Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2388-12T3
10-29-2014
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. KOLE AKINOLA, Defendant-Appellant.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (David A. Snyder, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Carolyn A. Murray, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Andrew R. Burroughs, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Reisner and Higbee. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment Nos. 99-06-02289, 99-06-02290, 99-07-02621 and 99-08-02734. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (David A. Snyder, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Carolyn A. Murray, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Andrew R. Burroughs, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief. PER CURIAM
Defendant, Kole Akinola, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm for substantially the same reasons set forth in Judge Sherry Hutchins-Henderson's oral opinion of August 9, 2012.
On this appeal, defendant raises the following argument for our consideration:
POINT ONE
THE DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR PCR RELIEF WAS NOT TIME BARRED UNDER R. 3:22-12(A)(2)(B).
Defendant pled guilty to second degree robbery and related charges on April 14, 2000. He was sentenced to a ten year term. Defendant subsequently filed multiple motions and appeals, including prior PCR petitions, contesting his conviction. He was paroled on August 25, 2008, but upon being paroled he was taken into custody by the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency for deportation.
Defendant filed this petition for PCR in December 2009, alleging his petition was not procedurally barred even though it was his third filed PCR, and it was filed more than a year after he was taken into custody by the immigration agency. The judge found in fact his motion was time barred by Rule 3:22-12(a)(2)B. Under Rule 3:22-12, the time limitation cannot be relaxed. We agree with the judge's reasoning on this point.
In the interest of justice, however, the court first granted the defendant an evidentiary hearing, and then found after the hearing that his claim was not only time barred, but that it failed on the merits. We agree for the reasons set forth in her detailed analysis of the facts and law.
We, therefore, affirm. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION