Opinion
No. 105,612.
2012-07-27
STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Roger Doyle AUSTIN, Appellant.
Appeal from Montgomery District Court; Roger L. Gossard, Judge. Korey A. Kaul, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. David Maslen, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Appeal from Montgomery District Court; Roger L. Gossard, Judge.
Korey A. Kaul, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. David Maslen, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before PIERRON, P.J., GREEN and LEBEN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
In August 2008, Roger Austin pled no contest to one felony count of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine after he was found in a residence that contained meth-making materials. Before sentencing, Austin filed a motion to withdraw his plea, but the district court denied Austin's motion after the second of two evidentiary hearings. Austin was sentenced to 180 months in prison. On appeal, Austin claims that he was taking an antidepressant and suffering from methamphetamine withdrawals during his plea hearing, which affected his ability to understand his plea. He also claims his codefendant coerced him to plead.
But the district court heard Austin's testimony and found no evidence convincing to the court that Austin's plea was anything but knowingly and voluntarily made. Austin failed to show that his decision-making ability was affected by medication or withdrawal symptoms. And he failed to show that a codefendant pressuring him to plead rose to the level of coercion necessary to convince the court that he acted against his will. We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Austin's motion; we therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.
Factual Background
In June 2008, Roger Austin was arrested at Justin Harmon's residence in Caney, where officers found various items related to methamphetarnine manufacturing. In July 2008, Austin was charged with six felony counts related to manufacturing, possessing, and distributing methamphetarnine. On August 21, 2008, Austin signed a plea agreement and pled no contest to one count of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetarnine. Austin was initially sentenced in October 2008, but later that same month the district court rescinded the sentence by agreement of the parties so that Austin could work as a confidential informant.
On August 31, 2009, Austin filed a motion to withdraw his plea. Austin claimed that he didn't understand his plea because he was on an antidepressant and suffering from withdrawals from his addiction to methamphetarnine. Austin also claimed that Harmon coerced him into taking a plea agreement by threatening to turn on him. In March 2010, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on Austin's motion to withdraw plea, and Austin presented testimony in support of his motion. But the district court denied it, concluding the evidence failed to show that Austin's plea was anything but freely and voluntarily made. In April 2010, the court appointed Austin a new attorney and granted him another evidentiary hearing—held in August 2010—on his motion. Austin presented additional evidence showing that he was on the drug Celexa on the day of the plea hearing. Austin said it made him “feel different.” But the district court again denied Austin's motion.
On September 14, 2010, Austin was sentenced to 180 months in prison with 36 months of postrelease supervision. Austin has appealed to this court based on the claim that he should have been allowed to withdraw his plea.
Analysis
The District Court Didn't Err in Denying Austin's Motion to Withdraw Plea.
Austin argues that he showed good cause to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing and that the district court erred by denying his motion. Specifically, Austin argues that he presented evidence showing that he was impaired by medication and that a codefendant had threatened him when he pled no contest. The State contends that Austin failed to establish a sufficient reason why he should be allowed to withdraw his plea. The district court denied Austin's motion because it found Austin's evidence “woefully insufficient” to allow him to withdraw his plea.
Whether a defendant's plea may be withdrawn is controlled by statute: “A plea of guilty or nolo contendere, for good cause shown and within the discretion of the court, may be withdrawn at any time before sentence is adjudged.” K.S.A.2010 Supp. 22–3210(d)(1). This court won't disturb a district court's decision to deny a defendant's presentence motion to withdraw his plea unless the defendant demonstrates that the court abused its discretion. State v. Macias–Medina, 293 Kan. 833, 836, 268 P.3d 1201 (2012). The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion. State v. Hulett, 293 Kan. 312, 319, 263 P.3d 153 (2011). A court abuses its discretion if its action:
“ ‘(1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, i.e., if no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the trial court; (2) is based on an error of law, i.e., if the discretion is guided by an erroneous legal conclusion; or (3) is based on an error of fact, i.e., if substantial competent evidence does not support a factual finding on which a prerequisite conclusion of law or the exercise of discretion is based.’ “ Macias–Medina, 293 Kan. at 836 (quoting State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 3, 256 P.3d 801 [2011] ).
