Opinion
April 3, 2008.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This case was tried to the court on the charge of Creating A Public Disturbance, General Statutes Section 53a-181a, an infraction. The State's Bill of Particulars reads: "with intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, the defendant . . . engaged in . . . violent, tumultuous and threatening behavior and annoyed . . . another person by offensive conduct . . . and made unreasonable noise."
Section 53a-181a provides, in pertinent part, as follows: "A person is guilty of creating a public disturbance when with intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he (1) engages in . . . violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior; or (2) annoys . . . another person by offensive conduct; or (3) makes unreasonable noise."
On the credible evidence, the court makes the following factual findings:
In making the necessary credibility assessments, I have applied the standard criteria, including the factors set forth in the Connecticut Selected Jury Instructions Criminal, Revised to December 1, 2007, Sections 2.4-2 and 2.4-7.
(1) On September 19, 2006, Mr. Jonathon Luiz was employed by the Town of Canton as an Administrative Services Coordinator; he had been so employed for approximately nineteen months. Mr. Luiz's immediate supervisor was the town's Chief Administrative Officer, who in turn, reported to the First Selectman. On September 19, at about 3:00 p.m., Mr. Luiz was in his office on the second floor of the Town Hall; he was meeting with a former Board of Education employee discussing matters related to retirement. Mr. Luiz's office was adjacent to, and shared a wall with, the office of the First Selectman.
(2) At said time and place, Mr. Luiz heard a loud voice from the adjacent office; he was alarmed, went out into the hallway, and observed and heard the defendant hollering and yelling at the First Selectperson, Ms. Mary Tomolonius. As the defendant's hollering became increasingly louder, Mr. Luiz became more concerned; he (and the person with whom he was conferring) felt it was a serious situation, considered it advisable to call 911, and Mr. Luiz did so. The police responded, but apparently not during the course of the incident. Mr. Luiz estimated that the duration of the incident was approximately two minutes. During that time, he heard the defendant, in a loud voice, questioning Ms. Tomolonius as to why she was not doing anything about the "field issues"; when Ms. Tomolonius tried to explain, the defendant would interrupt her in a shouting tone; Mr. Luiz heard "sit on fat ass" and "don't do anything." Then, he later heard the defendant say: "this is personal, I'm going to get you."
The germane portions of Mr. Luiz's testimony were as follows:
A. There was a lot of swearing, and somebody was yelling.
Q. Now Mr. Luiz, is it fair to say that you were alarmed at this occurrence?
A. Yes
Q. And, you mention hollering and swearing. Could you recall specifically what words were spoken by Mr. Bahre?
A. Fat ass was the phrase that . . .
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A. That was repeated a few times.
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Q. Now, was this hollering maintaining a certain audible level?
A. In my opinion, it increased. At first it was loud, and it caught my attention. And then it increased . . . as the hollering began, it got louder.
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Q. Now of the hollering that you also heard, apart from the swearing, were there any other words that you were able to discern, that Mr. Bahre was yelling?
A. I recall that Mr. Bahre . . . had said — He questioned why the First selectman . . . was not doing anything about the field issues that existed between him and the maintenance workers on the fields. And he just kept, you know, Mary, why aren't you doing anything? And Mary would try to respond, he would cut her off. He would get louder; ask her the same question again. She would respond, you know, we've already been over this. And then he would say . . . you just sit there on your fat ass, you don't do anything. He was hollering this. And then I recall, toward the end of the hollering, he said this is personal, I'm going to get you.
(3) Mr. Luiz's office is at the same end of the building as that of Ms. Tomolonius. Other second floor offices, located at the other end of the building, are occupied by land use personnel: the building official, the zoning officer, town planner/wetlands agent, fire marshal/emergency management coordinator, town engineer, and secretarial personnel.
(4) The defendant, age fifty-one, has resided in Canton his entire life; he has been active in youth baseball. Between 2:30 and 3:00 p.m. on September 19, he proceeded to Millenium Field to reclaim baseball equipment, having been directed to do so by the police. At the Field, he encountered a public works employee; discussions with that person did not result in the release of any equipment, and accordingly, the defendant re-contacted the police. An officer arrived, further discussions ensued, and the defendant was instructed to go to Town Hall. The defendant went directly to Town Hall, went to the second floor, and proceeded to the First Selectperson's Office.
