An accused may consent to a search by law enforcement officers and if the consent is genuine neither a search warrant nor probable cause is necessary. State v. Aull, 78 N.M. 607, 435 P.2d 437 (1967); State v. Austin, 91 N.M. 793, 581 P.2d 1288 (Ct.App. 1978). See also Parkhurst v. State 628 P.2d 1369 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 899, 102 S.Ct. 402, 70 L.Ed.2d 216 (1981) (upholding validity of search of car trunk after defendants were stopped and consented to warrantless search).
Schneckloth was just recently reaffirmed in United States v. Mendenhall, 1980, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497. See also, United States v. White, 5th Cir. 1980, 617 F.2d 1131; United States v. Matthews, 8th Cir. 1979, 603 F.2d 48, cert. denied, 1980, 444 U.S. 1019, 100 S.Ct. 674, 62 L.Ed.2d 650; Slater v. State, Fla. 1956, 90 So.2d 453; Longo v. State, 1946, 157 Fla. 668, 26 So.2d 818; Strickland v. State, 1970, 226 Ga. 750, 177 S.E.2d 238; City of Overland Park v. Sandy, 1978, 225 Kan. 102, 587 P.2d 883; People v. Arnold, 1968, 91 Ill. App.2d 282, 233 N.E.2d 764; State v. Austin, 1978, 91 N.M. 793, 581 P.2d 1288; and State v. Erho, 1970, 77 Wn.2d 553, 463 P.2d 779. Upon proper analysis and in the light of the developing law, Tobin v. State, 1927, 36 Wyo. 368, 255 P. 788 and State v. Bonolo, 1928, 39 Wyo. 299, 270 P. 1065, are in accord.
That, however, is not the question on appeal. Rather, the question is whether the evidence will support an inference that defendant voluntarily consented to a search of the car.See State v. Austin, 91 N.M. 793, 581 P.2d 1288 (Ct.App. 1978). If the evidence permits an inference that defendant consented to a search of the car, the trial court's ruling must be sustained on the ground that the consent given was unlimited. Id.
State v. Ruud; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte; State v. Aull. See State v. Austin, 91 N.M. 793, 581 P.2d 1288 (Ct.App. 1978). The fact that a suspect has been subjected to arrest or detention does not automatically invalidate a subsequent consent to search.
We find, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the People have met their burden of proving that defendant voluntarily consented to a "complete search of [the] premises" as defined in the consent form. Defendant's unspoken assumption that the search would be limited because the police were searching only for large items did not limit the scope of the "complete search" to which she had consented (see, generally, United States v Torres, 663 F.2d 1019, supra; United States v Torres, 504 F. Supp. 864, aff'd. 659 F.2d 1012 [CCA9th], cert. den. 455 U.S. 926; People v Shelton, 110 Ill. App.3d 625; State v Koucoules, 343 A.2d 860 [Me]; State v Austin, 91 N.M. 793; 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure, ยง 8.1, subd [c]; see, also, Gentile v United States, 493 F.2d 1404 [CCA5th], cert. den. 419 U.S. 979). We see no merit to the argument that the officers exceeded the scope of the consent by searching when defendant was not present, i.e., when she was in the basement.
Some of our decisions have considered "standing" pursuant to the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960). See State v. Nemrod, 85 N.M. 118, 509 P.2d 885 (Ct.App. 1973), overruled on other grounds in State v. Vigil, 86 N.M. 388, 524 P.2d 1004 (Ct.App. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955, 95 S.Ct. 1339, 43 L.Ed.2d 432 (1975); State v. Austin, 91 N.M. 793, 581 P.2d 1288 (Ct.App. 1978); State v. Clark, 89 N.M. 695, 556 P.2d 851 (Ct.App. 1976). Concerning Jones, supra, Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), states:
Although there are conflicting inferences from the evidence, the trial court could properly find there was no consent. State v. Austin, 91 N.M. 793, 581 P.2d 1288 (Ct.App. 1978); State v. Ruud, 90 N.M. 647, 567 P.2d 496 (Ct.App. 1977). Although the trial court found a lack of consent to search, it also found that the border patrol officer had probable cause to search the trunk for illegal aliens.