Opinion
No. COA02-917
Filed 1 April 2003 This case not for publication
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 2 May 2002 by Judge W. Allen Cobb, Jr. in Columbus County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 March 2003.
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Belinda A. Smith, for the State. Paul T. Cleavenger for defendant-appellant.
Columbus County No. 01 CRS 052581.
Jimmy Baldwin ("defendant") appeals from a judgment of the Columbus County Superior Court imposed as a result of a jury verdict finding him guilty of second degree trespass for which he was given a split sentence of fifteen days in jail and supervised probation of thirty-six months. We find no error.
The State's evidence tends to show that on 1 August 2001, defendant was on the premises of the Hasty Mart Convenience Store, where he was grunting and/or making lewd comments to female patrons as they entered the store. When he was asked to leave the store by the store's owner, David Worley, defendant refused to leave. As a result, Worley called the police. Officer Chris Olsen ("Officer Olsen") of the Chadbourn Police Department responded to the call for assistance at Hasty Mart. Once Officer Olsen arrived, Worley again asked defendant to leave the premises. Again, defendant refused. Officer Olsen also asked defendant to leave, but defendant refused to do so. Officer Olsen then arrested defendant for trespassing.
At trial, defendant proceeded pro se and testified in his own behalf. Defendant recounted that some three weeks before the 1 August 2001 incident, he had a previous disagreement with Worley over a vehicle repair performed by Worley's Automotive and Tire. Defendant stated that he contacted the Chadbourn Police Department about the disagreement after he and Worley could not come to an agreement about his vehicle repair. Defendant testified that on 1 August 2001, he purchased some food at Hasty Mart and was eating in a designated area. Defendant insisted that he was not causing any type of disturbance, and that he was deprived of his constitutional rights when he was arrested for trespassing. Defendant testified that he and Officer Olsen had also had previous "incidents."
As defendant represented himself at trial, the court on its own motion, moved to dismiss the charge against defendant at the close of the State's evidence and at the close of all of the evidence. The court denied these motions, and the matter of defendant's guilt was submitted to the jury, which found him guilty as charged.
On appeal, defendant argues only that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the charge against him because the evidence was insufficient to establish the essential elements of second degree trespass. We disagree.
A motion to dismiss based upon insufficient evidence is properly denied if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and giving the State every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom, "`there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged and of the defendant being the perpetrator of the offense.'" State v. Williams, 150 N.C. App. 497, 501, 563 S.E.2d 616, 618 (2002) (quoting State v. Crawford, 344 N.C. 65, 73, 472 S.E.2d 920, 925 (1996)). "Substantial evidence" has been defined as that quantum of evidence that "`a reasonable juror would consider sufficient to support a conclusion that each essential element of the crime exists.'" Id. (quoting State v. Baldwin, 141 N.C. App. 596, 604, 540 S.E.2d 815, 821 (2000)).
As a general proposition, one is guilty of second degree trespass "if without authorization, [he] enters or remains on [the] premises of another: (1) after he has been notified not to enter or remain there by the owner, by a person in charge of the premises, by a lawful occupant, or by another authorized person."
State v. Marcopolos, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 572 S.E.2d 820, 821 (2002) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-159.13 (2001)). In Marcopolos, this Court reiterated that a person "who lawfully enters a place may be subject to [being convicted of] trespass if he . . . remains [in that place] after being asked to leave by someone with authority." Id. at ___, 572 S.E.2d at 822. In the instant case, the evidence in the light most favorable to the State tends to show that defendant did lawfully enter the Hasty Mart store on 1 August 2001. However, the owner of the store twice asked defendant to leave after complaints that defendant was grunting and/or making lewd comments towards female patrons of the store. When defendant refused to leave, the store owner called the police. When an officer responded to the scene, both he and the owner again asked defendant to leave the premises. Defendant again refused to leave the store, and he was thereafter arrested.
We conclude that this evidence was sufficient to prove all of the essential elements of second degree trespass. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss and submitting the charge to the jury.
Having so concluded, we hold that defendant received a fair trial, free from prejudicial error.
No error.
Judges BRYANT and ELMORE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).