The equipment consisted of batting practice safety items. According to the testimony, the equipment was quite heavy and would have required more than one person to remove it. The defendant had previously filed a complaint with the police, and was told by the police that the equipment was at the field.
According to the testimony, the defendant was not specifically told to go to the First Selectperson's Office.
(5) At all relevant times, Ms. Mary Tomolonius was the First Selectperson of the Town of Canton. On September 19, 2006, at approximately 3:00 p.m., Ms. Tomolonius was in her second floor office on the phone with the door closed. She opened the door; the defendant was in the threshold and began yelling and screaming at her "about the field" and that "his stuff had been taken from the field." Ms. Tomolonius retreated from the open door to behind her desk; the defendant followed her; continued yelling, leaning over her desk, and coming within inches of her face. Ms. Tomolonius testified, "I was terrified; I thought he was going to hurt me." The defendant then said: "This is personal, I am going to get you"; Ms. Tomolonius testified she "felt threatened and scared." The defendant then turned from Ms. Tomolonius, and on the way out, "gave her the finger." She testified that judging from his tone of voice, appearance, and demeanor, the defendant seemed upset and agitated. The incident lasted approximately two minutes. Ms. Tomolonius also testified that at one point during the incident she saw Mr. Luiz just outside, but did not call him in as she was "stunned."
Ms. Tomolonius was asked if she opened the door in response to a knock; she stated: "I honestly don't recall . . . we had been keeping our doors closed because of Matt [b]ecause of his behavior at town hall . . . [h]is kind of harassment of town staff."
Pertinent testimony by Ms. Tomolonius was as follows:
A. . . . I was sitting in my office on the second floor of town hall, and I was talking on the phone.
Q. . . . did something unusual occur?
A. . . . I got up and opened the door, and Matt Bahre was there, and he started to scream at me.
Q. Now, subsequently after opening the door and hearing the hollering, would you indicate to the Judge what happened next?
A. Matt was just yelling about — about the field, about — I believe that somebody had taken his stuff. He was just screaming at me, . . . I kept saying I don't know what you're talking about . . . I didn't know what it was that Matt was referring to. I kept trying to say I don't know what you're talking about. And he just, — his face got red, his eyes were, you know, very angry. I finally moved behind my desk, because I was increasingly afraid of him and — he just kept — he just kept yelling.
Q. . . . did you make any attempt to calm him down?
A. I just kept trying to talk softer . . . I thought that would help alleviate the situation.
Q . . . were those attempts successful?
A. No, . . . eventually he just kind of came over the desk at me, within inches of my face. And I actually thought he was either going to assault me, or you know, harm me in some way. I was actually terrified.
Q. Did you feel threatened by these actions?
A. Absolutely.
Q. Were you alarmed?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. And do you feel that he interfered with your personal space, that you . . .
A. Yes. He was inches from my face.
Q. Do you recall specifically, any words that Mr. Bahre may have mentioned to you in this encounter?
CT Page 5334
A. That he was going to get me and it was personal.
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Q. Did this alarm you further?
A. Yes, it did.
Q. And did you feel threatened by these words?
A. Absolutely.
When asked if the incident lasted no more than a minute or two minutes, Ms. Tomolonius testified: "I can't give the actual time, but it sure seemed like a very long period of time when he was screaming at me, and being very aggressive towards me."
(6) The parties knew one another through politics and town affairs. The defendant's company, "Canton Baseball," had a relationship with the town, a conflict developed, there was an agreement regarding the maintenance of the field (memo of understanding), which agreement was terminated, and equipment claimed by Mr. Bahre was kept in a shed. According to Ms. Tomolonius, the defendant, during the incident, was screaming about the equipment being missing and not having been returned.
(7) From Ms. Tomolonius' office, the defendant went down to the first floor where, for approximately five minutes, he examined items on a bulletin board. During that time, Officer Wiley Swain, a member of the Canton Police Department for nineteen years, saw the defendant at the bulletin board, spoke briefly with him, and observed that he appeared calm. Officer Swain, as a State's rebuttal witness, testified he then went to the First Selectman's Office and observed that Ms. Tomolonius was visibly upset and crying.
