We then determine whether, from the facts established and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, the jury reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative effect of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Arbelo, 37 Conn. App. 156, 159, 655 A.2d 263 (1995), citing State v. Turner, 24 Conn. App. 264, 267, 587 A.2d 1050, cert. denied, 218 Conn. 910, 591 A.2d 812 (1991). The first count charges the defendant with sale of a narcotic substance, specifically cocaine.

Indeed, “[i]n common parlance, a sale is the exchange of an object for value. The statutory definition of sale as applied to illegal drug transactions, however, is much broader and includes any form of delivery....” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Arbelo, 37 Conn.App. 156, 159–60, 655 A.2d 263 (1995); see also State v. Wassil, 233 Conn. 174, 193–94, 658 A.2d 548 (1995) (“sale was not originally defined narrowly to mean only barter, exchange or gift [or offer therefor] ... but rather was defined broadly as including barter, exchange or gift [or offer therefor]” [emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted] ). Thus, “the statutory definition of the term ‘sale’ is substantially broader in scope than the common dictionary definition....” (Emphasis added.)

In State v. Mierez , 24 Conn. App. 543, 551–54, 590 A.2d 469, cert. denied, 219 Conn. 910, 911, 593 A.2d 136 (1991), officers could not describe what was passed from the defendant to the alleged buyer other than as "small objects," and they saw no money change hands. In State v. Arbelo , 37 Conn. App. 156, 160, 655 A.2d 263 (1995), no witness saw the alleged drug transaction. Similarly, in State v. Davis , 38 Conn. App. 621, 625, 662 A.2d 812, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 919, 665 A.2d 907 (1995), no witness saw drugs pass from the defendant to the alleged buyer.

(Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Arbelo, 37 Conn. App. 156, 159-60, 655 A.2d 263 (1995); see also State v. Sargent, 87 Conn. App. 24, 44 n.ll, 864 A.2d 20 ("[t]his court has observed that the statutory definition of 'sale' as applied to illegal drug transactions is much broader than its common definition"), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 912, 870 A.2d 1082 (2005). Moreover, "transfer" is defined as " [a]ny mode of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset.

This court has observed that the statutory definition of "sale" as applied to illegal drug transactions is much broader than its common definition. See State v. Arbelo, 37 Conn. App. 156, 159-60, 655 A.2d 263 (1995). We note also that the "sale" element of the crimes charged was not seriously contested at trial by the defendant.

The defendant relies on three cases for the proposition that when the item exchanged cannot be identified by the observing officer, then, in the absence of other corroborating circumstances, the inference that the item exchanged was an illegal substance is not a reasonable one, but rather rests on speculation and conjecture. See State v. Davis, 38 Conn. App. 621, 624-28, 662 A.2d 812, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 919, 665 A.2d 907 (1995); State v. Arbelo, 37 Conn. App. 156, 158-62, 655 A.2d 263 (1995); State v. Mierez, 24 Conn. App. 543, 551-53, 590 A.2d 469, cert. denied, 219 Conn. 910, 911, 593 A.2d 136 (1991). Each of those cases, however, involved a sufficiency of the evidence claim in which the court was called on to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt for the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.

We conclude, however, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, that despite the short delay between the time of the transaction and the time of the driver's arrest, the jury reasonably could have inferred that the small white object that Weisgerber observed the defendant give to the driver was the same small white object, later determined by a toxicologist to be cocaine, that was found on the driver only two to four minutes later, and that this and other evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant relies on State v. Davis, 38 Conn. App. 621, 626, 662 A.2d 812, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 919, 665 A.2d 907 (1995), State v. Arbelo, 37 Conn. App. 156, 160, 655 A.2d 263 (1995), and State v. Mierez, 24 Conn. App. 543, 553-54, 590 A.2d 469, cert. denied, 219 Conn. 910, 911, 593 A.2d 136 (1991), to support his argument that there was insufficient evidence to permit a finding of guilt. In each of these cases, we concluded that the evidence did not support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because no witnesses could identify the objects exchanged in the alleged drug transactions.

" Id., 551-52. Similarly, in State v. Arbelo, 37 Conn. App. 156, 655 A.2d 263 (1995), we overturned a conviction because of the absence of evidence of a drug sale. "The weakness in the state's case here is that no state's witness saw money pass from [the purported purchaser] to the defendant, nor did any state's witness see any drugs pass from the defendant to [the purported purchaser]. Additionally, there is a paucity of circumstantial evidence supporting the state's theory that the brief contact between the defendant and [the purported purchaser] resulted in a drug sale.

" (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Arbelo, 37 Conn. App. 156, 160, 655 A.2d 263 (1995). In the present case, there are reasonable hypotheses that could explain the defendant's intent and his subsequent conduct, and thus a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt is improper.

A suspicion of illegal activity on the part of the defendant does not satisfy the state's burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Arbelo, 37 Conn. App. 156, 161-62, 655 A.2d 263 (1995). The state points to the evidence that the defendant was a regional commander of the Latin Kings to buttress its contention that, by virtue of his gang membership and rank, knowledge of the conspiracy may be imputed to him.