Opinion
SC 20396
04-01-2021
STATE of Connecticut v. Reggie BATTLE
Temmy Ann Miller, for the appellant (defendant). Mitchell S. Brody, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, former state's attorney, Sharmese L. Walcott, state's attorney, and Elizabeth Tanaka, former assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
Temmy Ann Miller, for the appellant (defendant).
Mitchell S. Brody, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, former state's attorney, Sharmese L. Walcott, state's attorney, and Elizabeth Tanaka, former assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.
PER CURIAM. The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether General Statutes § 53a-32 (d) affords a trial court the authority to impose a sentence that includes a period of special parole following a probation violation and revocation. The defendant, Reggie Battle, appeals, upon our grant of his petition for certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court remanding the case to the trial court with direction to deny his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Practice Book § 43-22. See State v. Battle , 192 Conn. App. 128, 147, 217 A.3d 637 (2019). On appeal, the defendant contends that the Appellate Court improperly construed § 53a-32 (d) (4) in concluding that the sentence imposed upon the revocation of his probation was not illegal. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
General Statutes § 53a-32 (d) provides: "If such violation is established, the court may: (1) Continue the sentence of probation or conditional discharge; (2) modify or enlarge the conditions of probation or conditional discharge; (3) extend the period of probation or conditional discharge, provided the original period with any extensions shall not exceed the periods authorized by section 53a-29; or (4) revoke the sentence of probation or conditional discharge. If such sentence is revoked, the court shall require the defendant to serve the sentence imposed or impose any lesser sentence. Any such lesser sentence may include a term of imprisonment, all or a portion of which may be suspended entirely or after a period set by the court, followed by a period of probation with such conditions as the court may establish. No such revocation shall be ordered, except upon consideration of the whole record and unless such violation is established by the introduction of reliable and probative evidence and by a preponderance of the evidence."
We granted the defendant's petition for certification to appeal from the Appellate Court, limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that, under ... § 53a-32, a trial court, following a probation violation and revocation, may impose a sentence that includes a period of special parole?" State v. Battle , 333 Conn. 942, 219 A.3d 373 (2019).
On appeal, the defendant claims that the plain and unambiguous language of § 53a-32 (d) (4) did not authorize the trial court to impose a sentence of special parole upon the revocation of probation because that sanction is not one that is mentioned in the statute. After examining the record and briefs on appeal and considering the arguments of the parties, we conclude that the judgment of the Appellate Court should be affirmed. The Appellate Court's thorough and well reasoned opinion fully addresses the certified question, along with the complete facts and procedural history of this case, and, accordingly, there is no need for us to repeat the discussion contained therein. We therefore adopt the Appellate Court's opinion as the proper statement of the issues and the applicable law concerning those issues. See, e.g., R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. , 333 Conn. 343, 357, 216 A.3d 629 (2019) ; State v. Henderson , 330 Conn. 793, 799, 201 A.3d 389 (2019).
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.