State v. Akok

6 Citing cases

  1. State v. Crippen

    2016 UT App. 152 (Utah Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 3 times
    Stating that, "although [the defendant]’s statements during the jailhouse phone call" that he had engaged in sexual activity with the witness "were not evidence of a lack of consent, those statements do tend to corroborate [the witness]’s overall account," and holding that the witness's testimony was therefore "not inherently improbable"

    ¶22 We conclude that Victim's testimony to the effect that her seizures prevented her from obtaining a driver license did not prejudice Crippen because such testimony (1) had no direct bearing on the facts of Crippen's case, (2) had no connotation of frailty such that the jury likely developed unfair sympathy for Victim, (3) was not the result of prosecutorial misconduct, and (4) was mitigated via a curative instruction. For this reason, we conclude that the cases Crippen cites in support of his position—State v. Akok , 2015 UT App 89, 348 P.3d 377, and State v. Campos , 2013 UT App 213, 309 P.3d 1160 —are inapposite. Whereas in Campos the prosecutor improperly argued that the jury should punish the defendant because the victim could no longer “walk his daughter down the aisle,” 2013 UT App 213, ¶¶ 48, 53, 309 P.3d 1160, and in Akok the prosecutor contended that the jury “ha[d] a duty to protect the alleged victim” from the defendant, 2015 UT App 89, ¶¶ 15–16, 348 P.3d 377 (alteration in original), in the instant case Crippen does not allege prosecutorial misconduct.

  2. State v. Jok

    2015 UT App. 90 (Utah Ct. App. 2015)   Cited 2 times

    The codefendant was also convicted as charged. He filed a separate appeal, which we also resolve today. See State v. Akok, 2015 UT App 89, 348 P.3d 377. ¶ 11 Defendant argues that the prosecutor's improper statement during the rebuttal portion of his closing argument prejudiced his right to a fair trial.

  3. State v. Lambdin

    2015 UT App. 176 (Utah Ct. App. 2015)   Cited 1 times

    ¶ 5 Second, Lambdin asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he “mis-informed [the jury] on the law of special mitigation by EED” during closing argument. See State v. Akok, 2015 UT App 89, ¶ 11, 348 P.3d 377 (stating that a prosecutor may not “call to the attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in determining its verdict” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). We consider whether the prosecutor's remarks departed from applicable law as a question of law.

  4. State v. Roberts

    2019 UT App. 9 (Utah Ct. App. 2019)   Cited 19 times
    Explaining that trial counsel may have reasonably decided "to reserve for himself the right to argue inferences from the evidence during his own closing argument without increasing the likelihood of the State objecting in return"

    See Hummel , 2017 UT 19, ¶ 110, 393 P.3d 314 ; Dennis , 385 P.2d at 153 & n.2. In support of his argument, Roberts compares the prosecutor's comments to statements made during closing argument in State v. Akok , 2015 UT App 89, 348 P.3d 377, and State v. King , 2010 UT App 396, 248 P.3d 984. Even assuming that the statements made in Akok and King are comparable to those made by the prosecutor in this case, both cases are procedurally inapposite.

  5. State v. Plazola

    2023 UT App. 161 (Utah Ct. App. 2023)   Cited 1 times

    Notably, by encouraging the jury to fall sway to emotion by considering Claudia's "innocence" as she described her neighborhood to the interviewer, the State invited the jury to focus on inadmissible portions of the video and use it in an impermissible way. Cf. State v. Akok, 2015 UT App 89, ¶ 30, 348 P.3d 377 ("The prosecutor's final statement in closing argument appealed to the jurors' emotions, and it was therefore improper . . . .").

  6. State v. Jok

    2019 UT App. 138 (Utah Ct. App. 2019)   Cited 10 times
    Resolving an unpreserved inherent improbability challenge after a bench trial and declining to address "whether the inherent-improbability doctrine applies at all to bench trial verdicts, where the trial court has presumably not only determined that sufficient evidence existed but that this evidence met the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt"

    This court agreed and vacated the judgments of conviction. State v. Jok , 2015 UT App 90, ¶¶ 11, 15, 348 P.3d 385 ; State v. Akok , 2015 UT App 89, ¶¶ 14, 30, 348 P.3d 377. ¶17 On remand, Jok, represented by new counsel, agreed to a bench trial, using the transcript of the first trial as evidence instead of presenting the evidence again.