The above quotations are taken from the opinion in Spring Garden Ins. Co. v. Imperial Tobacco Co., 132 Ky. 7, 116 S.W. 234, 235, 20 L.R.A., N.S., 277, 279, 280, 136 Am.St.Rep. 164, cited in appellant's brief. To sustain its claim that the burning of the factory in the case at bar was the culmination of a riot and within the definition of the Oregon statute appellant cites and comments on a number of criminal cases decided by Oregon courts: State v. Mizis, 48 Or. 165, 85 P. 611, 86 P. 361; State v. Seeley, 51 Or. 131, 94 P. 37; and State v. Allen, 152 Or. 422, 53 P.2d 1054. It would require too much space to discuss these cases at length; it is sufficient to point out that in each of them the facts comported with the common understanding of a riot as expressed in the citations of authority heretofore quoted. The conduct of the participants in each case was boisterous and disorderly. They all involved disturbances connected with force and violence and the use of firearms, always resulted in someone being hurt, and in every case, with a single exception, one or more persons were killed.

However, this court has long recognized that a defendant may not resist arrest merely because the arrest was unlawful. See State v. Wright, 310 Or. 430, 433, 799 P.2d 642 (1990) (unlawful arrest provides no defense to charge of resisting arrest as long as “officer was acting under color of official authority”); State v. Allen, 152 Or. 422, 53 P.2d 1054 (1936) (same). Implicit in those cases is the proposition that a defendant's decision to resist arrest attenuates the taint of the unlawful arrest.

The capacity of legislators to combine or disagree over sections, sentences, clauses, or even single words in a bill may be illimitable, but logrolling becomes a concern only when proposed legislation embraces more than one subject and matters properly connected therewith — a circumstance not presented here. Defendant's proposed rule effectively would require that each act contain but a single provision — a result that this court has rejected. See, e.g., State v. Allen, 152 Or. 422, 429-30, 53 P.2d 1054 (1936) ("[W]hile the subject must be single, the provisions involved may be multifarious."). Defendant contends, in the alternative, that SB 936 has two distinct purposes — to "`protect crime victims' rights'" and "`to ensure the prosecution and conviction of persons who have committed criminal acts.'"

Some of this court's earlier cases also examined both the body and the title of an act in adjudicating a one-subject challenge under Article IV, section 20. See, e.g., State v. Allen, 152 Or. 422, 430, 53 P.2d 1054 (1936) (illustrating process); Lovejoy, 95 Or at 465-68 (same). See also Warren, 222 Or at 323 (in a case in which both body- and title-based arguments were made, the court noted the "corollary" connection between the two; as to the body-based claim, the court considered the provisions of the act in question, but did so by utilizing the subject of the act expressed in the title as a referent).

A reading of these cases reveals that in those cases several defendants were jointly indicted, whereas each defendant was separately indicted in these cases, and the sufficiency of the indictments was not an issue in those cases. State v. Mizis, 48 Or. 165, 167, 85 P. 611, 86 P. 361 (1906); State v. Allen, 152 Or. 422, 53 P.2d 1054 (1936); State v. Seeley, 51 Or. 131, 132, 94 P. 37 (1908); and State v. Stephanus, 53 Or. 135, 136, 99 P. 428 (1909). Indeed, in Newby v. Territory of Oregon, 1 Or. 173 (1855), objection was made that an instruction to the jury that defendants were guilty of riot if they "* * * or any of them, and others to the number of three or more, assembled with an intent to whip Miller * * *" was "too broad and general."

Thus, it is the general rule that all matters, however diverse they may be, which have a logical or natural connection with or are germane to the general subject, may properly be included in one statute. See Statutory Construction, by Crawford, section 98, page 138; Johnson v. Harrison, supra, 47 Minn. 575, 50 N.W. 923, 28 Am. St. Rep. 382; Allen v. State, 129 Neb. 722, 262 N.W. 675; City of Owensboro v. Hazel, 229 Ky. 752, 17 S.W.2d 1031; State v. Allen, 152 Or. 422, 53 P.2d 1054. In the Nebraska case it was said the "subject" of an Act is the matter or thing which forms the ground work thereof, and may include many parts or things so long as they are germane to it and are such that, if traced back, will lead the mind to the subject as the generic lead.

The evils aimed at by the constitutional provision in question and the liberal construction which it should bear, have been more than once explained and announced by this court, and there is no need of further elaboration at this time. See, State v. Allen, 152 Or. 422, 428, 53 P.2d 1054; Lovejoy v. Portland, 95 Or. 459, 465, 188 P. 207, 209. As stated in the former case, the provision "was not intended to restrict the scope or magnitude of a single subject of a legislative act, and that, while the subject must be single, the provisions involved may be multifarious" ( 152 Or. 429).

Nothing is contained in the act except what is indicated by the title and matters which are germane thereto. See State v. Allen, 152 Or. 422, 429, 53 P.2d 1054, where the question is thoroughly discussed and which needs no amplification. See also State v. Shaw, 22 Or. 287, 289, 29 P. 1028, 1029.

While admittedly not necessary to state a crime, the names of the minimum number of alleged co-rioters serves to more "fully apprise [defendant] of the nature and identity of the offense, which he is called to answer," State v. O'Donald, 12 SCL 532, 533, 10 Am Dec 691 (1822), and consistent with the search for truth which is basic to every judicial proceeding, furnishes the defendant with information which serves to make definite that with which he is charged. In reviewing the Oregon cases in which riot was charged, the following cases disclose the indictment either alleged the identity of the alleged co-rioters or that their names were unknown, or both: State v. Mizis, 48 Or. 165, 167, 85 P. 611, 86 P. 361 (1906); State v. Allen, 152 Or. 422, 53 P.2d 1054 (1936); State v. Seeley, 51 Or. 131, 132, 94 P. 37 (1908); State v. Stephanus, 53 Or. 135, 136, 99 P. 428 (1909). We agree with the order of the trial court which sustained the demurrer "on the grounds that the indictment fails to allege the names of the co-rioters, or in the alternative allege their names to be, to the Grand Jury, unknown."