Summary
observing that Section 4176A"was meant to ‘fill the gap between normal motor vehicle violations which [do not] result in any harm to people and the vehicular crimes which are in our criminal code like vehicular homicide, manslaughter or criminally negligent homicide.’ " (alteration in original) (quoting Senate Debate, Del. H.B. 190, 142d Gen. Assem. (2003))
Summary of this case from Pardo v. StateOpinion
ID. Nos. 0702017412, 0705029301, 0711030030, 0703015970, 0711005602, 0804000906, 0708022326, 0711030044, 0701002343, 0809009372.
Submitted: January 21, 2009.
Decided: March 5, 2009.
Upon Consideration of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Indictment DENIED.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction
Defendants move to dismiss their respective criminal indictments charging Operation of a Motor Vehicle Causing Death ("OMVCD") in violation of 21 Del. C. § 4176A. Defendants argue that the OMVCD statute imposes an unconstitutionally excessive punishment for a strict liability offense. For the reasons that follow, the Court is satisfied that the Delaware General Assembly acted within its power in establishing the punishment provision delineated under the OMVCD statute and that the punishment provision is not unconstitutionally excessive. Accordingly, Defendants' motions are DENIED.
II. Facts
Defendants have filed similar motions to dismiss based on the allegation that 21 Del. C. § 4176A, the OMVCD statute, is unconstitutional because it imposes an unconstitutionally excessive punishment for a strict liability crime. The legislature passed this statute, entitled the Warren G.H.Prichett Act, on June 30, 2003 in order to address negligent motor vehicle violations which result in death. Prior to the statute's enactment, an individual that committed a motor vehicle violation that resulted in the death of another could not be prosecuted for homicide because the act of committing a motor vehicle violation (ie, speeding, running a stop sign or red light, improper passing) does not rise to the level of criminally negligent homicide, manslaughter or vehicular homicide. Thus, the statute was meant to "fill the gap between normal motor vehicle violations which [do not] result in any harm to people and the vehicular crimes which are in our criminal code like vehicular homicide, manslaughter or criminally negligent homicide." In cases where a defendant is convicted of OMVCD, the Court has the discretion to impose a maximum fine of $1,150 and a maximum prison sentence of two and a half years. The statute does not impose a minimum mandatory imprisonment sentence. OMCVD is graded as an unclassified misdemeanor under Delaware law.
House Bill No. 190, Senate Debate, 142nd General Assembly, June 25, 2003 at 1.
Id.
On October 6, 2008, the Delaware Supreme Court answered two questions certified to it by this Court pertaining to the OMVCD statute in Hoover v. State. In Hoover, the Supreme Court held that: (1) the OMVCD statute imposes strict liability for deaths proximately caused by a moving violation of the Motor Vehicle Code; and (2) the OMVCD statute is not unconstitutionally vague. Because it was not before the Court on certification, the Delaware Supreme Court left open the question of whether the punishment provision of the OMVCD statute is unconstitutionally excessive as a strict liability offense.
958 A.2d 816 (Del. 2008).
On November 17, 2008, this Court denied Defendant Steven A. Hoover's motion to certify a question of law challenging the constitutionality of the punishment provision of the OMVCD statute. On December 16, 2008, Defendant Norma Stinchecum filed a motion with this Court to dismiss her Indictment for OMVCD on the ground that the statute "imposes a felony-level criminal punishment for strict liability simple negligence violations of the Traffic Code." Soon thereafter, the other above-captioned Defendants filed similar motions to dismiss. This is the Court's decision on those motions.
State v. Hoover, Del. Super., ID No. 0705029301, Vaughn, P.J. (Nov. 17, 2008) (ORDER).
State v. Stinchecum, Del. Super., ID No. 0711030044 (Motion to Dismiss) (Dec. 16, 2008).
III. Discussion
At the outset, the Court emphasizes its limited inquiry in this matter. In their briefs, Defendants spend much time questioning the prudence of the General Assembly in enacting 21 Del. C. § 4176A without reference to the actor's state of mind. The Court will not entertain this argument. The Delaware General Assembly determined that the statute was appropriate and necessary, as evidenced by its passage, and the Court will not sit as a super-legislature to debate the wisdom of legislative policy. Nor will the Court entertain Defendants' arguments challenging the statute's classification as a strict liability crime. The Delaware Supreme Court has already determined that the General Assembly did not intend to provide a requisite mental state for committing this offense (thus making it a strict liability crime). The sole issue before the Court is whether the penalty provision of the OMVCD statute is unconstitutionally excessive.
Helman, 784 A.2d 1058, 1068 (Del. 2001).
