State v. Ballard

10 Citing cases

  1. State v. Hedge

    793 S.W.2d 478 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 4 times

    The rule of strict construction does not require that the court ignore either common sense or evident statutory purpose. State v. Hobokin, 768 S.W.2d 76, 77 (Mo. banc 1989); State v. Ballard, 294 S.W.2d 666, 669 (Mo.App. 1956). Chapter 575 is entitled "Offenses Against the Administration of Justice."

  2. State v. Hobokin

    768 S.W.2d 76 (Mo. 1989)   Cited 22 times

    The rule of strict construction does not require that the court ignore either common sense or evident statutory purpose. State v. Ballard, 294 S.W.2d 666, 669 (Mo.App. 1956). It is evident that the purpose of § 575.090 is to guard against the inconvenience and alarm that may be occasioned by making a false report to members of the public.

  3. State v. Stoner

    473 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. 1971)   Cited 2 times
    In State v Stoner (473 S.W.2d 363 [Mo]), the Supreme Court of Missouri held that a coin receptacle in a pay phone is a "safe" within the meaning of a statute prohibiting possession of tools commonly used to break into safes.

    In view, however, of the above definition of a safe, which would encompass the metal coin receptacle here, and the obvious intent of the legislature to protect such depositories by making it a felony to possess tools, implements, etc., adapted for breaking into the same, the rule of strict construction should not be here applied. Rather, the statement in State v. Ballard, Mo.App., 294 S.W.2d 666, 669[1-4], should apply: "The rule of strict construction is not violated by according the language used by the legislature its full meaning in support of the policy and aim of the enactment. The rule does not compel a narrow or forced construction, out of harmony with the manifest purpose and intent of the statute or one which would exclude cases from it that are obviously within its provisions.

  4. State v. Wilbur

    462 S.W.2d 653 (Mo. 1971)   Cited 4 times

    38 S.W. 909. See also State v. Ballard, Mo.App., 294 S.W.2d 666; State v. Hook, Mo.App., 433 S.W.2d 41, construing similar language in § 557.090, on bribery of witnesses. The absence of "be brought" language in § 557.080 and § 557.090 would seem to afford a basis for distinguishing those statutes from the one here under consideration.

  5. State v. Laplante

    148 S.W.3d 347 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 17 times
    Holding that a “motorized bicycle” or “mini-bike” was a “motor vehicle” for purposes of the DWI statute where it was operated on a city street

    Id.; State v. Ballard, 294 S.W.2d 666, 669 (Mo.App. 1956). Appellant argues that the legislature did not intend for section 577.010 to apply to mini-bike operators.

  6. State v. Daugherty

    744 S.W.2d 849 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 4 times

    That limitation is recognized in this state. State v. Ballard, 294 S.W.2d 666 (Mo.App. 1956). Section 568.175 was adopted as part of a bill pertaining to the welfare of children and included provisions governing the adoption of children.

  7. State v. Gully

    716 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 4 times
    In State v. Gully, 716 S.W.2d 892 (Mo.App. 1986), this Court pointed out that the General Assembly, in enacting § 569.170 and the other burglary related statutes effective January 1, 1979, added the term "inhabitable structure" (as statutorily defined) with the specific intent to broaden the objects of forcible entry which would trigger the applicability of such statutes.

    It would seem illogical to hold that while the legislature did not intend that the applicability of § 569 depend on the presence or absence of an occupant of the structure, it did intend the section's applicability to turn on the seemingly much less relevant factor of whether or not the structure has actually been slept in. Statutes are not interpreted in an illogical or forced way where a logical interpretation is available. See State v. Ballard, 294 S.W.2d 666, 669 (Mo.App. 1956). Thus, we hold § 569.010(2)(c) includes any vehicle or structure of the type which is commonly used for overnight accommodation, whether or not the vehicle has, as of the date of the alleged offense, been so used. Appellant's first point is ruled against him.

  8. State v. Davis

    598 S.W.2d 189 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)   Cited 3 times

    The rule does not compel a narrow or forced construction, out of harmony with the manifest purpose and intent of the statute ...." State v. Ballard, 294 S.W.2d 666, 669 (Mo.App. 1956). Section 167.031 and its related sections are primarily directed at school attendance.

  9. State v. Shell

    571 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978)   Cited 10 times

    The rule does not compel a narrow or forced construction, out of harmony with the manifest purpose and intent of the statute or one which would exclude cases from it that are obviously within its provisions." State v. Ballard, 294 S.W.2d 666, 669 (Mo. App. 1956). We must view the crucial words in the context of the statute and assume that the legislature did not use meaningless words.

  10. State v. Hook

    433 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968)   Cited 19 times

    This hearing was continued to February 15, 1966, when it was held and Hook was bound over to the circuit court. Defendant relies on the case of State v. Ballard, Mo.App., 294 S.W.2d 666, in support of her contention that no matter was pending at the time defendant is alleged to have committed the offense charged, and that therefore her actions do not constitute a violation of the statute. In State v. Ballard, the defendant had been arrested and taken before the circuit attorney in the City of St. Louis.