I. Specific Intent
The mens rea requirement under Section 53a-181a, which the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, is that the defendant acted with the specific "intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm," or, that he was "recklessly creating a risk thereof." Section 53a-182, defining Disorderly Conduct, and Section 53a-181, defining Breach of Peace, contain essentially identical scienter language. To avoid problems of constitutional vagueness, our Supreme Court has provided judicial gloss to the mens rea language of these statutes. State v. Wolff, 237 Conn. 633 (1996); State v. Indrisano, 228 Conn. 795 (1994).
In Indrisano, dealing with Disorderly Conduct, the Supreme Court stated: "the mens rea language of 53a-182(a) can be formulated more precisely as follows: the predominant intent is to cause what a reasonable person operating under contemporary community standards would consider a disturbance to or impediment of a lawful activity, a deep feeling of vexation or provocation, or a feeling of anxiety prompted by threatened danger or harm. In order to sustain a conviction for disorderly conduct, the state must begin by demonstrating that the defendant had such a state of mind." Indrisano, 228 Conn. 810-11. In Wolff, dealing with Breach of Peace, the Supreme Court, after repeating the above interpretive language, stated: "The need to apply interpretive gloss to Section 53-182(a) that we perceived in Indrisano is equally present with regard to Section 53a-181." Since the identical specific intent language is contained in Section 53a-181a, Creating a Public Disturbance, the Indrisano interpretive gloss is applicable to the state of mind element for the infraction.
It is the court's view the State has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, the required specific intent, as embellished upon, and explained, through the interpretive gloss furnished by our Supreme Court. A specific intent can be proven circumstantially, upon a consideration of the totality of the evidence, and upon relevant proof of circumstances leading up to the incident, those following the incident, and the facts and circumstances of the incident itself. State v. Smith, 35 Conn.App. 51, 63-64 (1994). See, also: State v. Widlak, 74 Conn.App. 364, 372-73 (2002) (case involving different burden of proof), cert. denied, 264 Conn. 902 (2003). And, formation of an intent does not necessarily require planning or premeditation, but rather, a specific intent may be formed very quickly or instantaneously. See, e.g. State v. Cooper, 227 Conn. 417, 444 (1993).
The defendant's conduct (including portions of his language), as proven by the credible evidence, establishes, beyond a reasonable doubt, a predominant intent consistent with the Indrisano interpretation of identical language contained in the Disorderly Conduct statute. The defendant had been undertaking to effect the return of his equipment for some time prior to September 19, 2006. He went to the field on the afternoon of 9/19 for that purpose, apparently after having previously discussed the dispute with the police. Upon having discussions with the town employee, his efforts in such regard were frustrated and unproductive, leading to the involvement, at the field, of the police officer who told the defendant he would have to go to town hall. By his own testimony, he believed he was "getting the run-around" with respect to the return of his property; the defendant went directly to Ms. Tomolonius' office and was immediately overheard shouting, hollering, and yelling at the First Selectperson, who was in her office conducting the lawful activity of her position. The evidence did not indicate any incivility (or any preliminary words) or provocation by Ms. Tomolonius. The defendant's hollering and yelling continued, increasing in volume, and leading a person from an adjacent office to call 911; such conduct set the tone as the First Selectperson retreated to behind her desk with the defendant continuing to shout and refusing to permit Ms. Tomolonius any completed or uninterrupted response. The aforesaid, coupled with the defendant's words ("fat ass" and "this is personal, I'm going to get you") and his accompanying conduct (continued yelling and interruption, leaning over her desk and coming within inches of her face, and then directing an obscene gesture at her), all establish, in my view, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he acted with the predominant intent to cause what a reasonable person operating under contemporary community standards would consider a disturbance to or impediment of a lawful activity, a deep feeling of vexation or provocation, or a feeling of anxiety prompted by threatened danger or harm. Accordingly, it is concluded that the State has proven, by the required standard of proof, the statute's specific intent element, extending to that element its full interpretive gloss.
II. Recklessly Creating A Risk Thereof
As indicated, the State's bill of particulars alleges that the defendant acted with the required specific intent ("intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm") or, in the alternative, "recklessly causing a risk thereof."
