State v. Alford

12 Citing cases

  1. Eyman v. Alford

    448 F.2d 306 (9th Cir. 1971)   Cited 7 times

    We reverse. Appellee exhausted his state remedies by appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court (State v. Alford, 98 Ariz. 124, 402 P.2d 551), denied June 3, 1965 and Motion for Rehearing (State v. Alford, 98 Ariz. 249, 403 P.2d 806) denied June 29, 1965. Application for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States was made June 28, 1965, and on January 24, 1966, the United States Supreme Court entered the following order (Alford v. Arizona, 382 U.S. 1020, 86 S.Ct. 625, 15 L.Ed.2d 535):

  2. State v. Hurles

    185 Ariz. 199 (Ariz. 1996)   Cited 27 times
    Holding that insanity statute did not vitiate the presumption of innocence or negate the State's burden of proof

    We find no support for Hurles' proposition that Arizona recognizes a distinct plea of "not guilty-by-reason-of-insanity." See State v. Alford, 98 Ariz. 249, 250, 403 P.2d 806, 807 (1965) ("The rule . . . that in a prosecution for homicide, defendant, under the general plea of not guilty, may set up the defense of insanity . . . has not been changed by adoption of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.") (emphasis added). Thus, Arizona maintains a distinction between recognized pleas and affirmative defenses, such as insanity.

  3. State v. Ortiz

    492 P.2d 397 (Ariz. 1972)

    There are different standards of insanity and incompetency. State v. Alford, 98 Ariz. 124, 402 P.2d 551, reh. den. 98 Ariz. 249, 403 P.2d 806 (1965), cert. den. 382 U.S. 1020, 86 S.Ct. 625, 15 L.Ed.2d 535, reh. den. 384 U.S. 1028, 86 S.Ct. 1937, 16 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1966). "A person may be mentally competent to stand trial although upon other subjects his mind may be unsound.

  4. State v. Kennedy

    472 P.2d 59 (Ariz. 1970)   Cited 25 times
    In State v. Kennedy, 106 Ariz. 190, 472 P.2d 59 (1970), we stated that it is presumed the trial court takes into consideration the time served in county jail prior to sentencing the defendant.

    We have held that the court should consider not only the circumstances of the offense but the moral character and the past conduct of the defendant. State v. Foggy, 101 Ariz. 459, 420 P.2d 934, cert. den., 386 U.S. 1025, 87 S.Ct. 1386, 18 L.Ed.2d 468, reh. den., 387 U.S. 938, 87 S.Ct. 2060, 18 L.Ed.2d 1008; State v. Horton, 101 Ariz. 229, 418 P.2d 385; State v. Tuggle, 101 Ariz. 216, 418 P.2d 372; State v. Bradley, 99 Ariz. 328, 409 P.2d 35; State v. Sowards, 99 Ariz. 22, 406 P.2d 202; State v. Wallace, 98 Ariz. 243, 403 P.2d 550; State v. Alford, 98 Ariz. 124, 402 P.2d 551, rehearing den. 98 Ariz. 249, 403 P.2d 806, cert. den., 382 U.S. 1020, 86 S.Ct. 625, 15 L.Ed.2d 535, reh. den. 384 U.S. 1028, 86 S.Ct. 1937, 16 L.Ed.2d 1047. A trial court must necessarily have a wide latitude in its determination of a proper sentence in order to meet the objectives for sentencing, particularly that of rehabilitation. It is mandatory that the court, under Rule 336, Rules Cr.Proc., 17 A.R.S., if upon suggestion of either party, must hear evidence as to circumstances summarily in open court โ€” either at a special time or upon notice to the adverse party as the court directs, or the court may inquire into such circumstances of its own motion.

  5. State v. Griswold

    457 P.2d 331 (Ariz. 1969)   Cited 66 times
    In State v. Griswold, 105 Ariz. 1, 457 P.2d 331 (1969), we took the position that the decision in Boykin, supra, would only be applied prospectively.

    We stated: "While `plea bargaining' is recognized, a guilty plea procured by `fraud or duress' is ground for setting aside a judgment on the plea of guilty. State v. Murray, 101 Ariz. 469, 421 P.2d 317; and Silver v. State, 37 Ariz. 418, 423, 295 P. 311. Pleading guilty is the same as if defendant had been tried before a jury and been found guilty. State v. Alford, 98 Ariz. 249, 403 P.2d 806; State v. Anderson, 96 Ariz. 123, 392 P.2d 784; and State v. Fry, 95 Ariz. 68, 386 P.2d 794. Thus, once the plea is made the court has only to determine whether the plea is voluntary. Benton v. United States, 9th Cir., 352 F.2d 59. It is well understood that any plea which is involuntary is of course void. "The courts are careful to see that the plea of guilty is made voluntarily, after proper advice and explanation by the court with a full understanding of its consequences.