In Austin's case, we must also keep in mind that the district court, which hears the evidence, makes the factual findings. We must defer to those findings where they are supported by substantial evidence. State v. Anderson, 291 Kan. 849, 855, 249 P.3d 425 (2011). In addition, to the extent the district court has not made explicit factual findings, we note that neither party asked it to make additional findings. In such cases, we presume that the district court made the factual findings necessary to support its decision. State v. Gaither, 283 Kan. 671, 686, 156 P.3d 602 (2007).
A defendant must show good cause for withdrawing his plea. K.S.A.2010 Supp. 22–3210(d)(1). The “good cause” standard required for withdrawing a plea before sentencing is a lesser standard than the manifest-injustice standard required for withdrawing a plea after sentencing. Macias–Medina, 293 Kan. at 836–37. Courts assessing good cause generally consider three factors: “ ‘(1) whether the defendant was represented by competent counsel; (2) whether the defendant was misled, coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken advantage of, and (3) whether the plea was fairly and understandingly made.’ “ 293 Kan. at 837 (quoting State v. Aguilar, 290 Kan. 506, 511, 231 P.3d 563 [2010] ). But other factors may be considered, and all three factors don't have to be in a defendant's favor to show good cause. Macias–Medina, 293 Kan. at 837.
Austin advances two arguments to show that he should have been allowed to withdraw his no-contest plea before sentencing. First, Austin argues that he didn't understand his plea because he was taking an antidepressant drug, Celexa, and was suffering from withdrawal from methamphetamine during the plea hearing. Second, Austin argues that his plea was entered against his will because a codefendant threatened to blame Austin for the entire meth-manufacturing operation.
A defendant taking prescription drugs who informs the court that he isn't under the influence of any intoxicating drugs usually is able to make a voluntary plea. State v. Denmark–Wagner, 292 Kan. 870, 879, 258 P.3d 960 (2011). During a plea hearing, the court isn't required to ask a defendant about medications the defendant may be taking, as long as the court ensures: “(1) that the defendant is informed of the maximum penalty that may be imposed if the defendant accepts the plea, (2) that the defendant understands the nature of the charge, and (3) that the defendant understands the consequences of pleading guilty.” 292 Kan. 870, Syl. ¶ 4.
Under certain circumstances, the failure of a court to make an on-the-record inquiry and determination about whether a defendant is under the influence of medication before accepting a plea is reversible error if there is any indication at the plea hearing that the defendant is on medication. See Price v. State, No. 89,202, 2004 WL 2238643, at *2 (Kan.App.2004) (unpublished opinion) (citing U.S. v. Rossillo, 853 F.2d 1062, 1065–67 [2d Cir.1988] ). Here, though, Austin signed a form plea agreement stating: “[A]t the present time I am not under the influence of drugs, nor alcohol, nor suffering from any mental disease.” At the plea hearing, the court asked Austin whether it was his signature on the plea document and whether his plea was free and voluntary, but the court didn't specifically inquire about medications. The record doesn't give any indication that the court would have known Austin was on medication during the plea hearing.
There were two evidentiary hearings on Austin's motion to withdraw his plea. In March 2010, Austin testified that he had been diagnosed with anxiety and depression and had been addicted to methamphetamine. Austin said that the withdrawal symptoms affected his ability to understand his plea: “It was hard to think clearly, along with the medications they had me on here at the jail at that time. [To be] honest with you, I just—I was incoherent at times. I don't know how else to describe it, dysfunctional.” Austin testified that he thought he was on an antidepressant during the plea hearing, but his counsel failed to produce Austin's jail medical records from August 2008, which would have supported his testimony. Austin testified that didn't think he knew what was going on the day of the plea hearing and that he signed the plea agreement “under the assumption that [he] was getting probation.” Austin said he didn't read the document before signing it because he “just wanted to get out.”
