Opinion
No. 108,069.
2012-12-7
Anthony Leroy DAVIS, Appellant, v. Jay SHELTON, Warden, Norton Correctional Facility, Appellees.
Appeal from Norton District Court; Preston A. Pratt, Judge. Anthony Leroy Davis, appellant pro se. Robert E. Wasinger, of Department of Corrections, of Norton, for appellees.
Appeal from Norton District Court; Preston A. Pratt, Judge.
Anthony Leroy Davis, appellant pro se. Robert E. Wasinger, of Department of Corrections, of Norton, for appellees.
Before STANDRIDGE, P.J., ATCHESON, J., and HEBERT, S.J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Anthony Leroy Davis, an inmate at the state prison in Norton, appeals the dismissal of his petition, filed pursuant to K.S.A. 60–1501, challenging discipline imposed on him for violating the facility's rules. The Norton County District Court dismissed the petition because Davis suffered no constitutionally recognized injury to his liberty interests or property rights, as required to seek relief under K.S.A. 60–1501. The district court ruled correctly, and we affirm.
Prison officials wrote Davis up for failing to report for work in a timely fashion. Davis disputed the factual basis for the write-up. A hearing officer found against Davis and imposed a punishment of 30 days' restrictions on his privileges and suspended the restrictions if Davis had no other violations for 120 days. For purposes of our ruling, we assume Davis completed the necessary steps to exhaust internal review of the discipline. We do not understand the Department of Corrections to argue otherwise, although the agency correctly points out that on appeal Davis discusses grievances he filed about matters unconnected with this disciplinary action. Davis duly filed his 60–1501 petition in the district court and has timely appealed its dismissal to this court.
After Davis filed his principal brief, which he authored himself, he submitted what he characterized as a motion for summary disposition under Supreme Court Rule 7.041 (2011 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 59) permitting a party to request immediate relief based on a controlling decision of the appellate courts. In his motion, Davis cited Stanton v. Shelton, No. 107,436, an unpublished decision of this court issued on August 17, 2012. But an unpublished Court of Appeals opinion has no precedential or binding effect, see Rule 7 .04(f) ( 2011 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 57), and, therefore, cannot be the basis for summary disposition. We have treated Davis' submission as a Rule 6.09 letter providing additional authority and have considered it accordingly (2011 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 49).
The courts have held that placement of an inmate in administrative or disciplinary segregation typically does not, in and of itself, give rise to a freestanding due process claim to support habeas corpus relief as provided through K.S.A. 60–1501. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (placement of inmate in restrictive solitary confinement as discipline failed to state a constitutional claim for denial of due process because the conditions did not amount to an “atypical and significant hardship ... in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”); Amos v. Nelson, 260 Kan. 652, 666, 923 P.2d 1014 (1996); Anderson v. McKune, 23 Kan.App.2d 803, 807, 937 P.2d 16,rev. denied 262 Kan. 959, cert. denied522 U.S. 958 (1997). That sort of placement does not implicate a liberty interest because the conditions are not sufficiently more confining than prison itself. Davis does not and cannot show that his discipline—restrictions of his privileges—amounts to a denial of a liberty interest, especially since imposition of the restrictions was suspended.
Davis does not allege a loss of already earned good time credit, a deprivation that would implicate a protected liberty interest. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455–56, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985). Nor did Davis receive a monetary fine, a constitutionally actionable loss of property. Anderson, 23 Kan.App.2d at 807.
Absent a showing of a constitutional deprivation, Davis has no legal basis on which to proceed under K.S.A. 60–1501. The district court properly dismissed the petition. See Brown v. Cline, No. 107,983, 2012 WL 5392191, at *1 (Kan.App.2012) (unpublished opinion) (segregation and restricted privileges alone insufficient to support 60–1501 petition challenging discipline because inmate suffered no constitutionally protected loss).
Affirmed.