  6. Department of Liquor Control v. Santucci

    17 Ohio St. 2d 69 (Ohio 1969)   Cited 23 times
    Observing that "[liquor control] commission proceedings have traditionally been deemed civil"

    The cases from other jurisdictions generally hold that by a plea of guilty, understandingly and voluntarily made, the accused admits the allegations of fact charged in the complaint against him, and he may not later successfully contend that there was no evidence presented. See Johnston v. United States (C.A. 8), 254 F.2d 239; Davidson v. United States (C.A. 10), 349 F.2d 530; State v. Alford, 98 Ariz. 124, 402 P.2d 551; State v. Alford, 98 Ariz. 249, 403 P.2d 806; Crisp v. Hudspeth, 162 Kan. 567, 178 P.2d 228; Humphries v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 397 S.W.2d 163; People v. Brown, 13 Ill.2d 32, 147 N.E.2d 336; People v. Milani, 34 Ill.2d 524, 216 N.E.2d 816; State v. Jacobs, 261 Minn. 194, 111 N.W.2d 520; and Rafferty v. State, 29 Wis.2d 470, 138 N.W.2d 741. When appellee admitted before the commission the truth of the charges against him, it was equivalent to testimony on his part that those charges were correct, and accurately stated his wrongful and unlawful conduct.

  7. State v. Jennings

    448 P.2d 59 (Ariz. 1969)   Cited 32 times
    In State v. Jennings, 104 Ariz. 3, at 5, 448 P.2d 59, at 61 (1968) this Court stated that "[i]t is well understood that any plea which is involuntary is of course void.

    " While "plea bargaining" is recognized, a guilty plea procured by "fraud or duress" is ground for setting aside a judgment on the plea of guilty. State v. Murray, 101 Ariz. 469, 421 P.2d 317; and Silver v. State, 37 Ariz. 418, 423, 295 P. 311. Pleading guilty is the same as if defendant had been tried before a jury and been found guilty. State v. Alford, 98 Ariz. 249, 403 P.2d 806; State v. Anderson, 96 Ariz. 123, 392 P.2d 784; and State v. Fry, 95 Ariz. 68, 386 P.2d 794. Thus, once the plea is made the court has only to determine whether the plea is voluntary. Benton v. United States, 9th Cir., 352 F.2d 59. It is well understood that any plea which is involuntary is of course void. The courts are careful to see that the plea of guilty is made voluntarily, after proper advice and explanation by the court with a full understanding of its consequences.

  8. State v. Dodd

    101 Ariz. 234 (Ariz. 1966)   Cited 27 times
    In State v. Dodd, 101 Ariz. 234, 418 P.2d 571 (1966) our Supreme Court applied ยง 13-1649 where the previous crime was a narcotics offense.

    We have held that where no timely notice of intention to plead insanity is made under Rule 192, A.R.S., it is within the sound discretion of the trial court to decide whether evidence touching upon this defense will be allowed. State v. Alford, 98 Ariz. 249, 403 P.2d 806; State v. Reid, 87 Ariz. 123, 348 P.2d 731. Where the admissibility of testimony is within the discretion of the trial court, its ruling will not be set aside absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Head, 91 Ariz. 246, 371 P.2d 599; State v. Dominguez, 87 Ariz. 149, 348 P.2d 919; Hadley v. State, 25 Ariz. 23, 212 P. 458. Because of defendant's failure to attempt compliance with the notice rule, we find no abuse of discretion in the instant case.

  9. State v. Janovic

    417 P.2d 527 (Ariz. 1966)   Cited 13 times

    This is a matter which has been uniformly left to the discretion of the trial court. State v. Alford, 98 Ariz. 124, 402 P.2d 551, reh. den. 98 Ariz. 249, 403 P.2d 806, cert. den. 382 U.S. 1020, 86 S.Ct. 625, 15 L.Ed.2d 535; State v. Robinson, 89 Ariz. 224, 360 P.2d 474; Patten v. State, 50 Ariz. 32, 68 P.2d 669; Shaughnessy v. State, 43 Ariz. 445, 32 P.2d 337. We see no reason to deviate from that rule at the present time.

  10. State v. Starks

    20 Ariz. App. 274 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973)   Cited 5 times

    State v. Lopez, 99 Ariz. 11, 405 P.2d 892 (1965); State v. Murphy, 97 Ariz. 14, 396 P.2d 250 (1964). Appellant's assertion of error involves a nonjurisdictional defense, therefore he has waived this assertion based upon his plea of guilty. State v. Alford, 98 Ariz. 249, 403 P.2d 806 (1965). Affirmed.