"Reasonable suspicion need not be based solely on the officer's personal observation and may be based on information provided by a citizen" or "other officers[.]" Lyndhurst v. Brickel, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 72322, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 2334, 4 (May 28, 1998), citing Beachwood v. Sims, 98 Ohio App.3d 9, 14, 647 N.E.2d 821 (8th Dist.1994); State v. Antill, 91 Ohio App.3d 589, 590, 632 N.E.2d 1370 (4th Dist.1993); State v. Stewart, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 109867, 109868, 2022-Ohio-199, ¶ 19, citing Brickel; Sims. {¶ 24} Therefore, based on the foregoing circumstances, Trooper Dowler had a sufficient "reasonable suspicion" to justify further investigation of the black Jeep, and we find that the subsequent traffic stop was constitutionally valid.

When a reviewing court determines whether a stop was proper, it must consider the totality of the circumstances. State v. Antill (1993), 91 Ohio App.3d 589. {¶ 9} The October 12, 2010 Judgment Entry overruling Appellant's motion to suppress indicates the trial court relied upon the "fellow officer rule" whereby an officer can stop a vehicle based upon another officer's observations.

Hamilton v. Lawson (1994), 94 Ohio App.3d 462. If, during that brief detention, the officer develops probable cause to believe the suspect is driving under the influence of alcohol, the officer may place the individual under arrest. State v. Antill (1993), 91 Ohio App.3d 589. Next, if the officer requests the individual to submit to a chemical test and the individual either refuses or has an alcohol level over the legal limit, R.C. 4511.191 requires the officer to immediately seize and suspend the individual's driver's license. Before the officer requests a chemical test, however, the officer is required to advise the individual of the consequences for refusing to submit to a chemical test or for being found over the legal alcohol level by the test.

{¶ 55} There seems to be no question that Blake failed all six field sobriety tests. Poor performance on field sobriety tests is an effective means of determining intoxication, and is often a key factor in establishing probable cause to arrest for DUI. Homan, supra , 89 Ohio St.3d at 425; State v. Bresson (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 123, 129, 554 N.E.2d 1330; Lloyd, supra , 126 Ohio App.3d at 95; State v. Antill (1993), 91 Ohio App.3d 589, 595, 632 N.E.2d 1370. There is no doubt that, after the field sobriety tests were administered, the troopers had probable cause to arrest Blake.

In State v. Campbell (1996), 115 Ohio App.3d 319, this Court held that during a justified initial stop and detention, an officer may place an individual under arrest if the officer develops probable cause to believe a suspect is driving under the influence of alcohol. Id. at 328, citing State v. Antill (1993), 91 Ohio App.3d 589. To determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual for violating R.C. 4511.19(A), the court must review, "* * * whether, at the moment of the arrest, the officer had knowledge from a reasonable trustworthy source of facts and circumstances sufficient to cause a prudent person to believe that the suspect was driving while under the influence of alcohol."

This Court has held that if an officer develops probable cause to believe the suspect is driving under the influence of alcohol during a justified initial stop and detention, the officer may place the individual under arrest. State v. Campbell (1996), 115 Ohio App.3d 319, 328, citing State v. Antill (1993), 91 Ohio App.3d 589. To determine if an officer possessed probable cause to arrest a driver for violating R.C. 4511.19(A), the court must review "* * * whether, at the moment of the arrest, the officer had knowledge from a reasonably trustworthy source of facts and circumstances sufficient to cause a prudent person to believe that the suspect was driving while under the influence of alcohol."

Courts sometimes analyze cases involving whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to stop an individual by inverting the question and asking whether the officer would have been delinquent in his duties had he not taken the action that he did. See, e.g., State v. Antill (1993), 91 Ohio App.3d 589, 632 N.E.2d 1370. We feel compelled to note that our finding that the information provided by the informant was not sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion does not mean that it did not warrant further investigation by law enforcement officials.

Hamilton v. Lawson (1994), 94 Ohio App.3d 462, 640 N.E.2d 1206. If, during that brief detention, the officer develops probable cause to believe the suspect is driving under the influence of alcohol, the officer may place the individual under arrest. State v. Antill (1993), 91 Ohio App.3d 589, 632 N.E.2d 1370. Next, if the officer requests the individual to submit to a chemical test and the individual either refuses or has an alcohol level over the legal limit, R.C. 4511.191 requires the officer to immediately seize and suspend the individual's driver's license. Before the officer requests a chemical test, however, the officer is required to advise the individual of the consequences for refusing to submit to a chemical test or for being found over the legal alcohol level by the test.

In State v. Oney (Feb. 15, 1995), Hamilton App. Nos. C-940332 and C-940333, unreported, 1995 WL 59695, the investigatory stop by a police officer who had information from restaurant employees that Oney had just departed from a pickup window and pulled into a parking space with the motor running, that he was intoxicated, disorderly, verbally abusive, and smelled of alcohol was held to be based on articulable facts justifying a reasonable suspicion that Oney was intoxicated or otherwise impaired and, therefore, the investigatory stop was upheld. In State v. Antill (1993), 91 Ohio App.3d 589, 632 N.E.2d 1370, the citizen tipster and Antill lived together; the tipster told the police that Antill was highly intoxicated and was driving around looking for her. In addition, she described his car and gave them his license plate number.