State v. Allred

8 Citing cases

  1. State v. Warner

    257 P.3d 467 (Utah Ct. App. 2011)

    ¶ 3 "We will not reverse a trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Allred, 2002 UT App 291, ¶ 9, 55 P.3d 1158 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for mistrial based on Officer Benson's testimony about outstanding traffic warrants because the court's analysis regarding that testimony was contradictory and the court failed to give the jury a curative instruction.

  2. State v. Levin

    101 P.3d 846 (Utah Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 7 times
    Stating that defendant opened the door to evidence of prior drug convictions "by testifying that `I don't smoke marijuana'"

    ¶ 7 "`In reviewing the trial court's denial of [a defendant's] motion to suppress, we examine the underlying factual findings for clear error, and review the trial court's conclusions of law based thereon for correctness.'" State v. Allred, 2002 UT App 291, ¶ 8, 55 P.3d 1158 (quoting State v. Hayes, 860 P.2d 968, 971 (Utah Ct.App. 1993)). However, because the determination of custody is fact-sensitive and "`the facts to which the legal rule is to be applied are so complex and varying that no rule adequately addressing the relevance of all these facts can be spelled out,'" we recognize that the trial court has a degree of discretion "unless such determination exceeds established legal boundaries."

  3. State v. Graydon

    2023 UT App. 4 (Utah Ct. App. 2023)   Cited 1 times

    ¶63 Moreover, in past cases, Utah appellate courts have repeatedly held that a curative instruction was an appropriate alternative to a mistrial. See, e.g., State v. Vallejo, 2019 UT 38, ¶¶ 90- 100, 449 P.3d 39; State v. Neilson, 2017 UT App 7, ¶¶ 16-19, 391 P.3d 398; State v. Allred, 2002 UT App 291, ¶¶ 19-20, 55 P.3d 1158. And there's good reason to think that the curative instruction here effectively ameliorated any harm caused by Officer 1's comment.

  4. State v. Mills

    2012 UT App. 367 (Utah Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 13 times
    Concluding "[t]he overall length, form, and circumstances of the voluntary, transcontinental telephone interview simply do not rise to the level of being so long, so draining, or so fierce as to be problematic under Miranda"

    See State v. Maestas, 2012 UT App 53, ¶ 50, 272 P.3d 769;see also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 324, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (per curiam) (“[A] police officer's subjective view that the individual under questioning is a suspect, if undisclosed, does not bear upon the question [of] whether the individual is in custody for purposes of Miranda.”). This factor weighs in favor of a determination of custody, as Butterfield effectively conveyed to Mills that he was the sole focus the investigation at the time of the interview. Compare State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1148 (Utah 1996) (finding a focus on the accused where “Officer Mangelson explicitly stated his conclusion of illegal conduct and, in effect, directed Mirquet to retrieve incriminating evidence from his car”), with State v. Allred, 2002 UT App 291, ¶ 13, 55 P.3d 1158 (“Defendant was not the sole focus of the investigation; the officers asked the same questions to all six individuals in an attempt to identify the bag's owner.”). ¶ 22 The third factor involves the presence or absence of “objective indicia of arrest.

  5. State v. Levin

    156 P.3d 178 (Utah Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 3 times
    Approving an interrogation of over an hour as “a reasonable amount of time for the officers to pursue their investigation” under the circumstances

    We conclude, however, that the length of the stop was a reasonable amount of time for the officers to pursue their investigation of driving under the influence and possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. Specifically: three suspects were involved, see State v. Allred 2002 UT App 291, ¶ 13, 55 P.3d 1158 (observing that the questioning of six suspects for up to forty minutes did not weigh in favor of a custody determination); there was noted difficulty getting all three suspects out of the car due to one suspect's physical disability; Deputy Keith conducted an open container search of the vehicle involving a number of containers and a search of one suspect's belongings; Deputy Keith called two drug recognition experts for assistance; the interrogation site was in a rural area, making it unlikely the drug recognition experts arrived immediately, see People v. Forster, 29 Cal.App.4th 1746, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 705, 709-10 (1994) (noting that although detention of "a little more than an hour" was "a relatively long one," that amount of time was reasonable because it was time spent awaiting for requisite officer to arrive); State v. Garbutt, 173 Vt. 277, 790 A.2d 444, 449-50 (2001) (determining that seventy-five minute detention, "although longer than the average roadside st

  6. State v. Bertoch

    2005 UT App. 68 (Utah Ct. App. 2005)

    '" State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, ¶ 12, 78 P.3d 590 (quoting State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 26, 63 P.3d 650). "`In reviewing the trial court's denial of [a defendant's] motion to suppress, we examine the underlying factual findings for clear error, and review the trial court's conclusions of law based thereon for correctness.'" State v. Allred, 2002 UT App 291, ¶ 8, 55 P.3d 1158 (citation omitted). First, Bertoch argues that the pipe and marijuana discovered during the highway patrol trooper's initial frisk should be suppressed because, as Bertoch contends, the trooper lacked a reasonable belief that Bertoch was armed and dangerous.

  7. State v. Bertoch

    2004 UT App. 470 (Utah Ct. App. 2004)

    '" State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, ¶ 12, 78 P.3d 590 (quoting State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 26, 63 P.3d 650). "`In reviewing the trial court's denial of [a defendant's] motion to suppress, we examine the underlying factual findings for clear error, and review the trial court's conclusions of law based thereon for correctness.'" State v. Allred, 2002 UT App 291, ¶ 8, 55 P.3d 1158 (citation omitted). First, Bertoch argues that the pipe and marijuana discovered during the highway patrol trooper's initial frisk should be suppressed because, as Bertoch contends, the trooper lacked a reasonable belief that Bertoch was armed and dangerous.

  8. State v. Gardner

    2002 UT App. 404 (Utah Ct. App. 2002)

    Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Miranda warnings were unnecessary for either interview because Defendant was not in custody.See State v. Allred, 2002 UT App 291,¶¶ 12-13, 55 P.3d 1158. Furthermore, even if we were to conclude that Defendant was in custody, Defendant voluntarily waived his rights. Finally, based on our review of the record, neither interview was coercive.