Opinion
No. 37213-4-II.
January 13, 2009.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Clark County, No. 07-8-01152-3, Barbara D. Johnson, J., entered December 19, 2007.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Bridgewater, J., concurred in by Penoyar, A.C.J., and Hunt, J.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
A.L.G. appeals her Clark County conviction of being a minor in possession/consumption of alcohol, RCW 66.44.270(2). She contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support that conviction. We affirm.
Initials are used to refer to A.L.G. because she is a minor, and this court has determined that some measure of anonymity is appropriate.
A commissioner of this court reviewed the matter pursuant to the State's motion on the merits, RAP 18.14, and referred it to a panel of judges.
FACTS
A.L.G. came to the attention of the Vancouver Police because her mother came to look for her at Evergreen Park, while the police were investigating a shooting. A.L.G. had telephoned earlier to ask for a ride home, but when her mother got to the park, the police would not let her enter. Officer Blaise Geddry told her to stay in the area, and he would look for A.L.G.
Sometime later, Officer Geddry came upon A.L.G. walking along a street a short distance from the park. In the process of confirming her identity, he smelled intoxicants on her breath. He asked her if she had been drinking, and she answered that she had "just had two beers at a friend's." RP (Dec. 19, 2007) at 27. She declined to name the friend. Officer Geddry also asked her if she had been in the park that evening, and she admitted that she had been there, "[h]anging with [her] homies." RP (Dec. 19, 2007) at 27. He arrested her for being a minor in possession of alcohol, but turned her over to her mother.
At trial, in addition to the facts described above, the State presented evidence that police officers had discovered several beer cans and a "Tutti Fruity" container on or near a picnic table and gazebo in the park. RP (Dec. 19, 2007) at 9. Some of the containers were empty; others were partially full. The juvenile court convicted A.L.G. on these undisputed facts, and this appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
A.L.G. contends that this evidence is insufficient to support her conviction because (1) it does not show that she was under the influence of alcohol or near containers of alcoholic beverages, and (2) it does not show that she consumed any alcohol in Washington.
Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, it would permit any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). An insufficiency claim admits the truth of the State's evidence and requires that all reasonable inferences be drawn in favor of the State and interpreted most strongly against the defendant. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d at 201. Circumstantial evidence is equally as reliable as direct evidence. State v. Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99 (1980).
The State charged A.L.G. under RCW 66.44.270(2)(a) and (b). Subsection (2)(a) makes it unlawful "for any person under the age of twenty-one years to possess, consume, or otherwise acquire any liquor." Subsection (2)(b) provides that:
It is unlawful for a person under the age of twenty-one years to be in a public place . . . while exhibiting the effects of having consumed liquor. For purposes of this subsection, exhibiting the effects of having consumed liquor means that a person has the odor of liquor on his or her breath and either: (i) Is in possession of or close proximity to a container that has or recently had liquor in it; or (ii) by speech, manner, appearance, behavior, lack of coordination, or otherwise, exhibits that he or she is under the influence of liquor.
The juvenile court found A.L.G. guilty under both subsections.
We agree with A.L.G. that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction under RCW 66.44.270(2)(b). There was no evidence that she was affected by the alcohol she admitted drinking. Neither was the testimony about the alcoholic beverage containers found in the park adequate to connect her with them. However, the smell of alcohol on a minor's breath, coupled with the minor's admission of drinking alcohol is sufficient to support a finding of guilt under RCW 66.44.270(2)(a). See State v. Walton, 67 Wn. App. 127, 834 P.2d 624 (1992).
A.L.G. contends that Walton is not determinative here because the State did not prove jurisdiction, having failed to produce any evidence about the location of her friend's house. She argues that because Vancouver borders Oregon, there is a reasonable doubt about whether the friend's house was in Washington or Oregon.
In Walton, jurisdiction was not an issue. Walton was contacted outside an apartment in which some juveniles were having a party, and he admitted drinking beer at the party.
RCW 9A.04.030(1) provides the State with criminal jurisdiction if a person "commits in the state any crime, in whole or in part." The State bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. L.J.M., 129 Wn.2d 386, 392, 918 P.2d 898 (1996); State v. Daniels, 104 Wn. App. 271, 274, 16 P.3d 650 (2001). The proof may consist of circumstantial evidence. See State v. Vickers, 18 Wn. App. 111, 114-15, 567 P.2d 675 (1977).
Here, the evidence showed that A.L.G. had alcohol on her breath when Officer Geddry talked to her. She was on foot at the time, and she had called her mother to pick her up at the park. She admitted that she had spent some time there that evening, "[h]anging with [her] homies." RP (Dec. 19, 2007) at 27. The reasonable inferences from this evidence are that her friends were from Vancouver, and she had spent the evening in Vancouver.
This was enough for a prima facie showing that jurisdiction existed. At that point, A.L.G. had to point to evidence that, if true, would be sufficient to defeat jurisdiction. L.M.J., 129 Wn.2d at 395. There was no such evidence. A.L.G.'s statement that she had drunk beer at a friend's house did not suggest that the house was in another state. It does not cast reasonable doubt upon the prima facie evidence of jurisdiction.
The judgment is affirmed.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
HUNT, J. and PENOYAR, A.C.J., concur.