We have traditionally permitted the admission of evidence for such a purpose in cases of assault or abuse of a child. See Pratt, 2015 ME 167, ¶ 24, 130 A.3d 381; State v. Allen, 2006 ME 20, ¶ 19, 892 A.2d 447. In Pratt, we held that evidence that the defendant had assaulted the victim fifteen hours before the victim was killed "was relevant, and therefore admissible, concerning . . . identity . . . and the relationship of the parties."

[¶21] The State offered plausible—but ultimately unpersuasive—arguments regarding the admissibility of that evidence, including that it was cumulative of other evidence admitted at trial and that the inquiry to Miller was intended to cause the witness to acknowledge that she had reviewed evidence that suggested that Carrillo's confessions to law enforcement officers were not false. See State v. Allen, 2006 ME 20, ¶ 24, 892 A.2d 447; In re Soriah B., 2010 ME 130, ¶ 18, 8 A.3d 1256; M.R. Evid. 703. Whatever the prosecutor's motive or understanding in the moment the question was asked, the trial court found that it was not the result of bad faith by the State, and we have no reason to second guess that determination.

[¶ 3] In 2003, the parents' 21–month–old son, Nathaniel, died. The mother was convicted of manslaughter for Nathaniel's death, seeState v. Allen , 2006 ME 20, 892 A.2d 447, and the father was convicted of assaulting him the night before he died, seeState v. Allen , 2006 ME 21, 892 A.2d 456. Ten years after they were convicted, the mother and father became parents to the twins who are the subject of this proceeding.

[¶ 4] The following facts are drawn from the court's findings, all of which are supported by competent evidence in the record, and from the lengthy procedural record. SeeIn re Gabriel W. , 2017 ME 133, ¶ 3, 166 A.3d 982. Evelyn and Elijah are twins born prematurely in October 2013. Six days after they were born, the Department petitioned for a preliminary protection order on the ground that the twins' parents had been convicted of crimes perpetrated against their first child, Nathaniel, who died due to the mother's abuse within the first year after they had adopted him. Specifically, in 2005, the mother had been convicted of manslaughter (Class A), 17–A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A) (2016), seeState v. Allen , 2006 ME 20, ¶ 1, 892 A.2d 447 (affirming conviction), and the father had been convicted of assault of a person under the age of six (Class C), 17–A M.R.S. § 207(1)(B) (2016), seeState v. Allen , 2006 ME 21, ¶ 1, 892 A.2d 456 (affirming conviction). Because the statutes pursuant to which the parents were convicted have not been amended since their convictions, we cite the current codification of those statutes.

[¶ 10] For instance, in State v. Allen , although there was no direct evidence as to how the defendant inflicted the fatal injury, we concluded that a conviction for manslaughter was supported by sufficient record evidence "[g]iven the ample medical testimony about the timing, presentation, and cause of [the toddler's] injuries." 2006 ME 20, ¶¶ 25–27, 892 A.2d 447 (explaining that the State presented evidence that the toddler was alone with the defendant at the time of the injury, the cause of death was consistent with inflicted trauma to the head rather than an accidental fall as the defendant claimed, and the evidence was not consistent with an alternative cause of death posited by the defendant); see alsoState v. Chapman , 496 A.2d 297, 304–05 (Me. 1985) (upholding a manslaughter conviction based on evidence that the child died of an inflicted brain injury, the defendant was alone with the child at the time the injury had taken place, and the defendant's explanation for the injury was both improbable and inconsistent with the medical evidence, even where there was no direct evidence as to exactly how the defendant inflicted the injury); State v. Tomer , 304 A.2d 80, 83–85 (Me. 1973) (upholding a manslaughter conviction based on evidence that the child died of inflicted injuries where the child was unharmed before the

In so doing, the court mistakenly acted as a fact-finder. See State v. Allen, 2006 ME 20, ¶ 26, 892 A.2d 447 ("The weight to be given to the evidence and the determination of witness credibility are the exclusive province of the jury." (quotation marks omitted)); see also Chenell v. Westbrook College, 324 A.2d 735, 737 (Me. 1974) ("The trial [c]ourt may not substitute [its] judgment as to the credibility of witnesses for the judgment of the jury.").

Furthermore, the evidence regarding the March 2010 events was relevant and admissible as circumstantial evidence that Woodard committed the charged crime through an ongoing scheme of accepting out-of-state bottles for redemption. SeeM.R. Evid. 401, 402, 404(b); State v. Allen, 2006 ME 20, ¶ 18, 892 A.2d 447 (stating that evidence is admissible notwithstanding Rule 404(b) “to show lack of accident, design, motive, knowledge, plan, scheme, and identity” because such evidence is not offered to show action in conformity with a character trait). [¶ 29] That Woodard was not also charged with attempted theft by deception, see17–A M.R.S. §§ 152, 354 (2012), for his role in the March 2010 bottle delivery, which was interrupted by Trahan and local police, does not change this outcome.

[¶ 16] Relevant evidence is admissible, M.R. Evid. 402, unless it is excluded for some reason other than its relevancy. See State v. Allen, 2006 ME 20, ¶ 18, 892 A.2d 447, 453. In this instance, the court excluded the evidence based on its assessment that, pursuant to M.R. Evid. 403, it would mislead the jury to consider matters that were the subject of separate civil cases and did not bear directly on the crimes for which Filler was being tried.

"Any conflicts in evidence are resolved in favor of the State." State v. Allen , 2006 ME 20, ¶ 26, 892 A.2d 447. 1. Factual Findings

[¶ 54] Assessing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the jury, based on the evidence presented, could have found that the baby was home with Hopkins and Hopkins's two older sons at the time of his death, the baby's cause of death was consistent with severe inflicted trauma rather than an act of a sleeping person or falling, and the evidence was not consistent with the alternative cause of death asserted by Hopkins—that her older boys were responsible for the baby's death. SeeState v. Allen , 2006 ME 20, ¶¶ 25-27, 892 A.2d 447 (holding that there was sufficient evidence supporting the defendant's manslaughter conviction where the State presented evidence that the toddler was alone with the defendant at the time of injury, the cause of death was consistent with inflicted trauma rather than an accidental fall as the defendant claimed, and the evidence was not consistent with an alternative cause of death advanced by the defendant). The evidence was sufficient to support Hopkins's conviction of manslaughter.