Our Penal Code defines reckless action as follows: "[a] person acts `recklessly' with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that disregarding it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation." General Statutes Section 53a-3(13). Under this statutory definition, it is necessary "to consider objectively the nature and degree of the risk and the [defendant's] subjective awareness of that risk." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In Re Jeremy M., 100 Conn.App. 436, 448, cert. denied, 282 Conn. 927 (2007). "Subjective realization of a risk may be inferred from a person's words and conduct when viewed in the light of the surrounding circumstances." Id., quoting State v. Davila, 75 Conn.App. 432, 439, cert. denied, 264 Conn. 909 (2003). "Recklessness, however, does not involve intentional conduct because one who acts recklessly does not have a conscious objective to cause a particular result." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In Re Jeremy M., supra at 448.
It is my view that the defendant's actions and words, as set forth above, were not at all consistent with the standard of conduct which a reasonable person would have observed in like circumstances, and compel the conclusion that he created a risk of inconvenience, annoyance and alarm, as those terms have been interpreted, and limited, through the judicial gloss. Furthermore, the credible evidence of the defendant's words and conduct clearly supports an inference, reasonably drawn, that, subjectively, he was aware of the risk that such words and conduct could (and would) cause inconvenience, annoyance and alarm, as judicially interpreted and limited. From the totality of the circumstances in this case, it may be reasonably inferred that the defendant, age fifty-one, would be aware that by shouting, hollering, and yelling at Ms. Tomolonius, who was in her office conducting a lawful activity, and then continuing to do so in an even louder tone of voce, refusing to permit her to respond, leaning over her desk to within inches of her face, using the language quoted above, as well as making a threatening statement and an indecent gesture, he was creating a risk of inconvenience, annoyance and alarm.
In Indrisano, supra, 228 Conn. 810, the Supreme Court analyzed the meaning of the words "inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm." The Court stated: "Webster's Third New International Dictionary includes the following among the meanings of three statutory terms: `inconvenience' — something that disturbs or impedes; `annoyance' — vexation; a deep effect of provoking or disturbing; and `alarm' — fear; filled with anxiety as to threatening danger or harm." Cf. In Re Jeremy M., supra, 100 Conn.App. 448 fn. 9.
Analyzing the defendant's words and conduct (as set forth above), it is my view that they created a risk of inconvenience, annoyance and alarm; that the defendant was aware of, and consciously disregarded, the risk that his words and actions would result in inconvenience, annoyance and alarm; and, that his disregard of that risk, constituted a gross deviation from the conduct of a reasonable person in the same situation. The evidence indicated that Ms. Tomolonius was "stunned," "terrified," and thought she was going to be "hurt." Further, she "felt threatened and scared" and, almost immediately following the incident, was observed to be visibly upset and crying.
Additionally, the defendant's conduct, besides terrifying, upsetting, and alarming Ms. Tomolonius, caused another person (Mr. Luiz) such alarm that he deemed it necessary to dial 911.
It is concluded that, alternatively, the defendant, by his words and conduct, recklessly caused a risk of "inconvenience, annoyance or alarm."
It is recognized, of course, that a person cannot at one and the same time act both intentionally and recklessly with regard to the same act and the same result. State v. Smith, supra, 35 Conn.App. 65. However, the State alleged "recklessly caused a risk of . . ." in the alternative; the court agrees with the State's contention that if the evidence was viewed as not supporting a finding of the required specific intent, it would support a finding of "recklessly caused a risk of . . ."
III. Defendant's Actions, As Alleged.
As stated, the Bill of Particulars alleges: ". . . the defendant . . . engaged in . . . violent, tumultuous and threatening behavior and annoyed . . . another person by offensive conduct and made unreasonable noise." The first portion of the Bill (violent, tumultuous and threatening behavior) sets forth language in subdivision (1) of 53a-181a; the next portion (annoys/offensive conduct) is the language of subdivision (2). The remaining (unreasonable noise) is subdivision (3). Subdivision (1) of 53a-181a (Public Disturbance) is essentially identical to the first subdivision of 53a-182 (Disorderly Conduct); and, both are substantially identical to 53a-181(a)(1) (Breach of Peace). Similarly, subdivision (2) of 53a-181a (annoys/offensive conduct) is substantially the same as the language in subsection (2) of the Disorderly Conduct provision, Section 53a-182(2). Accordingly, case law interpreting the words contained in these statutes is helpful.
