Opinion
I.D. No. 9510001021.
Submitted: March 1, 2000.
Decided: May 25, 2000.
Upon Defendant's Pro Se Motion For Postconviction Relief. DENIED.
ORDER
This 25th day of May, 2000, upon consideration of Defendant's pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61, it appears to this Court that:
1. Henry A. Artis (Defendant) has filed this pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61. Defendant alleges that his conviction is the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's motion is DENIED.
2. Defendant pled guilty on February 8, 1996 and was sentenced on April 16, 1996 to thirty years at Level 5 pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4214(a) for Kidnapping in the First Degree; ten years at Level 5 for Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony; and a probationary period for a conviction of Assault Second Degree, all stemming from his accosting of a woman in his apartment and his assault of a police officer on October 2, 1995. On April 16, 1996, upon a motion filed by the State pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4214(a), Defendant was declared a Habitual Criminal Offender. Defendant subsequently filed this motion for postconviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.
Plaintiff had been represented by Edward C. Pankowski, Jr., Esquire.
3. Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are set forth in toto below.
[Ground One] The defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment Right to effective assistance of counsel when the Defendant's Public Defender informed him that he would receive a four (4) to six (6) year sentence if he accepted the plea bargain as opposed to a life sentence if he insisted on taking the matter to trial.
[Ground Two] Defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel when the defendant's counsel: 1) allowed the defendant to plead guilty; 2) failed to file a motion to withdraw of guilty plea, and; 3) failed to appeal the Superior Court's acceptance of the guilty plea despite the defendants denial of the version of facts and the absence of any showing that the defendant was aware of the essential elements of the offense.
[Ground Three] The defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel when the Defendants counsel failed to investigate, prepare, and submit mitigating evidence to the sentencing court.
[Ground Four] Defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel when defendants counsel failed to report the findings of the presentence report with defendant and failed to investigate and object to erroneous information contained in the report.
[Ground Five] Defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel when the defendants counsel: 1) failed to challenge the State's motions to have the Defendant declared a Habitual Offender; 2) failed to object to the Courts declaration of the Defendant as a Habitual Offender; 3) failed to appeal the Habitual Offender designation.
[Ground Six] Defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel when the Defendants counsel gave him inaccurate advice concerning the applicable sentence. Counsel informed Defendant he would only receive 4 to 6 years if he took the plea bargain. Defendant received 52 years instead.
Additionally, Defendant filed a Memorandum in support of the grounds asserted in his Motion For Postconviction Relief.
Defendant's Motion For Postconviction Relief at 3 and back of 3.
4. To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant must show both (a) that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and (b) "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result would be different." Since Defendant must prove both prongs in order to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, failure to prove either prong will render the claim unsuccessful. Defendant must prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. In addition, the Delaware Supreme Court has consistently held that when setting forth a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk summary dismissal.
A. Defendant's Plea of Guilty Was Entered Knowingly, Voluntarily, and Intelligently.
Albury v. State, Del. Supr., 551 A.2d 53, 58 (1998) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984)).
Robinson v. State, Del. Supr., 291 A.2d 279 (1972).
State v. Mason, Del. Super., Cr. A. No. IN93-02-0279-RI, Barron, J. (April 11, 1996) (Mem. Op.) at 7.
5. A guilty plea may only be set aside subsequent to sentencing upon the filing of a meritorious motion pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. In such cases, the defendant "has the burden of showing prejudice amounting to manifest injustice." It is necessary that a defendant's plea of guilty must be entered knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently. Furthermore, absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, a defendant is bound by his signature on the plea form.
Allen v. State, Del. Supr., 509 A.2d 87, 88 (1986) ( citing Smith v. State, Del. Supr., 451 A.2d 837, 839 (1982)).
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
Fullman v. State, Del. Supr., No. 268, 1998, Christie, C.J. (Feb. 22, 1989) (Mem. Op.).
