State v. Bailey

11 Citing cases

  1. Martinez v. Sedillo

    137 N.M. 103 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 18 times
    Stating that matters of statutory construction are reviewed de novo

    State v. Cleve, 1999-NMSC-017, ¶ 17, 127 N.M. 240, 980 P.2d 23; State v. Wilkins, 88 N.M. 116, 119, 537 P.2d 1012, 1015 (Ct.App. 1975) (stating that "before applying a special statute over a general statute the two should be read together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to a consistent legislative policy") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {12} As a separate point in her brief in chief, Petitioner argues, based on State v. Bailey, 118 N.M. 466, 882 P.2d 57 (Ct.App. 1994), that the metropolitan court did not have jurisdiction to grant an injunction because of the lack of any procedure for it to follow in granting such relief and that the metropolitan court could not issue an injunction on its own, without notice to Petitioner. In Bailey, a criminal case, this Court held that a district court did not have the authority to issue an injunction prohibiting a defendant convicted of Motor Vehicle Code violations from operating a motor vehicle until he complied with the licensing and registration provisions of the Code.

  2. Best v. Marino

    2017 NMCA 73 (N.M. Ct. App. 2017)   Cited 11 times
    Considering a statutory order of protection

    {16} This issue was addressed in State v. Bailey , in which the defendant defied an injunctive order that required him to obtain a driver's license and registration prior to operating his vehicle. 1994–NMCA–107, ¶ 3, 118 N.M. 466, 882 P.2d 57. After the defendant refused to comply with the injunction, the district court found him in contempt.

  3. State v. Rudy B.

    243 P.3d 726 (N.M. 2010)   Cited 41 times
    Holding that there is no right to a jury as factfinder in a juvenile amenability hearing, just as there is no such right in a sentencing hearing generally

    {14} Subject matter jurisdiction, on the other hand, implicates a court's "power to decide" the issue before it. State v. Bailey, 118 N.M. 466, 469, 882 P.2d 57, 60 (Ct. App. 1994). Put another way, "the term 'jurisdictional error' should be confined to instances in which the court was not competent to act."

  4. State v. Mortensen

    No. A-1-CA-41007 (N.M. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2024)

    Jurisdictional error refers to an action taken by a court that does not have the power to adjudicate the question involved. See State v. Bailey, 1994-NMCA-107, ¶ 10, 118 N.M. 466, 882 P.2d 57. The sole question on appeal, then, is whether the district court had the authority to proceed as it did, even if its decision was in error or was an abuse of the court's discretion.

  5. State v. Lyster

    No. A-1-CA-36229 (N.M. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2020)

    This statement of law has been reaffirmed even in instances where the district court crafts a remedy in excess of the authority prescribed by law. See, e.g., State v. Bailey, 1994-NMCA-107, ¶¶ 4-7, 118 N.M. 466, 882 P.2d 57 (holding, notwithstanding the fact the district court lacked authority to issue an injunction in a criminal proceeding, that the district court's issuance of the injunction was erroneous but not in excess of jurisdiction); id. ¶¶ 7-10 (addressing whether the injunction-issuing court had subject matter and personal jurisdiction to act and rejecting the suggestion that judicial error constitutes a third form of jurisdictional defect). Here, the district court was called upon to resolve Ms. Lyster's petition for a new order of protection.

  6. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't

    Docket No. A-1-CA-36305 (N.M. Ct. App. May. 24, 2019)

    In so doing, the Department in effect ignored the writ—and did so at its peril. See State v. Bailey, 1994-NMCA-107, ¶ 11, 118 N.M. 466, 882 P.2d 57 (commenting that the defendant who violated an injunction "did not have the right simply to ignore the court's ruling; in effect, to become his own judge and jury"). {38} We recognize that the Department's failure to comply to the best of its ability with the Peremptory Writ was due, in part, to the adverse AHO Decision.

  7. Vandervossen v. City of Espanola

    130 N.M. 287 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 15 times
    Explaining that this Court exercising appellate jurisdiction is not a fact finding body

    These later cases, like Bogan, reflect a trend in modern New Mexico jurisprudence that discourages the indiscriminate use of terms such as jurisdictional error and voidness to describe what amounts to little more than an agency acting contrary to statute, an error that must be challenged in a timely manner. See State v. Bailey, 118 N.M. 466, 469, 882 P.2d 57, 60 (Ct.App. 1994); Sundance Mech. Util. Corp. v. Atlas, 109 N.M. 683, 687-90, 789 P.2d 1250, 1254-57 (1990); Alvarez v. County of Bernalillo, 115 N.M. 328, 328, 850 P.2d 1031, 1031 (Ct.App. 1993) (observing that "[f]ew words in the legal lexicon are as mischievous as the word `void'"). The Supreme Court's opinion in Mechem on which this Court expressly relied in Bogan best illustrates a truly void zoning decision subject to collateral attack, because in that case the municipality used its zoning authority to control property ownership, not just property use.

  8. Beverly v. Beverly

    13 P.3d 77 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 2 times

    {9} The court had the authority to hold Wayne in criminal contempt for ignoring a direct order. See State v. Bailey, 118 N.M. 466, 467-68, 882 P.2d 57, 58-59 (Ct.App. 1994). Charged with indirect criminal contempt, i.e., disobedience outside the presence of the court, Wayne was entitled to all procedural rights afforded defendants in criminal proceedings.

  9. Cohn v. Cohn

    123 N.M. 85 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 8 times
    Holding that “parents have a common law continuing duty to [financially] support a severely disabled child if ... the child was so disabled before reaching the age of majority”

    4. After an evidentiary hearing the district court concluded, in part, that: (1) because Robert failed to appeal the 1986 award within the time allowed by law he was foreclosed from challenging the judgment by the collateral bar rule affirmed in State v. Bailey, 118 N.M. 466, 882 P.2d 57 (Ct.App. 1994); (2) even if the court in 1994 had no jurisdiction to enforce the ongoing effect of the 1986 judgment, Robert was required to pay the full amount of the arrearages plus the statutory interest that accrued through February 1, 1995; and (3) the 1986 judgment should remain in full force and effect. In the event of reversal on appeal on this third holding, the court reserved jurisdiction to determine whether the 1986 judgment reserved jurisdiction for the court to declare the $250 per month obligation as alimony and to award judgment accordingly, and to determine whether that judgment reserved jurisdiction for a determination of ongoing spousal support and to award judgment accordingly.

  10. Spear v. McDermott

    121 N.M. 609 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 18 times
    In Spear, 916 P.2d at 234-35, jurisdiction was determined based on the children's and mother's domicile at the time abuse and neglect proceedings were initiated. The court held mother's change in domicile to the reservation during pendency of the proceedings did not divest the state court of jurisdiction obtained when the action was first brought.

    Even so, it would appear to be an error requiring correction by way of an appeal or a writ proceeding, rather than a circumstance causing a loss of jurisdiction. See, e.g., State v. Bailey, 118 N.M. 466, 469, 882 P.2d 57, 60 (Ct.App.) (district court that issued improper injunction did not lose jurisdiction so as to allow defendant to violate injunction and attack the order collaterally), cert. denied, 118 N.M. 256, 880 P.2d 867 (1994); Mid-American, 49 F.3d at 292 (defendant held in contempt for violation of court order; court later determined that complaint failed to state cause of action and should be dismissed; defendant still required to obey order, even if it was later determined to be erroneous, despite defendant's claim that court lacked jurisdiction to enter order). In summary, even if the decisions of the children's court were not in conformance with the ICWA, the court's jurisdiction and power to act in the matter would not simply end, and its ability to enter the order that Spear disobeyed would not be affected.