State v. Bass

27 Citing cases

  1. State v. Kiett

    No. A-4363-18 (App. Div. Jul. 7, 2022)

    Further, because the argument had been previously litigated in defendant's prior PCR petition, the judge found the motion was procedurally barred under Rule 3:22-5. Nonetheless, addressing the merits, the judge relied on State v. Bass, 457 N.J.Super. 1, 13-14 (App. Div. 2018), and rejected defendant's contention, determining defendant's "sentence [was] not the functional equivalent of a life sentence without parole" to warrant relief under Zuber. Because defendant's moving papers were not included in the record, we rely on the judge's decision to discern defendant's argument.

  2. State v. Thomas

    470 N.J. Super. 167 (App. Div. 2022)

    While crediting the parole data submitted by defendant and acknowledging that the "continued incarceration of defendant at the hands of the Parole Board did not seem to be the intention of [the sentencing judge]," the court nonetheless concluded: [D]efendant's initial sentence is not within the purview of Miller, [ Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) ], or Zuber, and is more appropriately addressed by [ State v. Bass, 457 N.J. Super. 1, 197 A.3d 192 (App. Div. 2018) ]. Defendant is not ineligible for parole at the time of the present motion.

  3. State v. Tormasi

    466 N.J. Super. 51 (App. Div. 2021)   Cited 27 times
    In Tormasi, we rejected the defendant's argument that the future opportunity to apply for parole did not satisfy Zuber, noting that "[b]oth federal and [s]tate precedent on cruel and unusual punishment support a finding that the possibility of parole provides a meaningful opportunity for release."

    We decline to do so. In State v. Bass, we addressed the type of sentence that may qualify as a de facto life term. 457 N.J. Super. 1, 197 A.3d 192 (App. Div. 2018), certif. denied, 238 N.J. 364, 210 A.3d 238 (2019). We held that an aggregate term of life with a thirty-five-year parole-bar was not the functional equivalent of a life sentence, and thus, the defendant was not entitled to resentencing under Zuber, even though the sentencing court had not considered the Miller factors when it imposed the sentence.

  4. State v. Smith

    DOCKET NO. A-4587-17T2 (App. Div. Jul. 7, 2020)

    Zuber, 227 N.J. at 443 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010)). Relying on State v. Bass, 457 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2018), the State contends Smith's life term with a thirty-year parole-bar is not the functional equivalent of a life sentence. It emphasizes that Smith will be eligible for parole in 2024 when he is forty-seven years old.

  5. Kiett v. N.J. State Parole Bd.

    No. A-0894-21 (App. Div. Jul. 18, 2023)

    In State v. Bass, 457 N.J.Super. 1, 12-14 (App. Div. 2018), and State v. Tormasi, 466 N.J.Super. 51, 67-68 (App. Div. 2021), we determined that the opportunity for parole was a sufficient safeguard against cruel and unusual punishment challenges by juvenile offenders. In Bass, although the defendant was convicted as a juvenile and received a life sentence with a thirty-five-year parole disqualifier, we determined that Zuber did not apply to the forty-nine-year-old defendant because enough time had elapsed that the defendant was "eligible for parole."

  6. State v. Robinson

    No. A-1004-19 (App. Div. Nov. 3, 2021)

    The holding in Miller does not apply to defendant because his custodial term is not the functional equivalent to a life-without-parole sentence. See id. at 66; State v. Bass, 457 N.J.Super. 1, 13-14 (App. Div. 2018). He has twice been considered for and denied parole based largely on his criminal and institutional infraction record while incarcerated as an adult, much of which occurred after he reached twenty-seven years old.

  7. State v. Still

    DOCKET NO. A-2116-17T4 (App. Div. Dec. 10, 2020)

    Id. at 452 (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 477). Almost two years after Zuber was decided, we addressed the length of sentence that may qualify as a de facto life term in State v. Bass, 457 N.J. Super. 1, 13-14 (App. Div. 2018), certif. denied, 238 N.J. 364 (2019). We held that a life sentence with a thirty-five-year parole bar imposed on a juvenile was not the functional equivalent of a life sentence, and thus, the defendant was not entitled to resentencing under Zuber, even though the sentencing court had not considered the Miller factors when it imposed sentence.

