Opinion
No. 25236-1-III.
May 22, 2007.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Benton County, No. 05-1-01072-3, Cameron Mitchell and Carrie L. Runge, JJ., entered April 18 and May 18, 2006.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Kulik, J., concurred in by Sweeney, C.J., and Schultheis, J.
Jessie James Bankhead appeals his conviction for possession of methamphetamine. He contends that the impoundment of his vehicle was improper and that the search warrant for the vehicle lacked probable cause. Holding that the impoundment was proper and that the magistrate did not abuse his discretion in issuing the search warrant, we affirm.
FACTS
On August 13, 2005, Corporal Erik Lundquist of the Richland Police Department drove through a hotel parking lot and saw a vehicle with expired license tabs. Corporal Lundquist contacted the driver who showed a license bearing the name "Ryan Rumsey." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 110. When the driver was unable to provide the correct social security number for Ryan Rumsey, the driver was placed under arrest for forgery. The driver then identified himself as Christopher Stone. The vehicle was registered to Melissa Morgan.
A search of the vehicle incident to Mr. Stone's arrest uncovered a J.C. Penney's bag containing a pair of jeans and a shirt; both items had security tags and price tags attached to them. A notebook was discovered containing written lists for "stores or merchandise to get." CP at 110. The notebook also contained a list titled "operation playtime," which contained instructions on how to shoplift and return items for cash. CP at 110. The notebook contained references to "Jes." CP at 110.
Mr. Stone told police that he had dropped off his girl friend, Ms. Morgan, at the motel to visit a friend. The police located Ms. Morgan in the backseat of a vehicle owned by Jessie Bankhead. The police knew that Mr. Bankhead had "an extensive criminal history." CP at 111.
Officers Gilk and Croskrey contacted Ms. Morgan and Mr. Bankhead in the parking lot. Ms. Morgan was informed of Mr. Stone's arrest and was given the keys to her vehicle. Ms. Morgan left the area. The police then attempted to speak with Mr. Bankhead to see if Ms. Morgan was in possession of any additional stolen property. When Officer Gilk looked through a window of the vehicle, he observed a J.C. Penney's bag similar to the one found in Ms. Morgan's vehicle. This bag was found in the backseat where the officers had earlier observed Ms. Morgan sitting. The officers saw J.C. Penney's tags on the floor of the vehicle. Mr. Bankhead denied any connection to the bag and said that it belonged to Ms. Morgan.
Later, officers contacted Mr. Bankhead while he was standing by the open trunk of his vehicle. Officer Gilk observed numerous items in Mr. Bankhead's trunk, including suitcases, backpacks, duffel bags, and loose electronic equipment. Mr. Bankhead denied ownership of most of these items. Mr. Bankhead's vehicle was impounded. The officers placed evidence tape on all the openings of the vehicle, which was towed to the police station.
Based on this information, Corporal Lundquist applied for a search warrant for the vehicle. The magistrate reviewed the search warrant and found probable cause to allow the search of Mr. Bankhead's vehicle. Subsequently, at a CrR 3.6 hearing, the trial court concluded that probable cause existed to support issuance of the search warrant. Mr. Bankhead was convicted of possession of methamphetamine. Mr. Bankhead appeals.
Mr. Bankhead's vehicle was properly impounded.
Mr. Bankhead contends that his vehicle was not subject to impound because the police lacked probable cause.
A vehicle may be impounded if (1) the officer has probable cause to believe that it was stolen or was used in the commission of a felony, (2) as part of the officers' community caretaking function, if no one is available to move the vehicle for the defendant, and (3) if impoundment is statutorily authorized, as long as the seizure is reasonable. State v. Reynoso, 41 Wn. App. 113, 116-17, 702 P.2d 1222 (1985) (quoting State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170, 189, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980)).
There is a distinction between the impoundment of a vehicle for the purpose of searching for incriminating items and the impoundment of a vehicle for a purpose unrelated to a search. State v. Davis, 29 Wn. App. 691, 697, 630 P.2d 938 (1981). Police may seize a vehicle without a warrant when exigent circumstances exist and the police have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or incriminating evidence. Id. at 697-98. Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances known to an officer are sufficient to warrant a prudent or cautious person to believe that a crime has been committed. State v. Terrovona, 105 Wn.2d 632, 643, 716 P.2d 295 (1986).
The impoundment of Mr. Bankhead's vehicle cannot be justified under the statutory authorization exception or the community caretaking exception. But the impoundment of the vehicle can be justified based on the officers' probable cause to believe that the vehicle was used in the commission of a felony. Exigent circumstances were also present because the vehicle could have been driven away while the officers went to obtain a warrant. See Davis, 29 Wn. App. at 699-700.
Mr. Bankhead relies on three cases, none of which involve situations where the search was unrelated to the impoundment. In State v. Houser, 95 Wn.2d 143, 153, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980), the police arrested the defendant and impounded his vehicle even though there were reasonable alternatives. In State v. Hill, 68 Wn. App. 300, 308, 842 P.2d 996 (1993), the impoundment of the vehicle was found unreasonable because no alternative to impoundment was considered. In Reynoso, the impoundment of a vehicle was found to be unreasonable because the owner was available to remove the vehicle from the scene. Reynoso, 41 Wn. App. at 117-18. In contrast, here the police had probable cause to believe the vehicle had been used in the commission of a felony.
The impoundment of Mr. Bankhead's vehicle was proper.
The search of the vehicle was based on probable cause.
Mr. Bankhead contends the search of his vehicle lacked probable cause.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend IV. This court reviews the validity of a search warrant for abuse of discretion giving great deference to the magistrate's determination of probable cause. State v. Freeman, 47 Wn. App. 870, 873, 737 P.2d 704 (1987). In reviewing the probable cause determination, this court considers all of the information that was presented to the issuing court. State v. Duncan, 81 Wn. App. 70, 74, 912 P.2d 1090 (1996). All doubts must be resolved in favor of the warrant's validity. State v. Fisher, 96 Wn.2d 962, 964, 639 P.2d 743 (1982).
Here, the issuing magistrate was aware that Mr. Stone had been found in the possession of suspected stolen property. Mr. Stone was contacted at Ms. Morgan's vehicle and he told the officers that she was his girl friend. A J.C. Penney's bag was found in Ms. Morgan's vehicle that contained items of clothing with the security tags and price tags still attached. A notebook was also found in the vehicle. The notebook contained instructions for stealing merchandise and then returning the items for cash. The notebook identified "stores or merchandise to get" and referred to "Jes." CP at 110.
Police found Ms. Morgan sitting in the backseat of Mr. Bankhead's vehicle. A J.C. Penney's bag of the same type found in Ms. Morgan's vehicle was found next to where she had been sitting. There were J.C. Penney's price tags on the floor near where Ms. Morgan had been sitting. There were numerous items in Mr. Bankhead's trunk, such as bags, duffel bags, and electronic equipment. Mr. Bankhead told the officers that most of these things did not belong to him. Based on these facts, the magistrate did not abuse his discretion in issuing the search warrant.
Affirm.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
Sweeney, C.J., Schultheis, J., Concur.