Opinion
2013 KA 0148
2013-09-13
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. DAVID BAKER
Walter P. Reed District Attorney Scott Gardner Ken Dohre Assistant District Attorneys Franklinton, Louisiana and Kathryn Landry Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Appellee State of Louisiana Lieu T. Vo Clark Mandeville, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant/Appellant David Baker
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
On Appeal from the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of Washington
State of Louisiana
No. 99404
Honorable William Knight, Judge Presiding
Walter P. Reed
District Attorney
Scott Gardner
Ken Dohre
Assistant District Attorneys
Franklinton, Louisiana
and
Kathryn Landry
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Counsel for Appellee
State of Louisiana
Lieu T. Vo Clark
Mandeville, Louisiana
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
David Baker
BEFORE: PETTIGREW, MCDONALD, AND McCLENDON, JJ.
McCLENDON, J .
Defendant, David Baker, was charged by grand jury indictment with three counts of first degree murder, violations of LSA-R.S. 14:30. He pled not guilty. After the guilt phase of a bifurcated trial, the jury found defendant guilty as charged on all three counts. However, the jury deadlocked during the penalty phase. Defendant filed a motion for new trial, but the trial court denied that motion and imposed three consecutive sentences of life imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The trial court also denied defendant's motion to reconsider sentence. Defendant now appeals, alleging two related assignments of error. For the following reasons, we affirm defendant's convictions and sentences.
FACTS
Late in the evening on April 5, 2008, Detective Brian Mackinnon of the Kerr County Sheriff's Office received a call for assistance from a Texas state trooper who was involved in the pursuit of a green Ford Taurus. Defendant, the driver of the Ford Taurus, led a convoy of officers on a pursuit for roughly thirty minutes before he hit a set of spike strips and was forced to pull onto the side of the road. After defendant was forcibly removed from the Ford Taurus, he was placed into the back seat of Detective Mackinnon's police cruiser and advised of his Miranda rights.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
During an on-scene search of defendant's vehicle, the officers recovered two handguns and a rifle. Because the officers were having trouble positively identifying defendant, Detective Mackinnon asked him whether he had any outstanding warrants. Defendant replied that he had an open warrant in Louisiana for murder. When the dispatcher could not locate any such open warrant, Louisiana authorities performed a welfare check at the home of James Dial, the registered owner of the Ford Taurus.
Law enforcement in Bogalusa responded to James Dial's home on Carroll Road to perform the requested welfare check. Upon entering the residence, they discovered three deceased bodies. The body of Emma Baker, defendant's wife, was located in the living room of the residence. The bound and duct-taped body of Shirley Walker, Baker's mother, was located in the bathtub of the front bathroom of the residence. The body of James Dial, Walker's ex-husband, was located in a rear bedroom of the residence.
Dr. Michael DeFatta, the chief deputy coroner and forensic pathologist for St. Tammany Parish, performed the autopsies on all three victims. He concluded that Emma Baker died from a gunshot wound to her right temple, and he recovered one bullet from her brain. Shirley Walker died of a gunshot wound to her forehead, and Dr. DeFatta was able to recover a bullet from her brain, as well. With respect to James Dial, Dr. DeFatta concluded that he died of blunt force trauma to the right side of his head, which was indicative of several blows. He also noted an incised wound across Dial's neck and throat, but the nature of the bleeding around that injury led Dr. DeFatta to conclude that it was not the main cause of death.
Charles Watson, a forensic scientist at the Louisiana State Police Crime Laboratory, compared the bullets recovered from the autopsies of Emma Baker and Shirley Walker to the firearms recovered from the Ford Taurus. He concluded that they were fired from one of the handguns found in defendant's possession at the time of his arrest - a .38 Smith & Wesson Safety Hammerless revolver. Stacey Williams, a forensic DNA analyst with the Louisiana State Police Crime Lab, performed an analysis on a sledgehammer recovered from the Bogalusa residence. She concluded that hairs found on the head of the hammer were consistent with DNA from James Dial. Further, DNA found on the handle of the hammer were consistent with James Dial as a major contributor and defendant as a minor contributor. The jury found defendant guilty of the first degree murders of Baker, Walker, and Dial.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
In his first assignment of error defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial. Defendant's second assignment of error asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to play a statement he made to Washington Parish authorities without subjecting himself to cross-examination. Defendant raised his second assignment of error in his motion for new trial, and it is the only argument from this motion that defendant renews on appeal.
