In State v. A.T.C., the Supreme Court upheld the JLA and Attorney General Guidelines against a facial constitutional challenge, subject to an important condition. 239 N.J. 450, 475, 217 A.3d 1158 (2019). The Court held prosecutors must provide a statement of reasons explaining their decision to offer a defendant a reduced term of imprisonment.
That said, statutes are presumed constitutional. State v. A.T.C., 239 N.J. 450, 466, 217 A.3d 1158 (2019) ; Whirlpool Props., Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Tax'n, 208 N.J. 141, 172, 26 A.3d 446 (2011). A statute "will not be declared void unless its repugnancy to the constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt."
See State v. A.T.C., 239 N.J. 450, 473-475 (2019) (noting that there are "three core principles from the Court's resolution of separation of powers challenges to statute granting discretion to prosecutors in Lagares, Vasquez, Brimage."); see State v. Brimage, 153 N.J. 1 (1998) (holding that Attorney General's plea agreement guidelines . . . authorized impermissible intercounty disparity in sentencing . . .); see also State v. Vasquez, 129 N.J. 189 (1992) (holding that the court is not compelled by the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act to impose [a] period of parole ineligibility on resentencing following violation of probation and [a] prosecutor, who originally waive[s] parole disqualifier, has no authority at resentencing to demand imposition of a period of parole ineligibility); see also State v. Lagares, 127 N.J. 20 (1992) (holding that the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act repeat-offender sentencing provision violated the separation of powers doctrine; and Attorney General was requested to adopt guidelines to assist prosecutorial decisio
Jessica Lunsford Act-"imposes a term of incarceration of twenty-five years to life, with a period of parole ineligibility of at least twenty-five years, on an offender convicted of an aggravated sexual assault in which the victim is less than thirteen years old." State v. A.T.C., 239 N.J. 450, 455 (2019) (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1)).
Effective May 15, 2014, the Act "significantly enhanced the sentencing exposure of defendants convicted of the aggravated sexual assault of a child under thirteen years of age." State v. A.T.C., 239 N.J. 450, 462-63 (2019).
Statutes are presumed constitutional. State v. A.T.C., 239 N.J. 450, 466 (2019) (citations omitted). "A law can be declared void only if its 'repugnancy to the constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt.'"
As already noted, the Legislature has left undisturbed those guidelines which were implemented to save Section 12 from constitutional infirmity and have been cited with approval by the Court. See, e.g., State v. A.T.C., 239 N.J. 450, 473, 217 A.3d 1158 (2019). The Guidelines include several potential mitigating factors, other than cooperation with law enforcement, that prosecutors must consider, and which serve to reduce parole ineligibility terms in plea offers and ultimately sentences.
Thus, the trial court focused "particular attention to any factors that rendered the victim vulnerable or incapable of resistance at the time of the crime," Lawless, 214 N.J. at 611, "engag[ing] in a pragmatic assessment of the totality of harm inflicted by the offender on the victim," State v. Kromphold, 162 N.J. 345, 358 (2000), and giving weight to "the victim's particular vulnerability to the perpetrator[,]" State v. A.T.C., 454 N.J. Super. 235, 256 (App. Div. 2018), rev'd on other grounds, 239 N.J. 450 (2019). We also disagree with defendant's argument that the trial court engaged in impermissible double-counting, which occurs when the "established elements of a crime for which a defendant is being sentenced . . . [are] considered as aggravating circumstances in determining that sentence," Kromphold, 162 N.J. at 354, with regard to aggravating factor two. Both sexual crimes required only that the victim be under age thirteen, see N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1); N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b); the endangering charge required the victim to be under age eighteen, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(1).
State v. A.T.C., 454 N.J. Super. 235, 255 (App. Div. 2018), aff'd in relevant part, 239 N.J. 450 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). When evaluating aggravating factor one, "[a] sentencing court may consider 'aggravating facts showing that [a] defendant's behavior extended to the extreme reaches of the prohibited behavior.'"
"The sentencing prerogatives of the prosecutor, a member of the executive branch, include 'determin[ing] the extent of a defendant's sentencing exposure when deciding what charges will be brought.'" State v. A.T.C., 239 N.J. 450, 468 (2019) (quoting State v. Lagares, 127 N.J. 20, 27 (1992)). "The grading of the offense is dependent upon a defendant's conduct and the nature of the underlying charge."