We note that under our constitution, however, pretrial detainees may be guaranteed greater due process protection than convicted prisoners. Accord State v. Bayaoa, 66 Haw. 21, 25 n.2, 656 P.2d 1330, 1333 n.2 (1982) (agreeing with the dissenting Bell justices that, at least in the context of Fourth Amendment searches, "the rights of persons not yet convicted of crimes must be more closely scrutinized than the rights of prisoners.") (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 568, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (Marshall, J., dissenting); 441 U.S. at 579, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ). We also note that model practices acknowledge solitary confinement as a legitimate administrative and penological tool, but reserve its use for particularized and serious problems.
retrial detainees" merely retained "some" Fourth Amendment rights upon their commitment ( see 441 US at 558). Here, in contrast, we deal with an arrestee, who at the time of the search had not yet even been arraigned and who was therefore entitled — at the very least — to enjoy greater constitutional protection than a pretrial detainee, who was remanded to supervision following arraignment, or a convicted prisoner ( Gilmore, 27 Va App at 330 n 5, 498 SE2d at 469 n 5; cf. Block v Rutherford, 468 US 576, 583 ["The very fact of nonrelease pending trial . . . is a significant factor bearing on the security measures that are imperative to the proper administration of a detention facility"]; People ex rel. Maxian v Brown, 77 NY2d 422, 427 [noting that "the deprivation entailed by prearraignment detention is very great (and is) . . . one as to which no predicate is established in advance and, indeed, which may ultimately be found to have been unwarranted" (internal quotation marks omitted)]; State v Bayaoa, 66 Haw 21, 25 n 2, 656 P2d 1330, 1332 n 2 [1982] ["at least with regard to the fourth amendment, the rights of persons not yet convicted of crimes must be more closely scrutinized than the rights of prisoners"]). Application of the reasonable suspicion standard in this case is also particularly inappropriate because we have stated that that standard applies to searches that are "uniquely discriminate" and "nonintrusive" ( see e.g. People v Dunn, 36 NY2d 19, 26 [canine sniff search of apartment hallway subject to reasonable suspicion standard because "(i)t does not entail entry into the premises or exposure of one's personal effects to the police"]; see also People v Cantor, 36 NY2d 106, 112-113 [reasonable suspicion standard applies to authority of police officers to stop and inquire of citizens in public place]).
Moreover, in contrast to federal jurisprudence, this court has held, pursuant to the Hawai'i Constitution, that "the rights of persons not yet convicted of crimes must be more closely scrutinized than the rights of prisoners." State v. Bayaoa, 66 Haw. 21, 25 n. 2, 656 P.2d 1330, 1332 n. 2 (1982) (rejecting the United States Supreme Court's reasoning to the contrary, pursuant to the United States Constitution, in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)) (citing State v. Clark, 65 Haw. 488, 498 n. 11, 654 P.2d 355, 362 n. 11 (1982)). Cf. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 157 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that "[t]he standards for forcibly medicating inmates may well differ from those for persons awaiting trial").
This court has indeed held that a warrantless police search does not contravene the Fourth Amendment if it involves property in which the defendant has no legitimate expectation of privacy. See, e.g., State v. Bayaoa, 66 Haw. 21, 29, 656 P.2d 1330, 1335 (1982); State v. Custodio, 62 Haw. 1, 7-8, 607 P.2d 1048, 1052 (1980); see also, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Whether a defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy is determined by a two-part test: (1) the "defendant must have exhibited an actual expectation of privacy," and (2) "the expectation must be one society is prepared to acknowledge as reasonable."