It is, of course, well established in Connecticut that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed, but this canon of statutory construction does not prevent the application of common sense to the language so as to effectuate the evident intent of the law-makers. See State v. Pastet, 169 Conn. 13, 21-22, 363 A.2d 41, 46 (1975); State v. Sober, 166 Conn. 81, 91, 347 A.2d 61, 67 (1974); State v. Archambault, 146 Conn. 605, 607-08, 153 A.2d 451, 452 (1959). Despite this lack of ambiguity, Management seizes upon the fact that the Connecticut courts have not decided this issue and argues that if and when they do, they will decide according to the so-called "New York rule," under which unlicensed brokers may sometimes recover commissions for negotiating the transfer of going businesses even if a transfer of real estate is also involved. Management claims that the negotiations around the Marina sale involved a "blend" of business and real estate brokerage services of the type covered by this rule.

Conn.Gen.Stat. § 53-40 (1958). See State v. Archambault, 146 Conn. 605, 153 A.2d 451 (1959) (Section 53-40 makes it a crime maliciously to threaten, inter alia, injury to a person's reputation with intent thereby to extort money.) Cal.Pen. Code §§ 519 and 520.

State v. Pastet, 169 Conn. 13, 21-22, 363 A.2d 41, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937, 96 S.Ct. 297, 46 L.Ed.2d 270 (1975), aptly observes: "Although the principle is well established that penal statutes must be strictly construed, the application of common sense to the language of a penal law is not to be excluded in a way which would involve absurdity or frustrate the evident design of the lawgiver." See State v. Shockley, 188 Conn. 697, 711, 453 A.2d 441 (1982); State v. Sober, 166 Conn. 81, 91, 347 A.2d 61 (1974); State v. Archambault, 146 Conn. 605, 607-608, 153 A.2d 451 (1959); State v. Bello, 133 Conn. 600, 604, 53 A.2d 381 (1947); see also 3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed. Sands) 59.06. The statute plainly intends that the conduct which it prohibits be judged from the vantage point of the criminal actor.

State v. Levy, 103 Conn. 138, 141, 130 A. 96; State v. Faro, 118 Conn. 267, 273, 171 A. 660.'" State v. Cataudella, 159 Conn. 544, 556, 271 A.2d 99 (1970); see State v. Pastet, 169 Conn. 13, 21-22, 363 A.2d 41, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937, 96 S.Ct. 297, 46 L.Ed.2d 270 (1975); State v. Sober, 166 Conn. 81, 91, 347 A.2d 61 (1974); State v. Benson, 153 Conn. 209; 215, 214 A.2d 903 (1965); State v. Archambault, 146 Conn. 605, 607-608, 153 A.2d 451 (1959). Moreover, "[s]ound rules of statutory interpretation exist to discover and not to direct the Congressional will."

Generally, libels are written defamations and slanders are oral defamations. See Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal, Co., 146 Conn. 605, 610-11, 153 A.2d 451 (1955). Although the plaintiff has referred to negative, oral statements made by Heid and Nichols, the plaintiff during trial and in his post-trial submissions uniformly characterized his claims as being based on "libels per se," or written defamations allegedly made by the defendants. "Whether a published article is libelous per se must be determined upon the face of the article itself.