Under Oklahoma law, "[t]here is a statutory presumption that every estate in land granted by a deed shall be deemed an estate in fee simple unless limited by express words." Cleary Petroleum Corp. v. Harrison, 1980 OK 188, ¶ 8, 621 P.2d 528 (citing 16 O.S. [now 2011] § 29: "Every estate in land which shall be granted, conveyed or demised by deed or will shall be deemed an estate in fee simple and of inheritance, unless limited by express words."). In support of this argument, Riverbend relies on, among others, 16 O.S. 2011 § 29 and State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Allison, 1962 OK 151, ¶ 5, 372 P.2d 850 ("The right to 'access, light, air or view' constitutes 'abutters rights' which are now recognized in most jurisdictions. These rights are in the nature of easements belonging to the owners of property abutting public highways, and they exist regardless of whether the State owns the fee of the highway, or merely an easement therefor.
Cleary Petroleum Corp. v. Harrison , 1980 OK 188, ¶ 8, 621 P.2d 528 (citing 16 O.S. [now 2011] § 29: "Every estate in land which shall be granted, conveyed or demised by deed or will shall be deemed an estate in fee simple and of inheritance, unless limited by express words."). In support of this argument, Riverbend relies on, among others, 16 O.S. 2011 § 29 and State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Allison , 1962 OK 151, ¶ 5, 372 P.2d 850 ("The right to ‘access, light, air or view’ constitutes ‘abutters rights’ which are now recognized in most jurisdictions. These rights are in the nature of easements belonging to the owners of property abutting public highways, and they exist regardless of whether the State owns the fee of the highway, or merely an easement therefor.
Under Oklahoma law, that fee simple estate or interest included abutter's rights. See,State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Allison, 372 P.2d 850, 851 (Okla. 1962) (“The right to ‘access, light, air or view' constitutes ‘abutters rights' which are now recognized in most jurisdictions. These rights are in the nature of easements belonging to the owners of property abutting public highways, and they exist regardless of whether the State owns the fee of the highway, or merely an easement therefor.”) (citations omitted).
The easements of light, air, view, and access have only a nominal value apart from the abutting property, the real injury suffered by the owner lying in the effect produced on his abutting lands by the wrongful interference with the easements, and their value is measured not by the value of the easements separately, but by the damage which the property sustains in consequence of their loss, and the effect of such loss on the market value. [29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 167, cited in State v. Allison, 372 P.2d 850 (Okla. 1962)]. It is well established that:
. . . the loss of view occasioned by a proposed public structure to be erected, in part at least upon a parcel of property taken by condemnation from a unit of property, so far as constituting a factor to be considered in determining severance damage, is to be measured by the effect the obstruction of the view, created by the structure, has upon the market value of the residue of the unit of property. . . . Housing Authority of City of Seattle, 68 Wn.2d 485, 413 P.2d 635, 638 (1966); also see 8.4 A.L.R.2d 348, Anno: Interference with view as matter for consideration in eminent domain, Sec. 4, p. 360; State v. Allison, Okla., 372 P.2d 850 (1962); Pierpont Inn, Inc. v. State, 70 Cal.2d 282, 74 Cal.Rptr. 521, 449 P.2d 737 (1969). Where the construction and operation of the project for which land was condemned results in interference with the privacy of abutting owners, it has been held that such loss is an element of damages which should be considered in ascertaining the compensation to which such abutting owner is entitled. . . .
In Hostutler v. State of Oklahoma on Relation of the Commissioners of the Land Office, Okla., 302 P.2d 983, we held that before a judgment will be reversed on account of the admission of incompetent evidence, it must affirmatively appear that the evidence probably resulted prejudicially to the interests of the one making the objection thereto. In State ex rel. Dept. of Highways v. Allison, Okla., 372 P.2d 850, we held that where, over proper objection, incompetent evidence is introduced which is prejudicial to the complaining party, the admission of such evidence constitutes reversible error. In the instant action, the Authority objected to the admission of the incompetent evidence and protected its record.