[¶5] The Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act is the exclusive remedy for collaterally challenging the judgment of a conviction. State v. Atkins , 2019 ND 145, ¶ 11, 928 N.W.2d 441 (relying on N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(4) ). Postconviction applications seeking to challenge the judgment are time barred after two years of the date the conviction becomes final unless an exception applies.

[¶6] Kremer argues a new interpretation of state law exists to allow his application to go forward. He argues this Court set forth a new interpretation of state law in State v. Atkins, 2019 ND 145, 928 N.W.2d 441, which would satisfy the exception found in N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(3)(a)(3). He argues that prior to Atkins, a defendant was allowed to withdraw a guilty plea at any time to correct a manifest injustice.

"Generally, the applicability of res judicata is a question of law and is fully reviewable on appeal." State v. Atkins, 2019 ND 145, ¶ 12, 928 N.W.2d 441. [¶6] Froistad moved to withdraw his guilty plea under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11 and N.D.C.C. ch. 29-32.1. "When a defendant applies for post-conviction relief seeking to withdraw a guilty plea, the application is treated as one made under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(d)." State v. Gress, 2011 ND 233, ¶ 7, 807 N.W.2d 567.

We agreed Atkins's motions were an application for post-conviction relief and affirmed the court's denial of Atkins's requests. State v. Atkins, 2019 ND 145, ¶¶ 11, 25 928 N.W.2d 441.Atkins v. State, 2021 ND 34, ¶ 2, 955 N.W.2d 109. [¶3] In November 2018, Atkins filed another application for post-conviction relief, raising 10 grounds for relief. Atkins, 2021 ND 34, ¶ 3.

We agreed Atkins's motions were an application for post-conviction relief and affirmed the court's denial of Atkins's requests. State v. Atkins , 2019 ND 145, ¶¶ 11, 25, 928 N.W.2d 441. [¶3] In November 2018, Atkins filed another post-conviction relief application.

[¶4] Central to the disposition of this appeal is whether Chase’s N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion was properly classified as a motion, or instead, as the district court found, as an application for post-conviction relief. We have, on occasion, considered defendants' motions as applications for post-conviction relief when the defendant has already filed at least one prior application for post-conviction relief. SeeState v. Atkins , 2019 ND 145, ¶ 10, 928 N.W.2d 441 (holding defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea was actually his third application for post-conviction relief when he had previously filed two applications for post-conviction relief); State v. Gress , 2011 ND 233, ¶ 6, 807 N.W.2d 567 (holding defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea was actually his second application for post-conviction relief when he had already filed one application for post-conviction relief). We have encountered parties seeking to evade the boundaries of post-conviction proceedings by filing motions under the Rules of Criminal Procedure under the guise of motion practice:

"A plain reading of this provision is that the Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act is to be used exclusively in place of other remedies collaterally challenging the judgment of conviction." State v. Atkins, 2019 ND 145, ¶ 11, 928 N.W.2d 441.

[¶10] The Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act is the exclusive remedy for collaterally challenging a judgment of conviction or sentence, see N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(4), which this Court has repeatedly held, see, e.g., Kremer v. State, 2021 ND 195, ¶ 8, 965 N.W.2d 866; State v. Jensen, 2021 ND 119, ¶ 7, 962 N.W.2d 393; Kovalevich, 2019 ND 210, ¶ 10; State v. Atkins, 2019 ND 145, ¶ 11, 928 N.W.2d 441. Kovalevich filed his present motion under N.D.R.Crim.P. 35(a), which provides "[t]he sentencing court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. . . ." Section 29-32.1-01(1)(a), N.D.C.C., of the Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act similarly provides a person who has been convicted of and sentenced for a crime may apply for post-conviction relief upon the ground that "the sentence was imposed in violation of the laws . . . of North Dakota." See also N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(d) (providing the post-conviction relief ground that "[t]he sentence is not authorized by law").

[¶7] The Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act is the exclusive remedy for collaterally challenging a judgment of a conviction. State v. Atkins, 2019 ND 145, ¶ 11, 928 N.W.2d 441 (relying on N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(4)). When considering successive applications for post-conviction relief, this Court has held that, "[w]hen a defendant has previously filed an application for post-conviction relief, a subsequent motion filed under the Rules of Criminal Procedure will be treated as an application for post-conviction relief when the motion 'seek[s] to evade the boundaries of post-conviction proceedings.'"

The court did not err in denying his motion for relief under N.D. R. Civ. P. 60, and his motion for reconsideration. See State v. Atkins, 2019 ND 145, ¶¶ 10-11, 928 N.W.2d 441 (stating the Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act is to be used exclusively to challenge a judgment of conviction, and regardless of the title on a motion it will be treated as a subsequent application for post-conviction relief). We summarily affirm under N.D. R .App. P. 35.1(a)(6),(7).