Specifically, the fact that Cordeiro used and sold illegal drugs made it more probable that he was the person whom Blaisdell arranged to meet on "skid row" in order to purchase a pound of marijuana and, consequently, that Cordeiro had the motive to meet, murder, and rob Blaisdell and that he had planned and prepared to do so. Cf.State v. Austin, 70 Haw. 300, 307, 769 P.2d 1098, 1102 (1989) (holding that the similarity between a defendant's earlier drug dealing and the drug dealing offense with which he was charged was extremely relevant to prove both a plan and a common scheme); State v. Kealoha, 95 Haw. 365, 380, 22 P.3d 1012, 1027 (App. 2000) (holding that "[e]vidence that [d]efendant sold methamphetamine to finance her cocaine use is probative of whether [d]efendant had a motive to manufacture methamphetamine and her intent to do so"). The fact that most of the evidence that Cordeiro challenges involved his use and sale of crystal methamphetamine and cocaine, rather than marijuana, does not change our view of its relevance.

Therefore, in light of ample other evidence supporting the inference that Villados knowingly possessed the drugs, the Rule 404(b) evidence was "unnecessary overkill[.]" State v. Austin, 70 Haw. 300, 309, 769 P.2d 1098, 1103 (1989). Moreover, the nature of the challenged evidence was likely to "rouse the jury to overmastering hostility."

Further, when prior misconduct is similar to the current offense and is offered to confirm identity or voluntariness by establishing a common methodology or scheme, a close connection in time and nature is highly probative only because it increases the likelihood that the same actor committed both instances of misconduct. See, e.g., State v. Acker, 133 Hawai‘i 253, 277, 327 P.3d 931, 955 (2014) (stating that prior incidents where defendants also robbed lone men, left them at remote locations, and escaped in their victims' vehicles were admissible to show common plan and lack of coercion); State v. Austin, 70 Haw. 300, 307, 769 P.2d 1098, 1102 (1989) (holding that the similarity between a defendant's earlier drug dealing and the drug dealing offense with which the defendant was charged was extremely relevant to prove both a plan and a common scheme). However, a close proximity in time and nature between the prior misconduct and the charged offense may also increase the likelihood that a jury will consider the previous conduct to conclude that the defendant has a propensity for committing such acts, which is a prohibited inference.

Since we conclude that the evidence was relevant to establish opportunity, we need not determine whether the other purposes identified by the circuit court were relevant in these circumstances. Cf. State v. Austin, 70 Haw. 300, 305-08, 769 P.2d 1098, 1101-02 (1989) (trial court instructed the jury that it could consider evidence of the defendant's prior uncharged acts for seven purposes delineated in HRE 404(b); this court concluded that the trial court properly admitted the evidence of prior uncharged offenses under HRE 404(b), analyzing two of the seven purposes). C. The Probative Value of the Evidence of Sexual Contacts in South Dakota Was Not Outweighed by Any Prejudicial Effect

This court has repeatedly invoked the "presumption" (actually, as the Yates court indicated, a reasonable practical accommodation of the interests of the parties) in the past. See, e.g., Aga v. Hundahl, 78 Haw. 230, 236, 891 P.2d 1022, 1028 (1995); Myers v. South Seas Corp., 76 Haw. 161, 165, 871 P.2d 1231, 1235, reconsideration granted in part, 76 Haw. 353, 877 P.2d 890 (1994); State v. Austin, 70 Haw. 300, 308, 769 P.2d 1098, 1102 (1989); State v. Estrada, 69 Haw. 204, 222, 738 P.2d 812, 825 (1987); State v. Perez, 64 Haw. 232, 236, 638 P.2d 335, 338 (1981); State v. Melear, 63 Haw. 488, 497, 630 P.2d 619, 626 (1981); State v. Amorin, 58 Haw. 623, 629, 574 P.2d 895, 899 (1978). Because, under the circumstances of this case, in reaching a unanimous guilty verdict as to the charged offense of attempted murder in the second degree, the jury could not have reached, much less considered, the disputed instruction that erroneously described a nonexistent offense, there is no "reasonable possibility that [the] error might have contributed to [Holbron's] conviction."

Such omissions are inexcusable, and these mistakes must not be repeated. State v.Cadus, 70 Haw. 314, 769 P.2d 1105 (1989) (per curiam); State v.Austin, 70 Haw. 300, 769 P.2d 1098 (1989); State v.Hanawahine, 69 Haw. ___, 755 P.2d 466 (1988). On June 3, 1988, the trial court entered its judgment ordering Williams to pay $5,977 restitution and sentencing him to two concurrent five year terms of imprisonment. Mittimus occurred immediately.

Jurors are presumed to have followed the Circuit Court's instructions. See, e.g., State v. Holbron, 80 Hawai'i 27, 46, 904 P.2d 912, 931 (1995) (holding that there is a "sound presumption of appellate practice that jurors are reasonable and generally follow the instructions they are given.") (citation, internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); State v. Austin, 70 Haw. 300, 308, 769 P.2d 1098, 1102 (1989) ("A jury is presumed to follow a trial court's directive, so any prejudice was eliminated."). Therefore, it is presumed that Juror #7 did not talk to other jurors about the reasons she was eventually excused for cause.

The probative value of Steger's contemporaneous drug-related activities was heightened by Steger's defense, which basically was that he was merely present in the apartment and did not knowingly possess the approximately four ounces of crystal methamphetamine or intend to distribute the Ecstacy tablets recovered by the police. Steger attempted to place the blame for the methamphetainine and the Ecstasy found in the apartment solely on his co-defendant, Koch. Evidence of Steger's recent drug activities served to refute his defense that he was merely present in the apartment and had no responsibility for the methamphetamine and Ecstasy that were found there. See State v. Austin, 70 Haw. 300, 307, 769 P.2d 1098, 1102 (1989) (holding that evidence of the defendant's prior drug dealing was admissible under HRE Rule 404(b) where the defendant denied any involvement in the cocaine trafficking at issue); Foster, 344 F.3d at 801-02 (concluding that the defendant's defense, which closely resembled a "mere presence" defense, placed his state of mind into question and supported the admission of his prior drug trafficking conviction to prove his knowledge and intent regarding the charged drug offense). Other factors support the circuit court's admission of Cruz's testimony under HRE Rule 404(b).

The jury is presumed to follow the court's instructions. State v. Austin, 70 Haw. 300, 769 P.2d 1098 (1989). However, circumstances of the timing of the instruction and the nature of the erroneous action it is intended to correct, can combine to overcome the presumption, where the defendant's right to a fair trial is substantially prejudiced.