Hoover, 958 A.2d at 819.
Defendants make two arguments against the constitutionality of the OMVCD statute. First, they claim that the potential sentence of up to 30 months imprisonment is a disproportionate penalty for an unclassified misdemeanor in violation of Delaware law. Second, they claim that the penalty provision violates the Due Process Clauses of the Delaware and Federal Constitutions. The Court disagrees with both of these arguments.
Under Delaware law, statutes are entitled to a presumption of constitutionality and all doubts must be resolved in favor of the challenged legislative act. "[W]here a possible infringement of a constitutional guarantee exists; the interpreting court should strive to construe the legislative intent so as to avoid unnecessary constitutional infirmities." The General Assembly has broad authority to define crimes and it may legislate in any manner on any subject it sees fit, unless there is some constitutional limitation, express or implied. A. Delaware Law
State v. Cordrey, 2007 WL 1874755 (Del. Super. June 1, 2007); citing State v. Baker, 720 A.2d 1139, 1144 (Del. 1998).
Richardson v. Wile, 535 A.2d 1346, 1350 (Del.1988).
Eaton v. State, 703 A.2d 637 (Del. 1997).
Del. C. Ann. Const. art. 2, § 1.
The penalty provision of the OMVCD statute does not violate Delaware statutory law. Defendants complain that OMVCD is graded as an unclassified misdemeanor yet its penalty range falls between a Class F and Class G felony. Although this is correct and the penalty may seem harsh, it is allowable under Delaware law.
The Delaware Code provides statutory sentencing limits for Class A and Class B misdemeanors but it does not impose such limits for unclassified misdemeanors. Under Delaware law, the maximum sentence of imprisonment for a Class A misdemeanor is one year and the maximum sentence for a Class B misdemeanor is six months. 11 Del. C. § 4206(c) provides that the sentence for unclassified misdemeanors "shall be a definite sentence fixed by the Court in accordance with the sentence specified in the law defining the offense." By classifying the OMVCD statute as an unclassified misdemeanor, as opposed to a Class A or Class B misdemeanor, the General Assembly opted not to impose a statutory sentence ceiling but instead granted the courts sentencing flexibility to ensure that the penalty is proportionate to the offense. It is important to note that the penalty provision is a range, not a definite sentence. Therefore, a guilty actor only faces the possibility of a 30 month imprisonment sentence. The Court is free to impose a much lighter sentence, even one the does not entail any jail time. Because a sentence of up to 30 months incarceration falls within the sentencing parameters of an unclassified misdemeanor, it is consistent with Delaware law.
See 11 Del. C. § 4206(a) and (b).
The Court acknowledges Defendant Samuel K. Jacoby's argument made in his Reply Brief that the inclusion of the word "shall" in the punishment provision connotates the absence of judicial discretion in deciding whether to impose a prison sentence. The Court does not agree. The OMVCD statute instructs that a person convicted under the statute shall be imprisoned not more than 30 months. The Court does not interpret the statute as setting forth a minimum mandatory sentence of imprisonment. Rather, the statute gives the court full discretion in setting the appropriate length of jail time so long as it does not exceed 30 months.
The Court does not find it problematic that a defendant convicted of a misdemeanor crime may be sentenced to more than one year incarceration under Delaware law. The General Assembly has broad authority to define crimes and to set its penalty. The statutory boundaries of criminal sentences for violations of Delaware law are questions of public policy for the General Assembly to answer. In this case, the General Assembly graded OMVCD as an unclassified misdemeanor and set the maximum penalty at 30 months incarceration. In doing so, the General Assembly has pronounced its ability to set a penalty of more than one year for a misdemeanor crime. The Court finds no basis to disturb that decision. The maximum sentence does not exceed any statutory boundaries (this makes sense considering that it is the General Assembly that sets those boundaries) and the Court finds no constitutional impediment to the maximum sentence. Ultimately, the determination of an appropriate penalty is left to the discretion of the legislature, not to the Court. Therefore, any grievances with the severity of the penalty of OMVCD are better directed to the legislature.
Taylor v. State, 679 A.2d 449, 454 (Del. 1996).
State v. Sturgis, 947 A.2d 1087 (Del. 2008).
It also set the maximum fine at $1,150.
Maryland also imposes prison sentences for more than one year on some misdemeanor offenses. See MD Code § 3-203 (misdemeanor second degree assault punishable up to 10 years incarceration), MD Code § 3-204 (misdemeanor reckless endangerment punishable up to 5 years incarceration), MD Code § 205 (misdemeanor prison employee-contact with body fluid punishable up to 10 years incarceration).