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress inculpatory statements. The trial court held a hearing on defendant's motion to suppress on May 20, 2011 and May 26, 2011. At the hearing, the state introduced evidence supporting three statements that defendant made to law enforcement. The first was defendant's patrol car statements to Detective Mackinnon on April 5, 2008, the night of his arrest. The second was a statement taken on April 6, 2008, by Texas Ranger Kyle Dean at the behest of Louisiana authorities. The third was a statement made by defendant to Detectives Michele Brumfield and Tom Anderson of the Washington Parish Sheriff's Office on April 12, 2008, after defendant had been transported back to Louisiana. After the hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress as it related to all of these statements.
Prior to the beginning of trial, the state informed defendant and the court that it intended to introduce both of the statements defendant made to Texas authorities, but not the statement that he made to Washington Parish authorities. At that time, the state also requested that the trial court restrict defense counsel from referencing that Washington Parish interview in his opening statement and from introducing that statement without defendant subjecting himself to cross-examination. Defense counsel objected, but the trial court ultimately agreed with the state, excluding the Washington Parish statement as inadmissible hearsay without defendant subjecting himself to cross-examination and finding that its introduction was not necessary to place defendant's earlier statements in context. Defense counsel objected to this ruling and proffered the contents of the Washington Parish statement to be considered on appeal. Defendant later testified on his own behalf, but neither side sought to introduce the Washington Parish statement at that time.
Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the present trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. LSA-C.E. art. 801(C). A declarant is "unavailable as a witness" when the declarant cannot or will not appear in court and testify to the substance of his statement made outside of court. LSA-C.E. art. 804(A). Unavailability includes situations in which the declarant is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of his statement. See LSA-C.E. art. 804(A)(1). A statement, which was at the time of its making so far tended to subject the declarant to criminal liability, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true, is considered a statement against interest not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable. However, a statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. See LSA-C.E. art. 804(B)(3).
The Louisiana Supreme Court has declined to allow a criminal defendant to introduce exculpatory statements without subjecting himself to cross-examination on them. See State v. McDonald, 387 So.2d 1116, 1121 (La.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 957, 101 S.Ct. 366, 66 L.Ed.2d 222 (1980); State v. Guillory, 373 So.2d 133, 135 (La. 1979). This court has also recognized that self-serving declarations by an accused, unless part of the res gestae, are not admissible in evidence. State v. Day, 468 So.2d 1336, 1339 (La.App. 1 Or. 1985). However, the supreme court has recognized the rule that declarations made at one time or having some connection with each other must be introduced together. See State v. Cardinale, 251 La. 827, 844, 206 So.2d 510, 516, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 959, 89 S.Ct. 388, 21 L.Ed.2d 372 (1968); see also LSA-R.S. 15:450.
In the instant case, defendant's statements to Texas law enforcement officers were purely inculpatory. He stated to Detective Mackinnon on April 5, 2008, that he was wanted in Louisiana for murder. In his April 6, 2008 statement to Ranger Dean, defendant talked generally about the murders without getting into specific detail, but he offered that Emma Baker deserved more than death and that her children were better off without her. Both of these statements were made within a day of each other, before defendant's transfer to Louisiana.
Defendant's third statement, made to Washington Parish Sheriff's detectives on April 12, 2008, was in contrast in both its instigation and its amount of detail from those statements he made to the Texas authorities. While defendant's Texas statements were instigated by law enforcement officials, defendant sought to make his Washington Parish statement by informing jail officials that he wished to speak to the investigating detectives. Further, while defendant's earlier statements referenced his involvement in the murders generally, defendant's Washington Parish statement set forth in detail defendant's version of the killings. Specifically, defendant claimed that he killed James Dial in a struggle after Dial attempted to force defendant at gunpoint to perform oral sex on him. Defendant also claimed that he killed Emma Baker and Shirley Walker when they entered the residence shortly after the fight with Dial and mocked defendant for believing that Baker was not going to pursue a divorce from defendant.
Under these facts and circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in restricting defendant from introducing the contents of his Washington Parish statement without subjecting himself to cross-examination. This third statement was not so closely related in time or content to the Texas statements so as to require its introduction for completeness. Further, the statement was instigated by defendant himself, and it included claims wherein defendant clearly sought to diminish his culpability for the killings. These exculpatory remarks were not corroborated by any other facts that had been introduced at trial, and their implicit claims of self-defense, or sudden passion or heat of blood, were contradicted partly by evidence that Shirley Walker was bound and duct-taped before she was killed.
These assignments of error are without merit.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's convictions and sentences are affirmed.
CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.