State v. Andrews

4 Citing cases

  1. State v. Langen

    2021 S.D. 36 (S.D. 2021)

    We review de novo "whether the 180[-]day period has expired as well as what constitutes good cause for delay . . . ." State v. Andrews, 2009 S.D. 41, ¶ 6 n.1, 767 N.W.2d 181, 183 n.1. "A circuit court's findings of fact on the issue of the 180-day rule are reviewed using the clearly erroneous rule." State v. Seaboy, 2007 S.D. 24, ¶ 6, 729 N.W.2d 370, 372.

  2. State v. Two Hearts

    2019 S.D. 17 (S.D. 2019)   Cited 5 times
    Considering the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a defendant made "an unconstrained, autonomous decision to confess"

    Pursuant to SDCL 23A-44-5.1, a defendant must be brought to trial within 180 days from the date the defendant first appeared before any "judicial officer on an indictment, information or complaint." State v. Andrews , 2009 S.D. 41, ¶ 7, 767 N.W.2d 181, 183. Certain days are properly excluded from this calculation, including "delay which is occasioned by the defendant’s conduct, such as delay caused by pretrial motions ... [and] defendant’s competency examination ...."

  3. State v. Long

    2021 S.D. 38 (S.D. 2021)   Cited 9 times

    We review whether the 180-day period has expired and the existence of good cause for delay under the de novo standard. State v. Andrews, 2009 S.D. 41, ¶ 6 n.1, 767 N.W.2d 181, 183 n.1 (citations omitted). The 180-day rule "creates a right to disposition of a criminal case within 180 days unless good cause may be shown for delay."

  4. State v. Bruce

    2011 S.D. 14 (S.D. 2011)   Cited 18 times
    Stating that “[w]hen ... statutory ranges are established, the legislative intent is that ‘the more serious commissions of the crime ... deserve sentences at the harsher end of the spectrum’ ” and that “the most severe sanctions [are intended to be reserved] for the most serious combinations of the offense and the background of the offender”

    [¶ 19.] Bruce argues that the circuit court erred in failing to dismiss the indictment because the time between his initial appearance and ultimate trial exceeded the 180-day period allowed under SDCL 23A-44-5.1. "We review the determination . . . whether the 180 day period . . . expired as well as what constitutes good cause for delay under a de novo standard." State v. Andrews, 2009 S.D. 41, ¶ 6 n. 1, 767 N.W.2d 181, 183 n. 1. [¶ 20.] On December 24, 2008, Bruce made an initial appearance on the complaint.