Opinion
No. 38482-9-III
03-14-2023
STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Lindsey Dominique ALBRIGHT, Appellant.
Gregory Charles Link, Kate Huber, Washington Appellate Project, 1511 3rd Ave., Ste. 610, Seattle, WA, 98101-1683, for Appellant. Bret Allen Roberts, Yakima County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, 128 N 2nd St., Rm. 329, Yakima, WA, 98901-2621, for Respondent.
Gregory Charles Link, Kate Huber, Washington Appellate Project, 1511 3rd Ave., Ste. 610, Seattle, WA, 98101-1683, for Appellant.
Bret Allen Roberts, Yakima County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, 128 N 2nd St., Rm. 329, Yakima, WA, 98901-2621, for Respondent.
PUBLISHED OPINION
Pennell, J.
¶1 Two years after his conviction, Lindsey Albright filed a motion to compel discovery from the State. Mr. Albright did not cite any exceptional circumstances to justify his motion. He merely referenced superior court criminal rules governing a defendant's right of access to their own lawyer's file. The trial court denied the motion.
¶2 We affirm. The rules requiring a defense attorney to disclose their files to their client do not transfer to the State. When it comes to the State, postconviction discovery is generally unavailable absent a showing of extraordinary good cause. Because Mr. Albright did not make this showing, the trial court correctly denied his motion.
FACTS
¶3 In May 2019, Lindsey Albright entered an Alford plea to one count of first-degree assault. The superior court accepted Mr. Albright's plea and sentenced him to 120 months’ confinement plus 60 months for a firearm enhancement.
North Carolina v. Alford , 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970).
¶4 In September 2021, Mr. Albright filed a pro se "Motion to Compel State for Discovery." Clerk's Papers at 20-22. In his motion, Mr. Albright sought "an order to Compel State to disclose discovery. ... [p]ursuant to CrR 4.7(g)(h)." Id . at 20. The trial court denied the motion.
¶5 Mr. Albright timely appeals.
ANALYSIS
¶6 Mr. Albright argues that the State is required to produce discovery materials posttrial pursuant to our decision in State v. Padgett , 4 Wash. App. 2d 851, 424 P.3d 1235 (2018). He is incorrect. Padgett addressed an individual's right to obtain materials from their own attorney, not the right to obtain discovery from the State.
¶7 Attorneys have ongoing obligations to their clients, even after the close of a particular case or the termination of representation. See RPC 1.16(d). An attorney's post-representation obligations to a client include surrendering papers, such as a client's file, upon request. See id. ; Wash. State Bar Ass'n Rules of Prof'l Conduct Comm., Advisory Op. 181 (rev. 2009), available at https://ao.wsba.org/searchresult.aspx?year=#=181&arch=False&rpc=&keywords=. Based on an attorney's ongoing obligations to their client, we held in Padgett that the combined force of RPC 1.16(d) and CrR 4.7(h)(3) means an attorney must turn over a client file at the client's request upon termination of representation. 4 Wash. App. 2d at 854, 424 P.3d 1235. If the client file contains discovery, then the client may be able to receive that discovery as part of the client file, subject to appropriate redactions. Id. at 854-55, 424 P.3d 1235. Because a client's right to their file is rooted in the attorney-client relationship, a client's right to their file is not conditioned on a showing of need. See id. at 854, 424 P.3d 1235.
¶8 The State, on the other hand, does not have obligations to criminally accused persons akin to those of legal counsel. In a criminal case, the State is the defendant's party opponent. The State has an obligation to produce discovery during the pendency of a criminal case. See CrR 4.7(a) ; Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). This is a fundamental component of litigation, civil or criminal. But once a case is over, the State's ordinary discovery obligations end. This is true even if a conviction is appealed or challenged through a personal restraint petition. See In re Pers. Restraint of Gentry , 137 Wash.2d 378, 390-91, 972 P.2d 1250 (1999). Courts have inherent power to order discovery in the postconviction context, but only in exceptional circumstances where the requesting party shows "good cause," defined as "a substantial likelihood the discovery will lead to evidence that would compel relief under RAP 16.4(c)." Id. at 390-92, 972 P.2d 1250.
Under RPC 3.8(g), a prosecutor has an ongoing obligation to disclose "new, credible, and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood [ ] that a convicted defendant is innocent."
¶9 Mr. Albright's motion did not assert any exceptional circumstances that would justify postconviction discovery from the State. Instead, he relied solely on CrR 4.7, as interpreted in Padgett . Consistent with Gentry , court rules such as CrR 4.7 do not govern a defendant's request for postconviction discovery from the State. See 137 Wash.2d at 390-91, 972 P.2d 1250. The trial court therefore correctly denied Mr. Albright's motion.
We disagree with the blanket statement in State v. Asaeli that "CrR 4.7 applies only to procedures before trial." 17 Wash. App. 2d 697, 698, 491 P.3d 245 (2021). By its plain terms, CrR 4.7 sometimes applies "during trial." CrR 4.7(h)(2). Furthermore, as explained in Padgett , the combined force of RPC 1.16(d) and CrR 4.7(h)(3) applies to a client's postconviction request for disclosure of their own attorney's client file.
¶10 Mr. Albright certainly is entitled to request his client file from his trial counsel. He may also be entitled to information from a state entity pursuant to a public records request. See ch. 42.56 RCW. But Mr. Albright is not entitled to postconviction discovery from the State, as was requested in his motion to the superior court. CONCLUSION
¶11 The order denying Mr. Albright's motion for discovery is affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
Siddoway, C.J.
Lawrence-Berrey, J.