Second, the cases do not discuss the FCRA—they discuss the expungement of criminal records. See e.g., State v. A.V.G., No. A09–892, 2010 WL 935357, at *2 (Minn.Ct.App. March 16, 2010). Third, TalentWise's interpretation of the statute works against the consumer, contradicting Congress's intent.

See, e.g.,State v. Miller, No. 90624, 2004 WL 1245619, at *2 (Kan. Ct.App. June 4, 2004) (defendant seeking to expunge alternative charge did not meet the statutory requirement that a defendant be "found not guilty in court proceedings"); State v. A.V.G., No. A09–892, 2010 WL 935357, at *2 (Minn.Ct.App. Mar. 16, 2010) ("While respondent contends that his acquittal of the more serious assault charge resulted in a favorable outcome, the statute permits expungement only when all charges arising out of the same incident are resolved in the defendant's favor."); Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 911 A.2d 1245, 1247 (2006) ("Charges arising ... from the same incident, transaction, or set of facts as the count to which a criminal defendant pleads guilty comprise a single unit, and therefore may not be expunged."); Com. v. Lutz, 788 A.2d 993, 1000–01 (Pa.Super.Ct.2001) (defendant not entitled to expungement of charges that were dismissed as part of a plea agreement where defendant admitted to culpability of the dismissed charges as part of the plea); but seeLucas v. State, 993 N.E.2d 1159, 1159 (Ind.Ct.App.2013) ("While the statute is not a model of clarity, we conclude that it was intended to apply to any dismissed charge and not just in cases where all charges have been dismissed."). Although we recognize