  8. State v. J.V.

    242 N.J. 432 (N.J. 2020)   Cited 71 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In J.V., the Court explained that "[h]ad the Legislature intended an earlier date for the law to take effect, that intention could have been made plain in the very section directing when the law would become effective."

    Said another way, Section 26.1 cannot apply to J.V. because he was waived to adult court years before the statute became effective. Cf. State v. Bass, 457 N.J. Super. 1, 11-12, 197 A.3d 192 (App. Div. 2018) (refusing to apply Section 26.1 retroactively because "the waiver law was not only the same at the time defendant committed the offense, but also at the time of his waiver, conviction, and sentencing" and the court found "no evidence the Legislature intended [Section 26.1] to reach concluded cases which have already passed through the proverbial ‘pipeline’ "), certif. denied, 238 N.J. 364, 210 A.3d 238 (2019). Our decision today rests solely on the facts before us.

  9. State v. Link

    297 Or. App. 126 (Or. Ct. App. 2019)   Cited 16 times
    Holding that murder review hearing under Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.105 after thirty years of imprisonment did not "[provide] an opportunity for the consideration of the qualities of youth sufficient to comply with Miller " because "Graham and Miller are replete with language holding that the proper actor to consider the qualities of youth is the sentencer ," "any consideration of the qualities of youth would come—at a minimum—[thirty] years after the imposition of the sentence" and "delay would undercut the essence of Miller ," and parole board is required to consider neither "immaturity at the time of the offense, nor how such immaturity lessened the culpability or blameworthiness of the defendant"

    r 35 years); Com. v. Okoro , 471 Mass. 51, 52-62, 26 N.E.3d 1092, 1094-1101 (2015) (mandatory life with possibility of parole after 15 years); People v. Skinner , 502 Mich. 89, 97-138, 917 N.W.2d 292, 296-318 (2018) (discretionary life without parole); State v. Vang , 847 N.W.2d 248, 262-63 (Minn. 2014) (mandatory life with the possibility of parole after 30 years); Chandler v. State , 242 So.3d 65, 67-71 (Miss. 2018), cert. den. , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 790, 202 L.Ed.2d 569 (2019) (discretionary life without parole); State v. Hart , 404 S.W.3d 232, 236-47 (Mo. 2013) (life without parole); Steilman v. Michael , 389 Mont. 512, 513-22, 407 P.3d 313, 315-20 (2017), cert. den. , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 1999, 201 L.Ed.2d 260 (2018) (110 years with the possibility of release after 55 years); State v. Nollen , 296 Neb 94, 114-22, 892 N.W.2d 81, 95-99 (2017), cert. den. , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 165, 199 L.Ed.2d 98 (2017) (90-years to life with the possibility of parole after 45 years); State v. Bass , 457 N.J. Super. 1, 4-14, 197 A.3d 192, 193-200 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018) (life with the possibility of parole after 35 years); People v. Aponte , 42 Misc.3d 868, 981 N.Y.S.2d 902, 903-06 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) (mandatory minimum of life with the possibility of parole after 25 years); State v. Jefferson , 798 S.E.2d 121, 122-26 (NC. Ct. App. 2018), rev. den. , 370 N.C. 214, 804 S.E.2d 527 (2017), cert. den. , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 1169, 200 L.Ed.2d 318 (2018) (mandatory life with the possibility of parole after 25 years); Garcia v. State , 903 N.W.2d 503, 509-13 (N.D. 2017) (discretionary life without parole); State v. Hawkins , 55 N.E.3d 505, 509-10 (Ohio. Ct. App. 2015) (life with the possibility of parole after 33 years); Commonwealth v. White , 193 A.3d 977, 982-86 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018) (mandatory minimum of life with the possibility of parole after 35 years, and mandatory minimum of life with the possibility of parole after 45 years (citing Commonwealth v. Bebout , 186 A.3d 462, 467-70 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018) ); Aiken v. Byars , 410 S.C. 534, 545, 765

  10. State v. Anderson

    No. A-3528-22 (App. Div. Oct. 25, 2024)

    "A sentence is illegal if it exceeds the maximum penalty provided in the Code for a particular offense, is not imposed in accordance with law, or fails to include a mandatory sentencing requirement." State v. Bass, 457 N.J.Super. 1, 8 (App. Div. 2018) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting State v. Locane, 454 N.J.Super. 98, 117 (App. Div. 2018)).