A search warrant for an apartment house or hotel or other multiple-occupancy building will usually be held invalid if it fails to describe the particular subunit to be searched with sufficient definiteness to preclude a search of one or more subunits indiscriminately. State v. Anderson, 84 [Hawai'i] 462, 935 P.2d 1007 (1997) citing2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.5(b) at 526-29 (3d ed. 1996).As such the search of the totally separate ohana unit below the residence is beyond the scope of the warrant and therefore invalid.

The particularity requirement ensures that a search pursuant to a warrant "limit[s] the police as to where they can search, for otherwise the constitutional protection against warrantless searches is meaningless." State v. Anderson, 84 Hawai‘i 462, 467, 935 P.2d 1007, 1012 (1997) (quoting State v. Woolsey, 71 Haw. 638, 640, 802 P.2d 478, 479 (1990) ). A determination regarding whether a warrant satisfies the particularity requirement must be made "on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all of the surrounding facts and circumstances."

The particularity requirement ensures that a search pursuant to a warrant "limit[s] the police as to where they can search, for otherwise the constitutional protection against warrantless searches is meaningless." State v. Anderson, 84 Hawai'i 462, 467, 935 P.2d 1007, 1012 (1997) (quoting State v. Woolsey, 71 Haw. 638, 640, 802 P.2d 478, 479 (1990)). A determination regarding whether a warrant satisfies the particularity requirement must be made "on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all of the surrounding facts and circumstances."

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. That Search Warrant SW 97-40 authorized the police to search the entire residence at 471 Lipo Place, Wailuku, Maui, Hawaii [Haw.]. State v. Anderson, 84 Hawaii [Haw.] 462, 935 P.2d 1007 (1997). 2.

See also LaFave, Search and Seizure at 741 ("[W]here a significant portion of the premises is used in common and other portions, while ordinarily used by but one person or family, are an integral part of the described premises and are not secured against access by the other occupants, then the showing of probable cause extends to the entire premises."). See State v. Anderson, 935 P.2d 1007, 1014 (Haw. 1997); State v. Hymer, 400 So. 2d 637, 639 (La. 1981). See United States v. Dobson, 1990 WL 108993, at *3 (D.D.C. July 20, 1990) (permitting search of individual bedrooms when narcotics purchase made by informant in the kitchen); Anderson, 935 P.2d at 1019-20 (police had probable cause to search entire dwelling because of suspected illegal activity of two occupants); State v. McKewen, 710 So. 2d 638, 639 (Fla. Ct. App. 1998) (finding search of defendant's bedroom in single home appropriate when it was usually locked and defendant lived with person under investigation); Hymer, 400 So. 2d at 639 (finding probable cause to search defendant's room when a marijuana purchase was made on the property); State v. Coatney, 604 P.2d 1269, 1272 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (concluding search warrant for home considered one unit covered search of defendant's bedroom).

Where Edwards becomes problematic is that in explaining the application of the exclusionary rule, this court stated that, "[t]he proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing not only that the evidence sought to be excluded was unlawfully secured, but also, that his or her own . . . rights were violated." Edwards, 96 Hawaii at 232, 30 P.3d at 246 (quoting State v. Augafa, 92 Haw. 454, 464, 992 P.2d 723, 733 (App. 1999) (quoting State v. Balberdi, 90 Haw. 16, 21, 975 P.2d 773, 778 (App. 1999) (quoting State v. Anderson, 84 Haw. 462, 467, 935 P.2d 1007, 1012 (1997)))). TheAnderson opinion, expressly stated that the proponent must prove that his own "Fourth Amendment" rights were violated.

Thus, this case was not one where the place to be searched could only be narrowed with the benefit of hindsight. Cf. State v. Anderson, 84 Hawai‘i 462, 470, 935 P.2d 1007, 1015 (1997) (upholding a search warrant discovered to be overbroad only with the benefit of hindsight because its constitutionality had to be judged "in light of the information available to the police officers at the time the search warrant was issued"). Several people participated in serving the search warrant: Officers Marco Segobia, Stephen Parker, Kyle Hirayama, Edward Lewis, Joseph Stender, and Reubin Pukahi; Detectives Sean Smith, Jeremy Lewis, and Michael Hardie; and Lieutenant Sherry Bird.

Pattioay, 78 Hawai'i at 466 , 896 P.2d at 922 ... (citation omitted). *182 State v. Anderson, 84 Hawai'i 462 , 466-67, 935 P.2d 1007 , 1011-12 (1997) (brackets and emphases omitted). III. Discussion

[T]he proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing not only that the evidence sought to be excluded was unlawfully secured, but also, that his or her own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the search and seizure sought to be challenged.State v. Anderson, 84 Hawai'i 462, 467, 935 P.2d 1007, 1012 (1997) (internal citations, quotation marks, brackets, and emphases omitted). Rather than constitutional issues, however, this appeal concerns whether the blood evidence was secured in a manner that complies with our statute, HRS § 291E-21(c).

The proponent of the motion to suppress must satisfy this burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Anderson, 84 Hawai'i 462, 467, 935 P.2d 1007, 1012 (1997) (internal citations, quotation marks, brackets, and emphases omitted). The appellate court reviews a "circuit court's ruling on a motion to suppress de novo to determine whether the ruling was 'right' or 'wrong.'"