Opinion
No. 52226-4-I.
Filed: February 9, 2004. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of King County. Docket No: 02-8-04813-9. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 03/25/2003.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Washington Appellate Project Attorney at Law, Cobb Building, 1305 4th Avenue, Ste 802, Seattle, WA 98101.
Maureen Marie Cyr, Washington Appellate Project, 1305 4th Ave Ste 802, Seattle, WA 98101-2402.
Andre P. — Informational only (Appearing Pro Se), WA.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Daniel Jason Clark, King County Prosecuting Attorney, W554 King County Courthouse, 516 3rd Ave Ste W554, Seattle, WA 98104-2362.
Prosecuting Atty King County, King County Prosecutor/appellate Unit, 1850 Key Tower, 700 Fifth Avenue, Seattle, WA 98104.
A.P. was charged with second degree assault after he held a knife to another teenager's throat. The juvenile court found A.P. guilty. A.P. appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. We find the evidence sufficient, and affirm.
FACTS
While visiting A.P. and his brother at their residence, Katherine L. used A.P.'s computer without his knowledge or consent. At some point, Katherine L. realized that A.P. was standing behind her with one hand on her head and the other was holding a knife across her neck. The incident led to A.P. being charged with one count of second degree assault. The information alleged that A.P. did `intentionally assault Katherine [L.] with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a knife.'
At the fact finding hearing, Katherine L. testified that she felt something touch her neck and that moments later she realized that A.P. was holding a knife to her throat. Katherine L. testified that A.P. maintained this position with his hands as they walked toward a nearby door. According to Katherine L., A.P. then pushed her outside, shut the door, and started laughing. When asked to describe how close the knife was to her, Katherine L. replied `Touching.' Another witness testified that she saw A.P. walking behind Katherine L. and that he was holding a knife against her neck.
A.P. took the stand in his own defense. A.P. denied touching Katherine L. or brandishing a knife across her neck. The defense also called A.P.'s brother who testified that he did not see A.P. touch Katherine L. with the knife and that she did not appear to be upset after the incident. After hearing all the testimony, the juvenile court found that the State had proved that A.P. touched Katherine with the hand that was holding the knife (actual battery) and that the touching was offensive. Concluding that the knife was a deadly weapon under the circumstances in which it was used, the court determined that A.P. was guilty of second degree assault. This appeal followed.
DECISION
A.P. contends that his due process rights were violated when the juvenile court found him guilty of second degree assault because the State failed to prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, A.P. argues his disposition for second degree assault should be reversed and dismissed. We disagree.
Under the state and federal constitutions, the State is required to prove all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. To find A.P. guilty of second degree assault as charged in this case, the State must prove that he assaulted another with a deadly weapon. When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, our concern is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In reviewing such a challenge, all reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the State, and interpreted most strongly against the defendant. A.P. argues that the State failed to sustain its burden of proving that the knife held to Katherine L.'s neck was a deadly weapon within the meaning of RCW 9A.04.110(6). For the knife to qualify as a deadly weapon under that statutory provision, it, as used, must have been `readily capable of causing death or substantial bodily harm.' `The circumstances of a weapon's use include the intent and ability of the user, the degree of force, the part of the body to which it was applied, and the actual injuries that were inflicted.'
State v. Aver, 109 Wn.2d 303, 310, 745 P.2d 479 (1987).
State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 221, 616 P.2d 628 (1980).
State v. G.S., 104 Wn. App. 643, 651, 17 P.3d 1221 (2001).
State v. Barragan, 102 Wn. App. 754, 761, 9 P.3d 942 (2000).
A.P. points out that the knife was not admitted into evidence and that Katherine L. suffered no bodily injuries as a consequence of the encounter. Because the knife was used by A.P.'s family as a letter opener and thus `its blade was probably dull,' argues A.P., the knife could not satisfy the deadly weapon element of the second degree assault statute (RCW 9A.36.021(1)(c). This argument, however, completely ignores a wealth of evidence presented at A.P.'s adjudicatory hearing. A.P. did not merely have the knife in his possession when he confronted Katherine L., he held the sharp edge of the knife against her throat. There was also testimony that the knife blade was sharp and over four inches in length. Not only did A.P. display the knife, he manifested a willingness to use it in a way readily capable of causing serious bodily injury. Given the circumstances surrounding its use, the juvenile court as trier of fact could have reasonably found that the knife was a deadly weapon.
Appellant's Opening Brief at 16.
A.P. next contends that the State failed to prove the mental state necessary to establish second degree assault under RCW 9A.36.021(1)(c). `The State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the requisite mental state for the crime charged.' The premise underlying A.P.'s argument is that the State was required to prove that he intended to either inflict bodily harm or cause the reasonable apprehension of bodily harm. Because the juvenile court in this case did not find either intent, A.P. argues his assault conviction must be reversed. This argument is fatally flawed.
Greene, 92 Wn. App. 80, 106, 960 P.2d 980 (1998), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 139 Wn.2d 64, 984 P.2d 1024 (1999).
A.P. was charged under RCW 9A.36.021, subsection (1)(c), which merely requires an assault upon another with a deadly weapon. Washington recognizes three forms of criminal assault: (1) an attempt, with unlawful force, to inflict bodily injury on another person (attempted battery); (2) an unlawful touching of another with criminal intent (actual battery); and (3) putting another in apprehension of harm, with or without the intent or capacity to inflict the harm (common law assault). Only the second way of committing assault is at issue here.
State v. Kindsvogel, 149 Wn.2d 477, 483, 69 P.3d 870 (2003).
A.P. relies on State v. Byrd, for the proposition that specific intent to either inflict substantial bodily injury or cause apprehension is an essential element of second degree assault under RCW 9A.36.021(1)(c). The case, however, is readily distinguishable because it did not address assault committed by actual battery. Rather, the court in Byrd held that the other two forms of assault require proof of specific intent. Assault by actual battery, in contrast, `does not require specific intent to inflict harm or cause apprehension; rather, battery requires intent to do the physical act constituting assault.' Under the circumstances, the juvenile court was not required to find either that A.P. intended to inflict harm or cause the reasonable apprehension of harm.
125 Wn.2d 707, 887 P.2d 396 (1995).
State v. Hall, 104 Wn. App. 56, 62, 14 P.3d 884 (2000), review denied, 143 Wn.2d 1023 (2001); State v. Daniels, 87 Wn. App. 149, 155, 940 P.2d 690 (1997).
See State v. Strand, 20 Wn. App. 768, 779, 582 P.2d 874 (1978) (Intent to injure is not an element of second degree assault when the defendant is charged under the assault with a deadly weapon subsection of the crime.).
A.P., in the alternative, argues that his adjudication of guilt must be reversed because the juvenile court failed to enter any written finding regarding A.P.'s intent. Intent is a court-implied element of assault. `The intentional unlawful touching of the body of another is an assault.' While it is true, as A.P. argues, that the juvenile court's written findings of fact do not specifically mention this element of assault, an appellate court may resort to the trial court's oral ruling to interpret written findings and conclusions so long as no inconsistency exists. Here the court in its oral ruling addresses the intent element of assault. The court noted that the touching must be intentional and offensive for A.P. to be found guilty. Under the circumstances, the evidence is sufficient to support the court's determination that A.P. was guilty of second degree assault.
State v. Parker, 81 Wn. App. 731, 915 P.2d 174 (1996).
State v. Bynum, 76 Wn. App. 262, 266, 884 P.2d 10 (1994).
See Parker, 81 Wn. App. at 737.
Affirmed.
COLEMAN and BAKER, JJ., concur.