[¶ 37] This Court has stated: "The right [to cross-examine] is absolute and the denial of the right as to material evidence is prejudicial error requiring a new trial." State v. Bartkowski, 290 N.W.2d 218, 219 (N.D. 1980) (citations omitted). The "complete denial of cross-examination" is "constitutional error of the first magnitude."

This Court has said, " ‘ [t]he right (to cross- examine) is absolute and the denial of the right as to material evidence is prejudicial error requiring a new trial.’ " State v. Bartkowski, 290 N.W.2d 218, 219 (N.D.1980) (quoting State v. Hilling, 219 N.W.2d 164, 171 (N.D.1974)). We have also said, " [o]rdinarily, the complete denial of cross-examination ‘ would be constitutional error of the first magnitude.’

The right to confront witnesses is of constitutional magnitude [U.S. Const. amend. VI; N.D. Const. art. I, § 12; State v. Buckley, 325 N.W.2d 169 (N.D. 1982)] and defense counsel is given wide latitude in cross-examining prosecution witnesses. State v. Bartkowski, 290 N.W.2d 218 (N.D. 1980). Nevertheless, the latitude and extent of cross-examination has always been held to be within the trial court's reasonable discretion.

[¶13] "The right to cross-examine is absolute and the denial of the right as to material evidence is prejudicial error requiring a new trial." State v. Bartkowski, 290 N.W.2d 218, 219 (N.D. 1980) (cleaned up). "[T]he complete denial of cross-examination would be constitutional error of the first magnitude."

State v. Simon, 398 A.2d 861, 865 (N.J. 1979). See also State v. Bartkowski, 290 N.W.2d 218, 222 (N.D. 1980); 3 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d, § 512 (2d ed. 1982); 26 Moore's Federal Practice § 631.03[1] (3d ed. 1997). Thus, N.D.R.Crim.P. 31(e) provides for a special verdict form only in very limited circumstances in criminal trials, relating only to certain defenses raised by the defendant and overt acts of treason.

Second, those accused of a crime have the right to broad and extensive cross-examination of the witnesses against them — especially so with respect to the principle prosecution witness. State v. Haugen, 458 N.W.2d 288 (N.D. 1990); State v. Bartkowski, 290 N.W.2d 218 (N.D. 1980); Suan, supra. This right is secured in the North Dakota Constitution, article I, section 12; the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution; and the North Dakota Rules of Evidence, Rule 611(b).

Id. at 7, 390 N.E.2d at 241. In State v. Bartkowski, 290 N.W.2d 218 (N.D. 1980), the defendant asserted an entrapment defense to a charge of possessing a hallucinogenic drug with intent to distribute it. He attempted to cross-examine the officer who testified against him with respect to the purpose of the transfer of drug cases to a special unit of which the officer was a member, and generally on the question whether "political pressures required him to artificially create a substantial increase in drug convictions." Id. at 219.

We note that several jurisdictions preclude defense counsel from casting a shadow of bias over the police force in general through this type of questioning; rather, the questioning must have some bearing on the personal credibility or bias on the part of a witness. See, e.g., United States v. Williamson, 424 F.2d 353, 355-56 (5th Cir. 1970); Rowe v. State, 62 Md. App. 486, 493-99, 490 A.2d 278, 281-84 (questions regarding general policy of whether officers received promotions for closing major homicide cases to specific officer absent factual showing), cert. denied, 303 Md. 684, 496 A.2d 683 (1985); State v. Bartowski, 290 N.W.2d 218, 218-20 (N.D. 1980) (question whether increased appropriations for drug enforcement created political pressure to increase conviction rate prohibited); State v. Baril, 127 Vt. 394, 400, 250 A.2d 732, 736 (1969) (questioning seeking to establish bias link between officer's motivation for making arrest and criterion for promotion prohibited); but see Haeger v. State, 181 Ind. App. 5, 390 N.E.2d 239 (1979). We need not, however, decide the issue.

Although the opportunity to cross-examine a witness is the primary mode to safeguard the sixth amendment right of confrontation, the scope of cross-examination is necessarily a matter involving the trial court's discretion. State v. Buckley, 325 N.W.2d 169, 171-172 (N.D. 1982); State v. Bartkowski, 290 N.W.2d 218, 219 (N.D. 1980). Under Rule 608(b), N.D.R.Evid., a trial court may, in its discretion, allow a witness to be impeached through cross-examination with regard to specific instances of conduct not resulting in a conviction if the proffered conduct is probative of a witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. State v. Hilsman, 333 N.W.2d 411, 412 (N.D. 1983); see also State v. Biby, 366 N.W.2d 460, 464 (N.D. 1985). Rule 608(b) should be interpreted in a manner so as to "strike a balance between the needs of the judicial system and the needs of the individual witness as determined by the unique circumstances of the case in which he is appearing."

The power to notice obvious error is one we exercise cautiously and only in exceptional circumstances. State v. Bartkowski, 290 N.W.2d 218, 221 (N.D. 1980). It should be exercised only where a serious injustice has been done to the defendant. State v. Brickzin, 319 N.W.2d 150, 152 (N.D. 1982).