State v. Baker

12 Citing cases

  1. State v. Hoyt

    304 N.W.2d 884 (Minn. 1981)   Cited 54 times
    Holding that good-faith claim of right negates required criminal intent

    The issue before the court is whether defendant, in her offer of proof, presented a sufficient prima facie case of claim of right to create a fact issue; that is, she believed she had a license to enter St. Mary's and there were reasonable grounds for her belief. The district court appellate panel agreed that the criteria stated in State v. Baker, 231 N.C. 136, 56 S.E.2d 424 (1949) were proper for a determination of claim of right. The court there, in a criminal trespass action, declared: Although the State may prove beyond a reasonable doubt in a prosecution under this statute that the accused intentionally entered upon land in the actual or constructive possession of the prosecutor [owner] after being forbidden to do so by the prosecutor and thus establish as an ultimate fact that the accused entered the locus in quo without legal right, the accused may still escape conviction by showing as an affirmative defense that he entered under a bona fide claim of right. * * * When an accused seeks to excuse an entry without legal right as one taking place under a bona fide claim of right, he must prove two things: (1) That he believed he had a right to enter; and (2) that he had reasonable grounds for such belief.

  2. Dunbar Corp. v. Lindsey

    905 F.2d 754 (4th Cir. 1990)   Cited 92 times
    Holding that a "'heightened pleading standard' is highly appropriate in actions against government officials"

    Matthews, 235 N.C. at 283, 69 S.E.2d at 555. "'Actual possession of land consists in exercising acts of dominion over it, and in making the ordinary use of it to which it is adapted, and in taking the profits of which it is susceptible.'" Id., 235 N.C. at 284, 69 S.E.2d at 556 (quoting State v. Baker, 231 N.C. 136, 139, 56 S.E.2d 424, 426 (1949)). See also Dobbs, Trespass to Land in North Carolina, 47 N.C.L.Rev. at 45 ("Actual possession involves physical presence upon the land or upon some portion of it, and although this presence need not be continuous, it must involve more than an occasional or casual entry."); 75 Am.Jur.2d Trespass § 25 (1974) (actual possession shown "where, by the particular use [one] makes of the land, [one] indicates with precision the extent to which he proposes to enjoy it to the exclusion of others.").

  3. State v. Davis

    261 N.C. 463 (N.C. 1964)   Cited 2 times

    "* * * (I)t is apparent the Legislature intended to prevent the unwanted invasion of the property rights of another. S. v. Cooke, supra ( 246 N.C. 518, 98 S.E.2d 885); S. v. Baker, 231 N.C. 136, 56 S.E.2d 424. It is not the act of entering or going on the property which is condemned; it is the intent or manner in which the entry is made that makes the conduct criminal.

  4. City of Charleston v. Mitchell

    239 S.C. 376 (S.C. 1961)   Cited 29 times

    Its purpose is `to protect possession only.' State v. Baker, supra. [ 231 N.C. 136, 56 S.E.2d 424.] We have repeatedly held in applying G.S. § 14-126 that a person who remains on the land of another after being directed to leave is guilty of a wrongful entry even though the original entrance was peaceful.

  5. State v. Avent

    253 N.C. 580 (N.C. 1961)   Cited 18 times

    Three, did the accused so enter upon the land, of another after being forbidden to do so by the person in possession? S. v. Baker, 231 N.C. 136, 56 S.E.2d 424. G.S. 14-126 has been the statute law of this State for many years, and reads: "No one shall make entry into any lands and tenements, or term for years, but in case where entry is given by law; and in such case, not with strong hand nor with multitude of people, but only in a peaceable and easy manner; and if any man do the contrary, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."

  6. State v. Cooke

    248 N.C. 485 (N.C. 1958)   Cited 18 times
    In State v. Cooke, 248 N.C. 485, 103 S.E.2d 846 (1958), defendants asked the trial court to take judicial notice of a civil action in the United States District Court involving the same matter.

    The severity of the punishment for such invasion is measured by the character of the entry. But the essential ingredient in the crime is possession by the person named in the warrant. If the possession is actual, the State need only establish that fact, but if the State fails to establish actual possession, it must establish a right to possession which by operation of law implies possession. S. v. Clyburn, 247 N.C. 455; S. v. Cooke, supra; S. v. Baker, 231 N.C. 136, 56 S.E.2d 424. Defendants do not controvert the fact that the corporation named in the warrant had physical possession of the property nor do they deny that over the protest of the agent of the corporation they took possession.

  7. State v. Clyburn

    247 N.C. 455 (N.C. 1958)   Cited 25 times

    " Looking at the titles, it is apparent the Legislature intended to prevent the unwanted invasion of the property rights of another. S. v. Cooke, supra; S. v. Baker, 231 N.C. 136, 56 S.E.2d 424. It is not the act of entering or going on the property which is condemned; it is the intent or manner in which the entry is made that makes the conduct criminal. A peaceful entry negatives liability under G.S. 14-126.

  8. State v. Cooke

    246 N.C. 518 (N.C. 1957)   Cited 16 times

    If the State fails to establish that prosecutor has possession (actual or constructive) no crime has been established. S. v. Baker, 231 N.C. 136, 56 S.E.2d 424; S. v. Faggart, 170 N.C. 737, 86 S.E. 31; S. v. Yellowday, 152 N.C. 793, 67 S.E. 480; S. v. Whitehurst, 70 N.C. 85. Where an interference with the possession of property is a crime, it is necessary to allege in the warrant or bill of indictment the rightful owner or possessor of the property, and the proof must correspond with the charge.

  9. State v. Travis

    139 W. Va. 363 (W. Va. 1954)   Cited 9 times

    We are citing numerous cases decided in other jurisdictions which are to the same effect. See State v. Baker, (N.C.) 56 S.E.2d 424; State v. Yellowday, (N.C.) 67 S.E. 480; Murphey v. State, (Ga.) 41 S.E. 685; Hayes v. State, (Ga.App.) 79 S.E. 761; Myers v. State, (Ind.) 130 N.E. 116; People v. Stevens, (N. Y.) 16 N.E. 53. It is thus seen that there is ample authority for inquiry into the element of good or bad faith in prosecutions under the statute here considered. The next question which arises is: Who is required to show that good faith and what is he required to show? An answer to the first part of that question will be found in the case of State v. Glenn, (N.C.) 23 S.E. 1004. It is there held that it is incumbent upon a defendant charged with willful trespass to show that he entered under a license or a bona fide claim of right.

  10. State v. Mitchell

    759 S.E.2d 335 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014)   Cited 1 times

    Here, defendant needed to present substantial evidence that (1) defendant believed he had a right to enter the property and (2) defendant had reasonable grounds to support this belief. State v. Baker, 231 N.C. 136, 140, 56 S.E.2d 424, 427 (1949). Defendant argues that his testimony constitutes substantial evidence of this affirmative defense.