In Indrisano, supra, 228 Conn.App. 812, our Supreme Court analyzed the relationship of the statutory words to one another, and applying the doctrine of noscidur a sociis, concluded that subdivision (1) of 53a-182(a) "prohibits physical fighting, and physically violent, threatening or tumultuous behavior." In the present case, there was no evidence of physical contact as existed in Indrisano (pushing), although the defendant while leaning over the desk, shouting, did come within inches of Ms. Tomolonius' face. In this regard, the Supreme Court, in State v. Szyrnkiewicz, 237 Conn. 613, 620 (1996), made it clear that actual physical contact is not required under subdivision (1); also, that even speech alone may be proscribed when it can "be identified as fighting words that portend physical violence." The words spoken must be characterized by a direct tendency to cause acts of violence or a breach of peace; it must be speech "of such a nature that it is likely to provoke the average person to retaliation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. See also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942) (the "fighting words" principle permits prohibition of speech which has a direct tendency to inflict injury or to cause acts of violence or a breach of peace).
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court observed that the Appellate Court, in State v. LoSacco, 12 Conn.App. 481, 490-91, cert. denied, 205 Conn. 814 (1987), cited in the State's post-trial brief, filed 3/18/08; "construed `violent or threatening behavior' to mean conduct that actually involves physical violence or portends imminent physical violence." Further, that the terms "fighting" and "violent" lend an aspect of physicality to the more nebulous terms "tumultuous" and "threatening."
In Szymkiewicz, supra, 620, the Court states: "[A] fair reading of Indrisano indicates that speech can be proscribed not only when accompanied by actual physical conduct, but also when it can be identified as fighting words that portend physical violence."
It is my view that the defendant's overall conduct constituted violent, threatening, and tumultuous actions which reasonably could have precipitated imminent, immediate physical retaliation, as well as the contemporaneous eruption of a further breach of peace involving physicality; therefore, the overall conduct was unprotected constitutionally and came within the statutory proscription, as judicially interpreted and limited. Further, viewing the speech alone, it appears to me that the language used, considering its tone and the circumstances surrounding its use, falls within the Chaplinsky/ Indrisano description of "fighting words"; that is, language that tends to invite physicality, imminent retaliation, and a breach of the peace. In such regard, it is not necessary that the person to whom the words are directed actually respond violently; State v. Szymkiewicz, supra, 237 Conn. 620-21; and, Ms. Tomolonius testified she was "terrorized." It is concluded that the State has proven the defendant guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, under Subdivision (1) of 53a-181a (Public Disturbance).
It has been recognized that the Chaplinsky doctrine may be applied "more narrowly" when the words are directed to a police officer. See State v. Szymkiewicz, supra, 237 Conn. 620 fn. 12; State v. Nelson, 38 Conn.Sup. 349, 354 (1982). The rationale for the aforesaid is that "a properly trained police officer may reasonably be expected to exercise a higher degree of restraint than the average citizen." State v. Szymkiewicz, supra, 620 fn. 12, quoting, Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987). Both in his summation and post-trial brief (filed 3/13/08), the defendant argued that a person holding the governmental position of first selectperson is comparable to a police officer, and thus, for Chaplinsky purposes, should be considered as one falling within the same category; that is, a person subject to a higher expectation of self-restraint. I disagree because here, as in Szymkiewicz (store detective), the record is devoid of any evidence that Ms. Tomolonius received the same level of training as that received by a police officer.