See State v. Wood, 483 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1973) (finding that a 10 year maximum sentence for two misdemeanor convictions is not an excessive or disproportionate sentence constituting cruel and unusual punishment).
Finally, Defendants argue that "strict liability may not be imposed under Delaware statutory law because the offense is classified as a misdemeanor, thus making 11 Del. C. § 251(c)(1) inapplicable, and the legislature's purpose to impose strict liability is not plainly apparent on the face of the statute." The applicability of 11 Del. C. § 251 and the determination of the legislature's intent to impose strict liability has already been decided by the Delaware Supreme Court in Hoover. As noted above, the Court will not entertain arguments regarding issues already decided by the Supreme Court.
Def. Stinchecum Mot. to Dismiss, D.I. 13.
B. Due Process
Defendants argue that the imposition of a criminal penalty for a strict liability crime violates due process. In Morissette v. United States, the United States Supreme Court ruled that it is not a violation of due process to punish a person for committing a crime relating to the public welfare or safety even in the absence of criminal intent (strict liability offenses). The Court acknowledged, however, that strict liability offenses typically impose relatively small penalties and avoid imparting grave damage to a defendant's reputation. The holding in Morissette and its progeny led to the establishment of a two-prong constitutional test to determine whether a strict liability crime violates the due process clause. Pursuant to this test, a strict liability offense is not deemed to violate the due process clause where (1) the penalty is relatively small, and (2) where conviction does not gravely besmirch a defendant's reputation.
The Delaware Supreme Court has consistently construed the "law of the land" phrase in Article I, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution as having substantially the same meaning as the "due process of law" phrase of the Federal Constitution. As it relates to this case, the Court does not find that the Defendants are afforded more protection under the Delaware Constitution than under the United States Constitution. Thus, the Court need not engage in a separate analysis for state and federal due process. See In re Carolyn S.S., 498 A.2d 1095, 1098 (Del. 1984).
342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952) .
Holdridge v. U.S., 282 F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1960); United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121, 1125 (6th Cir. 1985).
The OMVCD statute imposes a maximum fine of $1,150 and a maximum prison sentence of two and a half years. There is no black letter law directing the Court to what constitutes a "relatively small" punishment. In order to decide what constitutes a "relatively small" punishment, the Court finds it prudent to consider similar statutes in other jurisdictions in order to lend perspective to its analysis. In Hoover, the Delaware Supreme Court acknowledged that eleven other states have statutes similar to Delaware's OMVCD statute with punishment provisions ranging from six months to five years imprisonment. Seven states impose maximum prison sentences of up to one year. Two states have maximum sentences of two years and one state other than Delaware has a maximum sentence of two and a half years. The District of Columbia, where negligent homicide is a felony, has a maximum sentence of five years. Relative to similar statutes in other jurisdictions, Delaware's maximum sentence of two and half years does not strike the Court as excessive or too severe. And, relative to the harm created by the defendant's negligence, the death of another, the Court finds a maximum penalty of up to 30 months reasonable.
Those states are: California, Cal. Penal Code § 192(c); Colorado, Colo, Rev. Stat. § 42-4-1402(a), (b); Connecticut, Conn. Gen. Stat. 14-222(a); Georgia, Ga. Code Ann., § 40-6-393(c); Hawaii, Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-704; Idaho, Idaho Code Ann. § 18-4006(3)(c); Kansas, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3405.
Michigan, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.324, and North Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat. 20-141.4(a)(2).
Massachusetts, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 24G(b).
D.C. Code § D.C. Code § 50-2203.01.
The Court notes that the United States Supreme Court has affirmed the constitutionality of strict liability crimes carrying more severe punishments than the one at issue here. See, e.g., United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971) (possession of unregistered firearm; fines up to $10,000 and/or imprisonment up to ten years); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945) (bigamous cohabitation; up to ten years imprisonment).
Nor does the Court find that a defendant convicted of OMVCD suffers a gravely besmirched reputation. Conviction under OMVCD amounts to a misdemeanor conviction. Therefore, a defendant suffers the same tarnish to his reputation that he would suffer had he been convicted solely of the underlying driving offense. A misdemeanor conviction does not carry the stigma of a felony conviction and the defendant does not suffer the loss of rights that accompany felony convictions.
Applying the constitutional test to the OMVCD statute, the Court finds that the penalty provision is "relatively small" and conviction of this offense does not impart grave damage to a defendant's reputation. Accordingly, the Court finds that the penalty provision of the OMVCD statute complies with Delaware law and the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The Defendants' respective motions to dismiss are
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.