Opinion
No. 34415-7-II.
March 20, 2007.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Thurston County, No. 05-1-01635-7, Gary Tabor, J., entered February 15, 2006.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Christopher Gibson, Nielsen Broman Koch PLLC, Seattle, WA.
Counsel for Respondent(s), James C. Powers, Thurston County Prosecuting Attorney Ofc, Olympia, WA.
Reversed and remanded by unpublished opinion per Bridgewater, J., concurred in by Armstrong and Quinn-Brintnall, JJ.
Andrew Michael Anderson appeals his conviction for first degree assault while armed with a deadly weapon. We hold that although the trial court allowed him to present some evidence that his real intent during the assault was suicidal, i.e., to provoke a lethal police response, it erred in excluding evidence of previous suicide attempts and a diagnosis of a depressive disorder. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
FACTS
At 2:30 a.m. on August 27, 2005, 19-year-old Andrew Anderson entered a Tumwater Mega Foods store wearing only pajama bottoms and carrying a nine-inch knife. Brandishing the knife, he walked up to a Mega Foods employee, Adam Kalland, and said, "Give me a pack of cigarettes or I'm gonna kill you." 1 RP (Feb. 1 2, 2006) at 27. According to Kalland, Anderson advanced to within three feet and tried to stab Kalland in the belly by lunging at him with the knife. Kalland managed to avoid the thrust, flee to the back of the store, and find someone to call 911. Kalland testified that had he not dodged, Anderson would have stabbed him.
After this assault, Anderson walked to the front of the store. When Kalland and another employee approached, armed with beer bottles, Anderson dropped the knife and ran outside the store. He stood in the parking lot crying. Two women who knew Anderson arrived and tried to get him into their car and keep him away from the Mega Foods employees who had gathered outside.
At this point, Tumwater police officers arrived. Having received a report that the suspect was possibly armed, Detective Kolb drew her gun and ordered Anderson to show his hands. He refused and posed as if to lunge at her. Once Kolb saw Anderson was not armed, she switched to a non-lethal taser. At that point, Anderson complied with her commands, and she arrested him.
The State charged Anderson with first degree assault while armed with a deadly weapon and attempted first degree robbery while armed with a deadly weapon. The trial court ordered Anderson to undergo a mental health competency evaluation. Thomas LeCompte, a licensed psychologist, diagnosed Anderson with a depressive disorder. He concluded that while Anderson was depressed, he did not suffer from a mental defect affecting his mental capacity, that he had the capacity to form a criminal intent, and that he was competent to assist his defense. The trial court entered an order finding Anderson competent to stand trial.
At trial, Anderson's defense was that, while he did intend to assault Kalland to get the police, he did not intend to cause Kalland great bodily harm as required by the first degree assault statute. He also denied having any intent to rob Kalland. Anderson testified that he was trying to commit suicide by provoking police into shooting him. He had recently learned that his college financial aid had been terminated. And earlier that night, he had gotten into a fight with his girlfriend. He left the party, got a knife from his house, and then set out to try to get someone to call the police. His first effort, punching out a car window, did not provoke a response, so he walked into the store so that they would call the police. He denied intending to hurt Kalland and denied lunging at him.
While the trial court allowed a good deal of evidence about Anderson's state of mind on the night in question, it also excluded some evidence as either irrelevant or prejudicial. Specifically, the trial court excluded evidence that Anderson had two previous suicide attempts, that LeCompte's report found that Anderson was depressed but competent, and that Anderson told police that he was trying to get them to shoot him.
After deliberating, the jury acquitted Anderson of the attempted first degree robbery charge, but it convicted him of first degree assault. In addition, by special verdict, the jury found that Anderson was armed with a deadly weapon while committing first degree assault.
ANALYSIS
Anderson's main argument on appeal is that the trial court erred when it excluded evidence that would have strengthened his defense that he intended only to kill himself and not to harm Kalland. He asserts that by excluding evidence of his two prior suicide attempts, his depression diagnosis, and his statements to police indicating a suicidal motive, the trial court deprived him of his constitutional right to present evidence in his defense. The State responds that this evidence was either irrelevant or was so unfairly prejudicial that exclusion was appropriate. We agree with Anderson.