Regarding speech, it is noted that "true threats" are not constitutionally protected. State v. Deloreto, 265 Conn. 145, 154-55 (2003). Deloreto dealt with entirely different wording contained in subdivision (3) of Section 53a-181(a), the Breach of Peace statute ("threatens to commit any crime against another person or such other person's property"). The Deloreto threats are far more indicative of resort to impending violence than the "This is personal, I am going to get you" language employed in this case. However, Deloreto differentiates between the Chaplinsky "fighting words" (direct tendency to inflict injury or to cause acts of violence or a breach of peace) and "true threats," defined as "statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Deloreto, supra, 265 Conn. at 154. "The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a prohibition on true threats `protects individuals from the fear of violence' and `from the disruption that fear engenders,' in addition to protecting people `from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur." Id. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) "[W]hether a particular statement may properly be considered a threat is governed by an objective standard of whether a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates . . . as a serious expression of intent to harm or assault . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 156. "A true threat, where a reasonable person would foresee that the listener would believe he will be subjected to physical violence upon his person, is unprotected . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Given the totality of the circumstances, it would appear to me that a reasonable person would, and should, foresee that the words used here, "this is personal, I'm going to get you," could be interpreted by the listener as a serious expression of an intention to harm; the language appears to go beyond mere hyperbole or jokes, particularly considering the circumstances surrounding the defendant's use of that language. However, it cannot be overlooked that Deloreto involved entirely different statutory language, as well as, express, unequivocal threats of violence.
The State also has alleged that the defendant violated Subdivision (2) of 53a-181a in that, acting with the required state of mind (specific intent or recklessly, all as discussed heretofore), he annoyed another person by offensive conduct. In Indrisano, our Supreme Court considered substantially identical language contained in 53a-182 (Disorderly Conduct) and, finding it to be impermissibly vague, provided a limiting interpretation to preserve the provision's constitutionality. Again, applying the principle of noscitur a sociis, the Court held that the words `by offensive or disorderly conduct annoys or interferes with another person' means: by conduct that is grossly offensive, under contemporary community standards, to a person who actually overhears or sees it, disturbs or impedes the lawful activity of that person." State v. Indrisano, supra, 228 Conn. 819. It is my view that the defendant's conduct and words (yelling, shouting, leaning over desk within inches of the complainant's face, use of inappropriate language, obscene gesture, etc.), fall within the statutory language, as clarified by judicial interpretation. Furthermore the evidence presented, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, clearly established that the defendant's conduct and words, disturbed, and interfered with, the complainant engaged in a lawful activity.
Although the Indrisano court interpreted the subdivision (2) language in a manner providing it with constitutional content, it concluded that the defendant could not be retried under that subdivision because he could not have anticipated the extent of the court's construction of statutory language at the time of his prosecution.
It is concluded that the State has proven the defendant guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, under Subdivision (2) of 53a-181a (Public Disturbance).
The State also has alleged that the defendant violated Subdivision (3) of 53a-181a in that, acting with the required state of mind (specific intent or recklessly, as discussed heretofore), he made unreasonable noise.
In determining whether conduct constitutes unreasonable noise, the court must "take into consideration the time and the place at which the noise was made." State v. Duhan, 194 Conn. 347, 359-60 (1984). As previously stated, this incident occurred at about 3:00 p.m. on the second floor of the Canton Town Hall; the evidence established that there were several town offices located on the second floor (a location open to the public) occupied by town officials and clerical personnel. The testimony was that the defendant was yelling, screaming, and hollering at Ms. Tomolonius, who was engaged in lawful activity; the conduct of the defendant (yelling, screaming, and hollering) certainly annoyed, alarmed, inconvenienced, and disrupted the First selectperson in the operation of her office. Additionally, the defendant's conduct alarmed, inconvenienced, and disrupted Mr. Luiz in conducting his business in an adjacent office. Thus, with respect to subdivision (3), the defendant's conduct was in violation of the statute not based on the language used, but because the noise was "unreasonably disturbing in the particular time, place and circumstances where it occurred." Duhan, Id., 360. Furthermore, as stated, the evidence supports a finding that the defendant acted (yelling, screaming, and hollering) with the required specific intent "to cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm," or in the alternative, by "recklessly creating a risk thereof."
And, while information as to specific distances separating various surrounding offices was not presented, such conduct (noise) had the potential for disturbing, alarming, and disrupting other persons engaged in the conducting or transacting of town business on the second floor.
It is concluded that the State has proven the defendant guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, under Subdivision (3) of 53a-181a (Public Disturbance).
A judgment of guilty may enter. The court imposes a fine of $90.00, plus costs, to be paid on or before April 11, 2008. If the defendant wishes to exercise a right of allocution, or to be heard on ability to pay, he may appear before this court, at 10:00 a.m., on the aforesaid date.