Carchman, 473 U.S. at 728, 105 S.Ct. at 3407; Cuyler, 449 U.S. 433, 101 S.Ct. 703; Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 98 S.Ct. 1834. See also State v. White, 234 Kan. 340, 673 P.2d 1106 (1983) and State v. Arwood, 46 Or. App. 653, 612 P.2d 763 (1980). Directly stated, since the provisions of the statute are clear and straight-forward, "[t]he time limit within which trial must be held is mandatory."

That duty devolves upon the state.”); State v. Arwood, 46 Or.App. 653, 657, 612 P.2d 763 (1980) ( [W]here the “[d]efendant had asserted his statutory demand for trial within 180 days [under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers],” “[s]omething more than his mere silence at arraignment [when a trial date was set outside the 180–day period] must serve to belie his earlier intention”). However, a defendant who has requested a speedy trial pursuant to ORS 135.760 may waive that right.

State v. White, 234 Kan. at 344, 673 P.2d 1106. See McBride v. United States, 393 A.2d at 129; State v. Ternaku, 156 N.J.Super. 30, 33-34, 383 A.2d 437 (1978); State v. Arwood, 46 Or.App. 653, 656, 612 P.2d 763 (1980); Annot., 98 A.L.R.3d 160, 208, § 15(a). Standing alone, this rule eviscerates Article III (b) of all impact or force.

However, the majority of courts hold that the period begins only when the prosecutor and the appropriate court receive the request. E.g. People v. Fex, 439 Mich. 117, 479 N.W.2d 625, 626 (Mich.), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1935, 118 L.Ed.2d 542 (1992); State v. Braswell, 194 Conn. 297, 481 A.2d 413, 417 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1112, 105 S.Ct. 793, 83 L.Ed.2d 786 (1985); State v. White, 234 Kan. 340, 673 P.2d 1106, 1110 (1983); People v. Hood, 223 Ill. App.3d 157, 164 Ill.Dec. 851, 854, 583 N.E.2d 1173, 1176 (1991), appeal denied, 144 Ill.2d 638, 169 Ill.Dec. 147, 591 N.E.2d 27 (1992); State v. Whittemore, 166 Wis.2d 127, 479 N.W.2d 566, 569 (Wis.Ct.App. 1991), review denied, ___ Wis.2d ___, 482 N.W.2d 107 (1992); Ravenscraft v. State, 753 S.W.2d 741, 742 (Tex.Ct.App. 1988); Oregon v. Arwood, 46 Or.App. 653, 612 P.2d 763 (1980); People v. Bielecki, 41 Colo. App. 256, 588 P.2d 377, 378 (Colo.Ct.App. 1978); State v. Ternaku, 156 N.J.Super. 30, 383 A.2d 437, 439 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 77 N.J. 479, 391 A.2d 494 (1978); State v. Plant, 532 S.W.2d 900, 902 (Mo.Ct.App. 1976). The language of the IADA reveals that the 180-day period does not commence until the prisoner has caused the proper officials to receive the request; that is, when the prosecutor has obtained the request.

The Appellant relies upon the following cases as support for his "substantial compliance" argument. SeePittman v. State, 301 A.2d 509 (Del. 1973);State v. Ferguson, 535 N.E.2d 708 (Ohio Ct.App. 1987);State v. Arwood, 612 P.2d 763 (Or.Ct.App. 1980);Nelms v. State, 532 S.W.2d 923 (Tenn. 1976). Consistent with the decision of the United States Supreme Court inFex, as well as the majority of other jurisdictions which have addressed the issue sub judice, we agree that a prisoner must strictly comply with the procedures set forth in the IADA before the 180-day time limit is triggered.

We hold, consistent with an apparent majority of jurisdictions which have considered the question, that the 180-day limitations period of Art. III(1) does not commence until proper Missouri authorities receive a request for final disposition of an outstanding detainer. See, e.g., People v. Bielecki, 41 Colo. App. 256, 258, 588 P.2d 377, 378 (1978); State v. Braswell, 194 Conn. 297, 304, 481 A.2d 413, 417, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1112, 105 S.Ct. 793, 83 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984); Pinnock v. State, 384 So.2d 738, 739 (Fla.Ct.App. 1980); Holland v. State, 265 Ind. 216, 223, 352 N.E.2d 752, 757 (1976); State v. White, 234 Kan. 340, 344, 673 P.2d 1106, 1110 (1983) (citing State v. Arwood, 46 Or.App. 653, 655-56, 612 P.2d 763 (1980)); Hines v. State, 58 Md. App. 637, 650, 473 A.2d 1335, 1341 (1984); State v. Ternaku, 156 N.J. Super. 30, 34, 383 A.2d 437, 439 (1978); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 451 Pa. 102, 104, 301 A.2d 605, 606 (1973); State v. Moosey, 504 A.2d 1001, 1003 (R.I. 1986). The judgment below is affirmed.

Most courts which have addressed the issue presented here have recognized the 180-day speedy trial period begins to run only upon receipt by the proper authorities of the prisoner's notice and request. See, e.g., People v. Bielecki, 41 Colo. App. 256, 258, 588 P.2d 377 (1978); State v. Arwood, 46 Or. App. 653, 655-56, 612 P.2d 763 (1980); State v. Plant, 532 S.W.2d at 902; State v. Ternaku, 156 N.J. Super. 30, 34, 383 A.2d 437 (1978); Annot., 98 A.L.R.3d 160, 208, § 15(a), and cases cited therein. In deciding the 180-day period commenced on the date the notice and request is received by the prosecutor and appropriate court, the court in State v. Ternaku, 156 N.J. Super. at 34, stated:

(Quoting State v. Martinez , 246 Or. App. 383, 387, 265 P.3d 92, rev den , 351 Or. 507, 272 P.3d 742 (2011), and Statev. Arwood , 46 Or. App. 653, 657, 612 P.2d 763 (1980) (brackets from Martinez omitted)). Therefore, we understand defendant to present two arguments: that the trial court's negligence is attributable to the state and, alternatively, that the trial court's negligence is not good cause to delay a restitution hearing.

"Moreover, ‘inattentiveness to the passage of time on the part of the trial court and prosecutor do not constitute good cause[.]’ " State v. Martinez , 246 Or.App. 383, 387, 265 P.3d 92, rev. den. , 351 Or. 507, 272 P.3d 742 (2011) (quoting State v. Arwood , 46 Or.App. 653, 657, 612 P.2d 763 (1980) (brackets in Martinez )). Here, the restitution hearing was scheduled for February 7, 2014, 86 days after the trial court entered the judgment against defendant.

Moreover, “inattentiveness to the passage of time on the part of the trial court and prosecutor do not constitute good cause[.]” State v. Arwood, 46 Or.App. 653, 657, 612 P.2d 763 (1980). In this case, the filing on the eighty-fifth day occurred because the prosecutor was awaiting a decision from the victim's compensation program about whether they would be covering the victim's damages, in order to know who would be entitled to recover the restitution from defendant.