is violating the law. Facts establishing reasonable suspicion justify a minimal intrusion for the purpose of further investigation. Marx, 289 Kan. at 661–62. Reasonable suspicion represents a minimal level of objective justification based upon the totality of the circumstances from the perspective of a trained law enforcement officer. Reasonable suspicion does not demand proof equivalent to probable cause but must be more than an unparticularized hunch. State v. Moore, 283 Kan. 344, 354, 154 P.3d 1 (2007). When viewed objectively, the facts reveal a basis for reasonable suspicion.
The facts ascertainable by Officer Rodriguez during his brief encounter with Beaman indicated that Beaman smelled of alcohol, presented bloodshot, watery eyes, slurred his speech, and appeared to have difficulty walking. These observations were independently corroborated by a patron of the store who indicated a belief that Beaman was drunk.
In making its decision, the district court relied upon City of Hutchinson v. Davenport, 30 Kan.App.2d 1097, 54 P.3d 532 (2002). In our view, Davenport is distinguishable from this case.
In Davenport, the defendant had visited his daughter at the law enforcement center. During a 5–minute encounter with the defendant, an officer had observed bloodshot eyes and had detected the odor of alcohol on the defendant's breath. But the officer had not noticed any signs of impairment, such as slurred speech, unsteady gait, or unsafe operation of a motor vehicle. By contrast, here, Officer Rodriguez observed indicia of impairment, including slurred speech and staggering. We must point out while the officer in Davenport saw no signs of physical impairment during his 5–minute encounter with Davenport, Officer Rodriguez saw two indications of physical impairment within a very short period of time in his brief encounter with Beaman. Officer Rodriguez' perception of the situation was reinforced by a customer at the store.
Reasonable suspicion is judged from the totality of the information known to the officer prior to the investigatory detention. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). We note that Officer Rodriguez had never previously met Beaman. Officer Rodriguez had no reason to believe that the signs of impairment were the result of physical defects rather than intoxication. When viewed separately, an unsteady walk or slurred speech might not lead a reasonably prudent person to conclude that Beaman was intoxicated. But both of those factors combined with the smell of alcohol and watery, bloodshot eyes would naturally lead a reasonable person to suspect intoxication. The reasonableness of this conclusion is supported by the independent verification of a neutral third party who similarly believed that Beaman was drunk. Under these circumstances, as a matter of law, Officer Rodriguez' traffic stop of Beaman was supported by reasonable suspicion. The district court erred in suppressing the State's evidence on the basis of an illegal traffic stop.
Reversed and remanded.