Under the Sixth Amendment and under article 1, section 22 of our state constitution, a criminal defendant has the right to present testimony in his defense. State v. Hudlow, 99 Wn.2d 1, 14-15, 659 P.2d 514 (1983). Our Supreme Court recently stated that a defendant has the right to present his version of the facts and that a right to present a defense is a fundamental element of due process of law. State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 857, 83 P.3d 970 (2004). But this right is not unlimited. A defendant does not, for example, have the right to present irrelevant evidence. Hudlow, 99 Wn.2d at 15. Even if evidence is relevant, the trial court may exclude it if the evidence would disrupt the fairness of the fact finding process. Hudlow, 99 Wn.2d at 15. The State's interest in a fair trial may outweigh the defendant's constitutional right to present evidence. Hudlow, 99 Wn.2d at 15.
In a recent decision interpreting Hudlow, our Supreme Court clarified that we examine the exclusion of relevant evidence a defendant presented under a three-prong approach. State v. Darden, 145 Wn.2d 612, 622, 41 P.3d 1189 (2002). First, we determine if the evidence is relevant. Darden, 145 Wn.2d at 622. Second, we determine if the State has met its burden of showing the evidence is prejudicial. Darden, 145 Wn.2d at 622. Finally, we balance the defendant's need for the information against the State's interest in excluding prejudicial evidence, and exclusion is proper only if the State's interest outweighs the defendant's. Darden, 145 Wn.2d at 622.
The Darden court addressed the defendant's right to confrontation rather than presentation of evidence in his case in chief. Darden, 145 W.2d at 624. But Darden relied on Hudlow, which addressed a defendant's right to present evidence as well as the defendant's right to cross-examine witnesses. Hudlow, 99 Wn.2d at 14-15. Therefore, the analysis in Darden applies to a defendant's right to present evidence.
In applying this balancing test, the Darden court relied on rules of evidence, holding that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially "`outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.'" Darden, 145 Wn.2d at 625 (quoting ER 403). In other words, a defendant's constitutional right to present evidence or cross-examine witnesses does not exempt him from the basic rules of evidence. Darden, 145 Wn.2d at 624 ("we apply basic rules of evidence to determine whether the trial court violated [the defendant's] confrontation rights."), see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1973).
Although the defendant is not exempt from the rules of evidence, he may be given more latitude under those rules. See Darden, 145 Wn.2d at 619 (noting that a defendant may have more latitude to explore motive, bias, credibility, and foundational matters in cross-examination).
Although Anderson's constitutional rights are implicated here, the admission of evidence lies within the trial court's sound discretion. State v. Rehak, 67 Wn. App. 157, 162, 834 P.2d 651 (1992), review denied, 120 Wn.2d 1022 (1993); Darden, 145 Wn.2d at 619. We therefore review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Darden, 145 Wn.2d at 619. The trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or reasons. State v. Powell, 126 Wn.2d 244, 258, 893 P.2d 615 (1995).
We turn to the first piece of evidence the trial court excluded: Anderson's first two suicide attempts. Applying the Hudlow test, we must first determine if this evidence was relevant to an issue in the case. Darden, 145 Wn.2d at 622. To convict Anderson of first degree assault, the State had to prove that Anderson, with the intent to inflict bodily harm, assaulted another with a deadly weapon. RCW 9A.36.011(1)(a). Anderson does not contest that he assaulted Kalland with a deadly weapon. Instead, he argues that he did not intend to inflict bodily harm. Thus, to be admissible, Anderson's suicides must be relevant to his intent on the night of the assault.
We hold that Anderson's state of mind was relevant and that his previous suicide attempts were relevant to his state of mind. We agree with the trial court's decision to admit evidence that Anderson had lost his financial aid, had a serious fight with his girlfriend that night, and wanted to kill himself. This evidence explains why, wearing only pajama bottoms, Anderson might assault someone; wait, crying, for police to arrive; and then accost the police. But without evidence of Anderson's suicidal history, the jury's picture of Anderson's state of mind was incomplete. Those attempts suggest that this was not mere teenage angst or a creative defense strategy, but a serious suicide attempt in a series of suicidal attempts. Evidence of his suicide attempts was necessary to complete Anderson's defense.
