A permissible factual "inference" is a logical deduction "which the trier of fact may make" from a fact in evidence "legally proved." Sections 26-1-501 and -502, MCA; State v. Barick, 143 Mont. 273, 287, 389 P.2d 170, 177 (1964). While the challenging party has the burden of overcoming the presumption of correctness of an implied consent refusal driver's license suspension at hearing, our standard of review of a pertinent district court finding of fact on the resulting hearing record is whether it was clearly erroneous, and whether the court correctly applied the applicable law to those facts.

While M. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) requires courts to draw all reasonable inferences on the Rule 56 factual record in favor of the non-moving party, a reasonable inference requires more than mere suspicion, imagination, or apprehension of "something wrong or hurtful without proof or on slight evidence." State v. Barick, 143 Mont. 273, 283, 389 P.2d 170, 175 (1964). An inference has probative value as evidentiary proof of a disputed fact only if it is based on duly "proved" record facts and circumstances, see §§ 26-1-101(4), -102(1), and -502(1), MCA, and can be reasonably deduced as a logical consequence thereof.

State v. Logan (1970), 156 Mont. 48, 573 P.2d 833; State v. Warrick (1968), 152 Mont. 94, 446 P.2d 916. Affidavits stating opinions and not facts do not constitute a showing of an abuse of discretion. State v. Barick (1964), 143 Mont. 273, 389 P.2d 170; State ex rel Hanrahan v. Dis. Ct. (1965), 145 Mont. 501, 401 P.2d 770. Here the news articles were published approximately six months prior to trial.

(Emphasis added.) No facts are shown by this petition, which we believe necessary to move the discretion of the district court. Territory v. Manton, 8 Mont. 95, 103, 19 P. 387; State v. Davis, supra; State v. Vischert, 131 Mont. 152, 157, 308 P.2d 969; State v. Board, 135 Mont. 139, 337 P.2d 924; State v. Barick, 143 Mont. 273, 280, 389 P.2d 170; State ex rel. Hanrahan v. District Court, 145 Mont. 501, 401 P.2d 770; State v. Warrick, 152 Mont. 94, 446 P.2d 916; State v. Logan, supra. Some of the jurors on voir dire examination indicated they had heard defendant's case discussed in the community and that local opinion on the case was predominantly "one way".

This Court remains evermindful of one fundamental rule — that questions of fact must be determined solely by the jury, and that given a certain legal minimum of evidence, this Court on review will not substitute its judgment for that of the jury. State v. Gunn, 89 Mont. 453, 300 P. 212; State v. Barick, 143 Mont. 273, 389 P.2d 170. The policy is firmly grounded on the recognition that, unlike an appellate court, the jury has, as stated in State v. Gustin, 85 Mont. 581, 584, 281 P. 351, 352: "* * * the advantage of seeing the witnesses on the witness stand, of observing their demeanor, their apparent candor or lack of it, of examining the * * * exhibits offered in evidence.

It is well established in Montana that the sufficiency of the corroboration necessary to sustain a conviction based on the testimony of an accomplice is a matter of law. State v. Dess, 154 Mont. 231, 462 P.2d 186; State v. Barick, 143 Mont. 273, 389 P.2d 170; State v. Moran, 142 Mont. 423, 384 P.2d 777. When the trial judge is satisfied that the evidence is corroborative, he must submit the case to the jury to determine what effect the corroboration has and whether it is sufficient to warrant a conviction.

Therefore, it is necessary that the specific conduct which constitutes the ulterior crime be clearly defined in order to determine if the defendant's intent was that proscribed by the burglary statute. See State v. Barick, 143 Mont. 273, 389 P.2d 170, 177. III.

"The corroborating circumstances should tend not merely to prove that an offense has been committed but they should have a tendency to identify the defendant as the criminal or to show his connection with the offense." In State v. Barick, 143 Mont. 273, 283, 389 P.2d 170, 175, we held that evidence which tends to connect the defendant with the crime is: "* * * that evidence which taken by itself leads to the inference, not only that a crime has been committed, but the prisoner is implicated in it."

Assuming arguendo that she was — there was still sufficient evidence before the jury that corroborated the evidence given by Lila Williamson connecting defendant to the crime. Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Ed., Vol. 7, § 2059, (1970 Pocket Supp. p. 108) cites State v. Barick, 143 Mont. 273, 282, 389 P.2d 170, 175, as a discerning opinion, authored by Mr. Justice Castles, covering this issue. There it was said:

"2. On such a deduction from that fact as is warranted by a consideration of the usual propensities or passions of men, the particular propensities or passions of the person whose act is in question, the course of the business, or the course of nature." This instruction was cited with approval by this Court in State v. Barick, 143 Mont. 273, 283, 389 P.2d 170. Court's Instruction 16 defines constructive possession as: "when a person has the intent to have, and has knowledge that he has capability of control although not in actual physical control but such thing is under his dominion."