Opinion
No. 40630-6-II.
Filed: March 15, 2011.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Pierce County, No. 09-1-05182-0, Susan Serko, J., entered April 23, 2010.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Armstrong, J., concurred in by Penoyar, C.J., and Quinn-Brintnall, J.
Rafael Avila, III appeals his conviction for first degree escape, arguing that the State failed to present sufficient evidence showing that he intended to escape. Finding the evidence sufficient to support the verdict, we affirm.
FACTS
On April 12, 2009, the Department of Corrections transferred Avila to Rap Lincoln Park (Rap House) in Tacoma, a work release program that houses offenders. Rap House offenders are still under a prison sentence but are permitted to work and have other limited interactions in the community. Upon arrival, all offenders participate in an orientation program so they can learn the rules of the house. These rules include the procedures for obtaining outside passes and the consequences if the offender violates the procedures. During the two week period Avila was in Rap House, the staff authorized him to leave the house 18 times.
On August 30, Avila obtained a four hour pass to go on a job interview. He did not return to Rap House at the required time. Officer Whitehurst, a community corrections specialist, apprehended Avila the next morning.
A jury found Avila guilty of first degree escape.
ANALYSIS
Avila argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his conduct satisfied the required elements of escape. We disagree.
I. Standard of Review
Evidence is sufficient to support a criminal conviction when any trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d at 201. In other words, a defendant who challenges the sufficiency of the evidence "'admits the truth of the State's evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom.'" State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 874, 83 P.3d 970 (2004) (quoting Salinas, 119 Wn.2d at 201).
II. Sufficient Evidence of Escape
A defendant commits first degree escape if he "knowingly escapes from custody or a detention facility while being detained pursuant to a conviction of a felony." RCW 9A.76.110(1). Escape occurs when offenders "depart[] from the limits of their custody without permission." State v. Ammons, 136 Wn.2d 453, 459, 963 P.2d 812 (1998).
A detention facility includes "any place used for the confinement of a person," including home detention. RCW 9.94A.030(30); State v. Parker, 76 Wn. App. 747, 888 P.2d 167 (1995). The State does not need to prove that a defendant left confinement willfully or with the intent of not returning, only that he or she knowingly acted outside the limitations of the confinement. State v. Danford, 97 Wn.2d 255, 259-60, 643 P.2d 882 (1982). The State was required to prove that the defendant "knew his actions would result in leaving confinement without permission." State v. Descoteaux, 94 Wn.2d 31, 35, 614 P.2d 179 (1980).
Avila argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict because he never intended to escape. He further argues that he believed he would only face criminal charges if he left Rap House for more than 24 hours. But neither Avila's intent to escape nor knowledge of potential punishment are among the elements the State had to prove. Rather, the State had to prove only that Avila was in a detention facility and knowingly left without permission. Ammons, 136 Wn.2d at 459; Danford, 97 Wn.2d at 259-60.
Avila was living at Rap House, serving his sentence for assault. He had read the policy manual and was aware that he was still in custody. He knew that Rap House policy prohibited offenders from leaving without an approved pass. He had a pass that approved a four-hour leave, but he remained out of confinement until Officer Whitehurst apprehended him the next day. These facts are sufficient to support the jury finding that Avila knowingly escaped.
Thus, we find that the State presented sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to determine that Avila committed the crime of first degree escape.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
QUINN-BRINTNALL, J. and PENOYAR, C.J., concur.