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State v. Barella

73 R.I. 367 (R.I. 1947)
State v. Barella

6 Citing cases

  1. State v. Ashness

    461 A.2d 659 (R.I. 1983)   Cited 51 times
    Holding that "the lack of a formal tender of the witness as an expert and a specific ruling thereon before treating him as an expert and allowing him to testify as such did not constitute prejudicial error"

    In Baker, we also propounded the requirement that "[t]o constitute an assault with a dangerous weapon it is necessary that the weapon should be presented at the party intended to be assaulted, within the distance at which it may do execution." Id. at 278, 38 A. at 654; accord, State v. Barella, 73 R.I. 367, 375, 56 A.2d 185, 188-89 (1947). In State v. Milazzo, 116 R.I. 443, 447, 358 A.2d 35, 37 (1976), we reaffirmed the ruling that the actual present ability of the defendant to inflict harm on the victim by using a dangerous weapon is an element of the offense of assault with a dangerous weapon.

  2. State v. Quattrocchi

    681 A.2d 879 (R.I. 1996)   Cited 41 times
    Holding that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of two uncharged sexual encounters with other children because the evidence had no independent relevance that was reasonably necessary to prove the elements of the crimes charged

    The defendant argues that the grand jury for the counties of Providence and Bristol did not have jurisdiction to return an indictment in respect to an incident that took place on Narragansett Bay off Middletown in the county of Newport in a boat owned by defendant. This court had held in State v. Barella, 73 R.I. 367, 372, 56 A.2d 185, 187 (1947), that any offense committed on Narragansett Bay outside Providence county could be "found and tried" in any county at the discretion of the Attorney General pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 12-3-4 as it then existed. The state concedes that in 1981 § 12-3-4 was amended to read that an offense committed on Narragansett Bay could be "tried in any county in the discretion of the attorney general, unless otherwise ordered by the presiding justice."

  3. State v. Jeremiah

    546 A.2d 183 (R.I. 1988)   Cited 25 times
    Noting the well-established rule that "'[t]o constitute an assault with a dangerous weapon it is necessary that the weapon should be presented at the party intended to be assaulted, within the distance at which it may do execution'"

    In Baker this court also recognized that "[t]o constitute an assault with a dangerous weapon it is necessary that the weapon should be presented at the party intended to be assaulted, within the distance at which it may do execution." 20 R.I. at 278, 38 A. at 654; accord, State v. Barella, 73 R.I. 367, 375, 56 A.2d 185, 188-89 (1947). In State v. Milazzo, 116 R.I. 443, 447, 358 A.2d 35, 37 (1976), we reaffirmed the principle that the actual present ability of the defendant to inflict harm on the victim by using a dangerous weapon is an element of the offense of assault with a dangerous weapon.

  4. State v. Milazzo

    116 R.I. 443 (R.I. 1976)   Cited 6 times
    In State v. Milazzo, 116 R.I. 443, 447, 358 A.2d 35, 37 (1976), we reaffirmed the principle that the actual present ability of the defendant to inflict harm on the victim by using a dangerous weapon is an element of the offense of assault with a dangerous weapon.

    This court has long held the view that "[t]o constitute an assault with a dangerous weapon it is necessary that the weapon should be presented at the party intended to be assaulted, within the distance at which it may do execution." State v. Baker, 20 R.I. 275, 278, 38 A. 653, 654 (1897); accord, State v. Barella, 73 R.I. 367, 375, 56 A.2d 185, 188-89 (1947); State v. Hunt, 25 R.I. 69, 54 A. 773 (1903). We believe that the Baker requirement, commonly known as the actual present ability rule, has survived the holding and language of Boudreau.

  5. State v. Harris

    111 R.I. 147 (R.I. 1973)   Cited 3 times

    This argument has its origin in the common law where a person could not be put on trial except in the county where the crime charged was alleged to have been committed. State v. Barella, 73 R.I. 367, 56 A.2d 185 (1947). Subject to minor exceptions, that is still the law, and § 12-17-1 stipulates that

  6. State v. Douglas

    78 R.I. 60 (R.I. 1951)   Cited 12 times

    State v. Watson, 20 R.I. 354, 360. See State v. Barella, 73 R.I. 367, and State v. Brown, 45 R.I. 9, where this rule of criminal pleading is referred to and State v. Watson is cited. See also State v. Hand Brewing Co., 32 R.I. 56. and 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 416.