This Court finds that Defendant's allegations with respect to the validity of his guilty plea contained in grounds one, two, and six are not supported by any specific allegations in his motion or the supporting memorandum of law. There is evidence in the record that the Defendant was informed by defense counsel of a range of sentences and the plea agreement itself states that Defendant "freely and voluntarily decided to plead guilty to the charges listed in [his] written plea agreement . . . and that he was satisfied with [his] lawyer's representation of [him] and that [his] lawyer ha[d] fully advised [him] of [his] rights and of [his] guilty plea." Additionally, Defendant stated that he had reviewed the plea "thoroughly and carefully with his attorney. . . ." This Court finds that Defendants' plea of guilty was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently and there is no evidence in the record to the contrary. Grounds one, two, and six of Defendant's motion are denied.
See Affidavit 1 of Edward C. Pankowski at ¶ 1.
See Truth in Sentencing Guilty Plea Form signed February 8, 1996.
Plea Tr. at 4-5.
B. Defendant has failed to show how counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or, in the alternative, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result would have been different.
6. Counsel must make decisions concerning which avenues to pursue; rejection of those that are not "reasonably suggested by the apparent factual circumstances surrounding the crime charged on the subsequent demeanor and conduct of the client" is not ineffective assistance. There is no constitutional basis for a rule that would require trial counsel to obtain a psychiatric evaluation — even where a defendant faces a possible death sentence.
United States ex rel. Rivera v. Franzea, 7th Cir., 794 F.2d 314, 317 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 991 (1986).
Clanton v. Blair, 4th Cir., 483 F.2d 1354, 1358 (1987) cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1036 (1988).
There is no evidence in the record which supports Defendant's allegations contained in grounds three and four that defense counsel should have obtained a psychiatric evaluation or other mitigating evidence which Defendant now alleges. Whenever evaluating the conduct of counsel, this Court must indulge "a strong presumption that counsel's conduct was professionally reasonable." Further, the Court must make "every effort . . . to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight[.]" "[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable[.]" Any inadvertence of counsel does not amount to "cause" unless it rises to the level of ineffectiveness in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
Albury, 551 A.2d at 58.
Strickland, 466 U.S. At 689.
Id. at 690.
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492 (1986).
This Court finds that Defendant has failed to demonstrate how defense counsel's actions were professionally unreasonable or, in the alternative, but for defense counsel's unprofessional errors, how his sentence would have been any different. Grounds three and four of Defendant's motion are denied.
C. Defendant's Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims Relating to the Habitual Criminal Offender Proceedings Are Procedurally Barred
7. When considering a motion of postconviction relief, the Court must first apply the procedural bars of Rule 61(i) before considering the merits of the individual claims. To protect the integrity of the procedural rules, ordinarily the Court should not consider the merits of a postconviction claim where a procedural bar exists. Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(4) provides, in pertinent part, that "any ground for relief that was formerly adjudicated, whether in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, is thereafter barred, unless reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice." The interest of justice exception under this Rule has been narrowly defined to require the movant to show that the trial court lacked the authority to convict or punish him.
Younger v. State, Del. Supr., 580 A.2d 552, 554 (1990) ( citing Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265 (1989)); see also Bailey v. State, Del. Supr., 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (1991); Flamer v. State, Del. Supr., 585 A.2d 736, 745 (1990); Winn v. State, Del. Supr., No. 257, 1992, Moore, J. (Feb. 9, 1993) (ORDER); Webster v. State, Del. Supr., No. 65, 1992, Horsey, J. (Apr. 1, 1992) (ORDER).
State v. Gattis, Del. Super., Cr. A. No. IN90-05-1017, Barron, J. (Dec. 28, 1995) ( citing Younger v. State, 580 A.2d at 554; Saunders v. State, Del. Supr., No. 185, 1994, Walsh, J. (Jan. 13, 1995)(ORDER); Hicks v. State, Del. Supr., No. 417, 1991, Walsh, J. (May 56, 1992) (ORDER)).
State v. Wright, Del. Super., 653 A.2d 288, 298 (1994) ( citing Flamer v. State, Del. Supr., 585 A.2d 736, 746 (1990)).
Defendant's claim that he was improperly declared a habitual criminal offender was rejected on its merits by the Delaware Supreme Court during his direct appeal when the Supreme Court granted the State's motion to affirm finding "the Superior Court properly determined that [Defendant] should be declared a habitual criminal." Grounds four and five of Defendant's motion are denied.
Artis v. State, Del. Supr., No. 270, 1996, Veasey. C.J. (Oct. 1, 1996) (ORDER).
8. For the reasons stated, Defendant's pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.