The court noted that a March 2007 mental-health evaluation indicated that Austin didn't suffer from any impairment in judgment. Austin's appointed attorney testified that Austin didn't appear to be under the influence of any medication when he entered his plea, though the attorney didn't directly ask: “I didn't specifically ask if he was on any medication or drugs or didn't understand, but he also didn't volunteer that information either.” On cross-examination, Austin's attorney testified that during the day of the plea hearing, Austin seemed coherent, seemed able to think logically, didn't disclose any mental disorders, and didn't indicate he was taking any kind of prescription medication. The attorney said that he believed Austin understood his plea and that there was “[a]bsolutely nothing” that Austin said or did on the day of the plea hearing that indicated that his plea wasn't made freely and voluntarily. The court denied Austin's motion, finding that the court had “absolutely no evidence before” it on Austin's allegations that the medication he was taking interfered with his decision-making ability.
In April 2010, the court granted Austin another evidentiary hearing on his motion and appointed him a new attorney. In August 2010, a jail nurse confirmed that Austin had been taking Celexa on the day of his plea hearing. But the nurse was unable to testify about the medication's side effects. She testified that the jail's medical records didn't reflect any concerns about Austin's mental health or reaction to the medication.
Austin testified that Celexa “[m]ade [him] feel different” and affected his thinking:
“Um, it's kind of hard to explain. It's like, um—I wasn't—my senses [weren't] about me, basically. It's like, um—say for instance, if you and I had a conversation at that time, a day or two later if we sat down and you were to ask me what that conversation was, I couldn't tell you exactly what it was. It kind of blocked out some of the things that I either spoke of or heard of—or heard during the conversation. [It made] me forget, made me really not aware of a lot of things.”
Austin emphasized the medication's effects on his ability to think clearly: “I know certain medications affect people differently, and I know the medication I was on—it did blur my way of thinking and that's about all I have to say right now.”
But the district court again denied Austin's motion, finding insufficient evidence to modify its previous order denying Austin's motion.
We find no abuse of discretion. We will separately discuss the evidence, but we emphasize that the district court heard the evidence, so we must defer to its factual findings. It appears to us that the district court simply didn't believe that Austin's ability to think was affected by the drug he was taking or that Austin lacked either the knowledge or the ability needed to freely and voluntarily enter the plea. We do not reweigh the evidence or assess witness credibility. Anderson, 291 Kan. at 855.
The only evidence about Celexa's affect on Austin's decision-making came from Austin himself. Testimony from Austin's attorney supports the suggestion that there was no indication at the plea hearing that Austin was on medication or that it affected his decision to plead no contest. See State v. Frost, No. 100,743, 2010 WL 1379112, at *3–4 (Kan.2010) (unpublished opinion) (rejecting motion to withdraw plea in part because defendant's attorney testified he didn't notice defendant under influence of drugs). The same judge presided over the plea hearing in August 2008 and the plea-withdrawal hearings in 2010, so he was able to observe Austin for indications that medication was affecting his judgment. See Macias–Medina, 293 Kan. at 839 (finding it important that same judge presided at plea hearing and motion hearing to withdraw plea).
The record of the plea hearing indicates that the court informed Austin he was charged with conspiracy to manufacture meth and faced a maximum penalty of 198 months in prison if the court accepted his plea. Austin said that he understood the charge and the possible punishment. Austin agreed that his no-contest plea was his own free and voluntary act. And Austin gave the factual foundation for the plea. Thus, the court wasn't required to inquire about Austin's medications. See Denmark–Wagner, 292 Kan. 870, Syl. ¶ 4.
The court's finding that there was insufficient evidence to show that taking Celexa interfered with Austin's decision-making ability is supported by the record. There was no evidence presented of potential side effects of Celexa. Although Austin testified that the medication affected his memory and blurred his thinking, there was no other evidence that it impaired his judgment, and we think it clear that the district court simply didn't find Austin's testimony credible. Therefore, the district court didn't abuse its discretion by finding that Austin's plea was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent and by denying Austin's motion on this ground.
