Opinion
2015-UP-568
12-23-2015
The State, Respondent, v. Damian D. Anderson, Appellant. Appellate Case No. 2014-001779
Deputy Chief Appellate Defender Wanda H. Carter, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Assistant Attorney General Christina Catoe Bigelow, and Assistant Attorney General Vann Henry Gunter, Jr., all of Columbia; and Scarlett Anne Wilson, of Charleston, for Respondent.
Unpublished Opinion
Submitted October 1, 2015
Appeal From Charleston County W. Jeffrey Young, Circuit Court Judge
Deputy Chief Appellate Defender Wanda H. Carter, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Assistant Attorney General Christina Catoe Bigelow, and Assistant Attorney General Vann Henry Gunter, Jr., all of Columbia; and Scarlett Anne Wilson, of Charleston, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM.
Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: S.C. Code Ann. § 14-7-1330 (1976) ("When a jury, after due and thorough deliberation upon any cause, returns into court without having agreed upon a verdict, the court may state anew the evidence or any part of it and explain to it anew the law applicable to the case and may send it out for further deliberation. But if it returns a second time without having agreed upon a verdict, it shall not be sent out again without its own consent unless it shall ask from the court some further explanation of the law."); State v. Freely, 105 S.C. 243, 247, 89 S.E. 643, 644 (1916) (stating the purpose of the statute is "to prevent forced verdicts, and to prevent undue severity of jury service"); State v. Kelly, 372 S.C. 167, 171-72, 641 S.E.2d 468, 470-71 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding "[t]here is no case law requiring or suggesting that an Allen charge be given when a juror retracts her verdict during polling and this [c]ourt will not impose such a requirement" and finding that when a juror states the announced verdict is not her verdict during jury polling, it does not necessarily indicate the jury is hopelessly deadlocked); State v. Barnes, 402 S.C. 135, 136-39, 739 S.E.2d 629, 629-631 (2013) (holding the trial court is not required to inform the jury its consent is necessary before deliberating a third time); Freely, 105 S.C. at 248, 89 S.E. at 644 ("If the circumstances satisfied the [court], in a wise exercise of [its] discretion, that the jury consented to the return, then it was lawful to return them."); State v. Robinson, 360 S.C. 187, 194, 600 S.E.2d 100, 103 (Ct. App. 2004) ("The jury's consent to resume or to discontinue deliberations is determined, either expressly or impliedly, by its response to the trial [court's] comments." (quoting Buff v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 342 S.C. 416, 422, 537 S.E.2d 279, 282 (2000)); State v. Rowell, 75 S.C. 494, 509, 56 S.E. 23, 28-29 (1906) (holding the jury's consent was implied when the jury did not indicate it was unwilling to deliberate a third time).
Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
FEW, C.J., and KONDUROS and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.