Given the evidence that Anderson had tried to kill himself before was relevant to showing his state of mind on the day in question, we next have to weigh the State's interest in excluding prejudicial evidence and determine if the defendant's need for that evidence outweighs the State's interest in avoiding prejudice. Darden, 145 Wn.2d at 622.
Because the issue was not whether Anderson was suicidal, but whether he intended to harm Kalland, the trial court was concerned that additional evidence of Anderson's past suicide attempts might confuse the issues and cause the jury to focus on Anderson's underlying motive rather than specific assaultive intent. The trial court determined that allowing Anderson to present the prior suicide attempts would evoke undue sympathy for Anderson's underlying mental problems and thereby distract the jury from determining whether Anderson intended to hurt Kalland when he lunged at him with the knife. The court found prejudice to the State and that Anderson's interest did not outweigh the prejudice the evidence would evoke.
But the trial court already admitted Anderson's suicidal motive; the suicide attempts are no more prejudicial than his description of the events leading up to his assault on Kalland. Having properly decided to allow this defense, the trial court's decision to prohibit Anderson from presenting a complete picture of his mental state is untenable. If anything, prohibiting Anderson from establishing his psychiatric history is more likely to mislead the jury into underestimating the seriousness of Anderson's suicide attempt than it is likely to confuse the jury.
Here, the prior suicide attempts explain Anderson's mental state. They would have supported and completed his defense about why he tried to entice the police to kill him. His need for this evidence in his defense outweighs the potential for prejudice and sympathy. We hold that the trial court erred in excluding the prior suicide attempts. This error is of constitutional magnitude and prevented Anderson from receiving a fair trial.
The State argues that even if the trial court did err, the error was harmless. When the trial court errs in an evidentiary ruling, the State must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same result in the absence of the error. State v. Maupin, 128 Wn.2d 918, 928-29, 913 P.2d 808 (1996).
The State contends that because the jury acquitted Anderson of attempted first degree robbery, it already believed that Anderson wanted to commit suicide. This reasoning is fallacious. Anderson did not take anything when he left the store; the jury could find that he did not intend to commit robbery on those grounds rather than because he wanted to kill himself. The State cannot maintain its burden beyond a reasonable doubt that if the jury had known of two prior suicide attempts, they would not have viewed his intent to assault Kalland differently. After all, the jury was only presented with two causes of Anderson's instant depression — his financial status and his girlfriend's behavior. The jury may not have believed those were sufficient reasons for Anderson's actions. We cannot find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that this error did not affect the outcome. State v. Austin, 59 Wn. App. 186, 195, 796 P.2d 746 (1990). Because this error was prejudicial, we reverse Anderson's conviction on this error alone.
Because it is likely to occur in a retrial, we address Anderson's other argument that the trial court erred in excluding portions of a mental competency examination indicating that he was depressed and had suicidal ideation. Anderson contends that the recent diagnosis of depression would support his theory that he did not intend to harm Kalland. The State responds that this evidence, like the suicide attempts, does not reveal Anderson's intent on the night he assaulted Kalland.
The trial court excluded this report on relevance grounds. It reasoned that the purpose of the mental health evaluation was to determine whether Anderson was competent to stand trial and whether he was capable of forming criminal intent. For the same reasons we addressed regarding the prior suicide attempts, the diagnosis that Anderson suffered from a depressive disorder would be relevant regarding his mental intent. Even though this evaluation does not support incompetency or diminished capacity, it is relevant to his defense that he was attempting suicide, not assault. In a future trial, Anderson should not be prohibited from introducing the results of a mental diagnosis, subject to a proper evidentiary foundation.
Finally, we address statements that Anderson made to police that he just did not care anymore, that he was just trying to scare the Mega Foods employee, that he was trying to get the officers to shoot him, and that he just wanted to die. We do not address the manner in which he attempted to introduce these statements at his first trial, but we note that the statements are relevant to his defense if properly adduced.
Because a new trial is warranted, we do not address Anderson's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Reversed and remanded for new trial.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
Armstrong, J.,
Quinn-Brintnall, J., concur.