Austin also claims that his plea was a result of coercion. He argues that a codefendant threatened to blame him for the entire meth-making operation and that this threat caused him to enter into the plea agreement against his will to avoid a 20–year sentence. Austin alleges that he was coerced into making the plea, and he claims that the codefendant's threat rendered his plea involuntary.
We consider whether a defendant was misled, coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken advantage of when assessing whether good cause exists for the defendant to withdraw his plea before sentencing. Macias–Medina, 293 Kan. at 837. A defendant is coerced if he is prevented from exercising his free will in his decision to plead. 293 Kan. at 838.
Once again, evidence supporting Austin's claim—here, of coercion—was limited to Austin's own testimony. At the first hearing on his motion to withdraw plea, Austin accused codefendant Justin Harmon of threatening him:
“[Defense counsel]:—what kind of threats were those?
“[Austin]: Telling me that if I didn't stand up and say that it was me that he was going to turn State evidence against me, and he had discussed it with his lawyer, someone, [the] DA, that I could be looking at 15 to 20 years and that he would do everything he could to get it off on me and point in my direction that I did it.
“And there was other people that he had pointed me out to when I was in back, because they bring the trays;—serve—the meal trays to the back in the mods and serve them in the cells at that time, which they still do, but then it was kind of not as organized as they are now about the matter but back then, you know, they'd open like anywhere up to two to three cells at that time and then he would kind of linger back and like pour something to drink and that's when those accusations towards me [would be made].
“[Defense counsel]: So how would that be threatening to you if he was telling you you're going to do a lot of time?
“[Austin]: It just—it just piled up on top of the other things, you know, that I—you know, it just—I don't know, and I've never been too good at—I'm sorry. I've never been too good about explaining everything, but it's just—just one thing on top [of] another and it just seemed like it made matters worse on what direction I should go at that time.
“My thoughts—it just clouded them up more or kind of made me dizzy thinking, if you can understand that at all, scared, [made me] feel intimidated.”
But Austin had signed a plea petition that stated: “I [have not] been beaten, threatened, mentally or physically forced, intimidated or coerced in any manner to plead GUILTY or NO CONTEST to the crime charged against me.” At the plea hearing, the court had asked Austin whether anyone had threatened or coerced him to enter his plea, and Austin replied, “No, sir.” Austin agreed at the plea hearing that his plea was his own free and voluntary act. Austin acknowledged in testimony on his motion to withdraw the plea that he hadn't been physically threatened. In denying Austin's motion, the district court said: “And he says he feels he was coerced [into] pleading guilty by some codefendant that we haven't heard anything [from] at all ... so I find that's not persuasive.”
Again, the district judge was in the best position to assess Austin's credibility because he presided over both the plea hearing and the motion hearings. See Macias–Medina, 293 Kan. at 839 (noting that judge was able to observe when defendant said he wasn't threatened or coerced). There is nothing in the record to support Austin's claims that he was coerced by a codefendant other than his own testimony. The district court simply didn't find coercion sufficient to set aside a plea based upon the evidence presented. That conclusion was well within the district court's discretion, especially since that the same judge had presided over the plea hearing. See State v. Ferguson, No. 97,067, 2007 WL 4246866, at *2 (Kan.App.2007) (unpublished opinion) (rejecting motion to withdraw plea based on coercion of codefendant). Austin said he felt scared and intimidated, but there was no evidence that he acted against his free will in entering his plea. Whatever pressure existed didn't rise to the level of good cause for allowing Austin to withdraw his plea. See Denmark–Wagner, 292 Kan. 870, Syl. ¶ 3, 877 (holding that pressure to accept a plea agreement doesn't constitute coercion when defendant acknowledges that the decision to enter plea was his own choice).
We find no abuse of discretion. The district court's judgment is affirmed.